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JPRS L/10194

16 December 1981

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 12/81)

LOKAL'NYYE VOYNY: ISTORIYA I SOVREMENNOST'



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Moscow LOKAL'NYYE VOYNY: ISTORIYA I SOVREMENNOST' in Russian 1981 (signed to press 13 Jun 80) pp 1-42, 92-95, 126-129, 166-168, 200-203, 227-290, 303

[Annotation, introduction, chapter 1, headings and conclusions of chapters 2-6, chapter 7, conclusion, and table of contents from book "Local War -- History and the Present Day", edited by Army Gen I. Ye. Shavrov, Voenizdat, 30,000 copies, 304 pages]

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Annotation

[Excerpts] This book synthesizes the experience of local wars and major military conflicts from the end of the 19th century to the later half of the 1970's.

The authors comprehensively investigate, from a Marxist-Leninist position, the theory and history of local wars, their place in the global strategy of imperialism, as well as their character and specific features. The authors devote considerable attention to development of the art of warfare taking into account the experience of local military conflicts, as well as exposure of contemporary military concepts and doctrines of the imperialist nations.

This book is intended for scientific workers, teachers, propagandists, and all those who are interested in military problems.

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INTRODUCTION

At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century the attention of the entire world was focused on Central America and Southern Africa, where the Spanish-American and Boer wars had erupted. Although small in spatial scale, they played an important political role, since they were the first landmarks indicating capitalism's entry into its final stage of development -- imperialism.

Imperialism had furnished practical proof that of all the exploiter systems it was distinguished, as V. I. Lenin wrote, "by the least love of peace," "by the greatest tendency toward violence," and therefore "by the greatest tendency toward conflict." The two world wars as well as hundreds of local wars and military conflicts were born precisely in the womb of imperialism.

"Capitalism has become reactionary from progressive," commented V. I. Lenin, characterizing its transition to the monopolist stage. "It has developed productive resources to such an extent that mankind must either change over to socialism or for a period of years and even decades experience armed struggle by the great powers for the artificial preservation of capitalism by means of colonies, monopolies, privileges, and all types of national oppression."¹

Lenin's analysis of capitalism at the imperialist stage of development served as the foundation for the struggle by the working people of Russia, under the guidance of the Communist Party, to overthrow the rule of the exploiters and for socialism. It arms Communists of all countries with a developed program of action, directed against the domination of the monopolies, colonialism and national oppression, and for social progress.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has consistently advocated and continues to advocate peace and international security, harnessing the forces of war and aggression. The 24th and 25th CPSU congresses confirmed the immutability of the party's policy line of doing everything possible to ensure conditions of peaceful construction in our country, for the cause of peace and security of all peoples. "...We shall continue this policy," stated CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "with redoubled energy, seeking to curb the forces of war and aggression, to strengthen world peace, and to guarantee the rights of peoples to freedom, independence, and social progress."²

CPSU foreign policy, aimed at restraining the forces of war and aggression, is grounded on a Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the correlation of forces in the world at each given moment in history. Taken into consideration is the experience of numerous wars unleashed by imperialism, including local wars.

What does this experience tell us?

Having perpetrated such a monstrous crime against mankind as a world war, imperialism had by no means given up local wars.

As forerunners of a world conflagration, local wars fostered its initiation and the formation of hostile coalitions, and became proving grounds for testing the

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latest weapons, new modes and forms of conduct of military operations. As regards local wars as a legacy of the world wars, the experience of history demonstrates that they, just as world wars, do not and cannot resolve the conflicts which are organically inherent in imperialism. The results of the world wars, favorable for one group of monopolists and imperialist powers, proved unfavorable to the other, and this merely aggravated the conflict. Local wars and military conflicts arose on this soil, aimed at "adjusting" the results of the world wars to some degree.

Imperialism has extensively utilized and continues to utilize local wars and conflicts to crush the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the liberation movement of oppressed peoples which, as is indicated by the experience of history, become intensified in connection with world wars.

As we know, World War I fostered maturation of a revolutionary situation in a number of countries. This led to socialist and democratic revolutions, and particularly to the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia.

As a result of the collapse of German fascism and Japanese militarism in World War II, reactionary regimes fell in a number of countries of Europe and Asia, and the national liberation movement acquired great strength, which led to the collapse of the colonial system.

It is characteristic that imperialism resorted to the force of arms time and again, endeavoring to hold back the growth of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the national liberation struggle. We know that since 1945 wars and military conflicts have erupted more than 100 times in various parts of the world through the fault of the forces of imperialism and international reaction, while the number of domestic counterrevolutionary insurrections and military coups is so great that it is difficult to make a count.

Study of the experience of local wars and military conflicts which have taken place since World War II sheds light on the military policy and strategy of world imperialism in the new, changed conditions, which are characterized primarily by strengthening of the influence of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on the course of world events, by increase in the class struggle by the working people of the capitalist countries against the oppression of the monopolies, and by victory of the national liberation movement. This experience helps understand why, having created a colossal war machine and stockpiling enormous quantities of nuclear weapons, imperialism resorts to local wars, in which these weapons are not directly utilized.

As we know, in the principal capitalist countries military expenditures are increasing year after year, and the arms race is escalating. At the same time imperialist circles cannot ignore the military might of the Soviet Union and all of the socialist nations as well as the consequences of another world war. This compels the ruling elite in the imperialist nations to seek modes of utilization of military force which would not threaten to undermine the foundations of imperialism and at the same time would forestall development of world events disadvantageous to imperialism. Local wars constitute an effective and, in the opinion of militarist circles, quite acceptable means of achieving these objectives.

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"...Imperialism..." noted the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties, "is forced to take into consideration the present correlation of forces in the international arena, the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union and the possible consequences of a nuclear missile war. It is becoming increasingly more difficult and dangerous for imperialism to place its bets on unleashing another world war. In these conditions... the ruling circles, while not refraining from preparations for such a war, place special emphasis on local wars."⁴

Adapting to changes in the world balance of power and encountering such a factor as the unified military might of the socialist nations, the aggressive forces of imperialism are directing their "local" attacks against individual socialist countries, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, the national liberation movement, and against developing countries in which progressive regimes have been established. They understand full well that the outcome of the struggle between socialism and capitalism depends in large measure on how the world revolutionary process develops, what path will be taken by peoples which have become liberated from the colonial yoke.

It is extremely important to expose the true aims and intentions of the forces of imperialist reaction, which are carefully concealed by various theories, and particularly by the claim that various forms of local aggression present no danger to the world. Western military ideologues attempt to convince people that local wars are easy to limit or even to extinguish, and that the experience of such wars allegedly provides nothing in the sense of preparations for a nuclear world war. It is quite obvious that behind all this stands the sinister desire spiritually to disarm peoples in the face of military danger.

This is indicated in particular by a persistent effort on the part of U.S. militarist circles to claim that such an inhuman weapon as the neutron bomb is a tactical, almost completely safe weapon. This is nothing other than an attempt to "efface the boundary" between conventional and nuclear weapons and to make the transition to nuclear war externally imperceptible.

The facts show that the imperialists have extensively utilized in local wars all types of modern weapons, including strategic bombers, carrier task forces, chemical, bacteriological and incendiary agents. And in a number of instances aggressive circles have pushed local military conflicts toward a point beyond which nuclear weapons could be employed. According to materials recently published by the Brookings Institution (USA), since World War II in at least 33 of the 215 instances of employment of U.S. troops and naval forces the question of possible employment of nuclear weapons was discussed. The possibility of initiation of a world nuclear conflict was thus allowed. This once again confirms the falseness of the bourgeois propaganda thesis that local aggression presents no danger to the world as a whole.

Any military conflict, including a local conflict, is a two-sided process. Therefore study of the experience of local wars is important not only to understand the military policy and strategy of world imperialism but also for understanding the capabilities and modes of action of opposing forces, and national liberation armies in particular. The experience of local wars enables one to judge the effectiveness of the strategy and tactics of opposing forces as well as the effectiveness of their employment of weapons and combat equipment.

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The experience of local wars is investigated at two levels.

First of all, it is examined with observance of the principle of historicism in approach to societal phenomena, which requires that they be studied in movement, in development from one historical stage to the next. Military history is not only a chronicle of events but also an active instrument in people's hands, which enables one correctly to assess facts and phenomena of the contemporary era.

"...The most important thing in approaching this question from a scientific standpoint," wrote V. I. Lenin, "is not to forget the basic historical linkage, to examine each question from the standpoint of how a given phenomenon... took place, and from the standpoint of its development to determine what a given thing has now become."⁵

Secondly, local wars are investigated from the position of a logical approach to study of the events and facts of history, which makes it possible to appraise individual local wars and conflicts not as isolated phenomena but as links in a single chain of expansionist desires characterizing the strategy of the struggle of imperialism with the progressive forces of our planet. All this made it possible to apply a systems analysis in studying the experience of local wars and military conflicts.

V. I. Lenin taught that when investigating complex and repeating social phenomena "one must endeavor to establish... a foundation of accurate and indisputable facts on which to rely.... In order that this genuinely be a foundation, it is necessary to take not separate facts but an entire aggregate of facts applying to the matter in question, without a single exception...."⁶

If one traces change in the role and place of local wars in the strategy of world imperialism in the last 80 years, one cannot help but see the principal landmarks of this evolution.

On the threshold of the 20th century, local wars comprised an important element in the predatory policy of the imperialist countries. But for a number of reasons, in particular by virtue of the effect of such a factor as interimperialist conflicts, they were not yet subordinated to a single goal. On the eve of World War I local wars essentially constituted a test of forces of different, but homogeneous in their social essence, national detachments of the world bourgeoisie.

Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution imperialism, as V. I. Lenin noted, sought to elaborate "an optimal international strategy" of class struggle against revolutionary forces and to incorporate in a practical manner the idea of "counterrevolutionary holy alliances." Apparent in these alliances, alongside a community of interests, were conflicts in the struggle for world domination which tended to tear them apart.

Both these trends were in evidence on the threshold of World War II. On the one hand two hostile groups of imperialist powers were endeavoring to improve their strategic position with the aid of local military clashes initiated at that time, and were endeavoring to test the strength of one another's position on the eve of a new major armed conflict. In addition, the very process of formation of these

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groups was determined in large measure by the outcome of local wars in the 1930's. On the other hand, imperialists of every hue and shade were united by hatred of the Soviet Union and the desire to destroy or at the very least to weaken it. Therefore a number of local wars also pursued concealed aims of anticommunism, attempts to test the military strength of the USSR. But in the final analysis conflicts within the camp of the enemies of socialism, which had become more acute in the struggle for world domination, for a certain period of time gained the upper hand over the desire to crush revolutionary forces.

The victory over fascism created favorable conditions for development of the world revolutionary process. As a result of successful revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries, a world socialist system arose, the general crisis of capitalism deepened, the Communist and worker movement in the capitalist countries experienced further development, and the foundations of the colonial system became seriously undermined.

The new period of international relations is characterized by aggravation and a complex interweaving of various forms of struggle between the two social systems on the political, economic and ideological fronts, in conditions of a dynamically changing disposition of forces in the world arena and further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. There is taking place, as L. I. Brezhnev noted, "a certain shifting of the center of gravity of the strategy of imperialism in the world arena. The policies of imperialism are determined to an ever increasing degree by the class aims of the general struggle against world socialism, national liberation revolutions and the worker movement."⁷

The European and Far Eastern centers of imperialism (Germany and Japan) were toppled as a result of World War II. The United States advanced to the front lines of struggle against communism and all the revolutionary forces of our planet, assuming the role of "guarantor and protector" of the capitalist system. The strategy of world imperialism, dictated in fact from a single center, assumed from the very outset a clearly marked reactionary, anti-Soviet thrust. A common front of struggle by imperialism against the forces of socialism, the revolutionary and national liberation movement was forming. Each military action by imperialism, each local war or military conflict, initiated or provoked by imperialism, now proved to be linked to one degree or another with the struggle between the two systems in the world arena and became links of a common chain of aggressive actions by imperialism in the struggle against the revolutionary and progressive forces of the contemporary era.

All this had a substantial effect on changing the role and place of local wars in the strategy of imperialism. Analysis of these changes essentially comprised the principal task of investigation.

The authors of this volume have proceeded from the position that a local war is in its sociopolitical essence a continuation of the politics of classes and nations by means of armed violence. In contrast to a world war, a local war is characterized by a relatively limited political objective, which determines a certain limitedness of the scale of military operations, a specific strategy and tactics, and limited use of weaponry.

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Local wars are initiated or provoked by imperialism with the aim of seizing or strengthening economic or strategic positions in various countries and regions, in order in the final analysis to undermine or push back the forces of socialism and to crush the revolutionary and national liberation movement. For the countries and peoples which have become the victims of imperialist aggression or the targets of acts of political provocation, a local war becomes a general, just war of liberation for social and national independence.

In its sociopolitical essence a military conflict is also a continuation of the politics of classes and always possesses a specific political significance. Even a battle, as V. I. Lenin noted, "which possesses no political significance is not a battle but simply a fight."⁸

A military conflict is an armed clash which is characterized, in contrast to a local war, by a significantly smaller scale and smaller quantity of forces involved in the actions. As is indicated by military-historical experience, sometimes it is difficult to draw a line between local war and military conflict. But such a line exists, and it can be found by employing the criteria of quantitative analysis (spatial scope of military operations, quantity of forces involved in the armed clash, numerical strength of forces, etc). The root difference between a local war and a military conflict lies in the fact that a war usually characterizes a specific state of a country, while in most cases a conflict characterizes the state of the armed forces and even a portion of the armed forces.

Military conflicts in our time possess similar or identical causes as local wars. Frequently military conflicts precede wars, develop into or accompany wars. This also determines the necessity of examining them within a systemic unity, as adjacent links of the common chain of military actions of capitalism.

War is an expression of extreme aggravation of political conflicts between nations or classes, at the same time constituting a specific form of manifestation of these conflicts and their resolution. A necessary attribute of war is armed violence. Since it is present in such phenomena of history as, for example, popular armed uprisings, these phenomena can be studied from the standpoint of employment of means of armed violence by the warring parties. But nevertheless war and such an event of history as a popular uprising are far from identical phenomena, since the causes of war and popular armed rebellions are different. War -- a product of an exploiter society -- is not necessarily always directly linked to a conflict between productive forces and production relations, while this conflict is the principal cause of popular armed uprisings.

The authors' subject of investigation is local wars and military conflicts proper, and the most significant of these and, in addition, studied in a correlation with the entire course of international relations in each historical segment of time.

Investigation of local wars and military conflicts is one of the most important tasks of Soviet military-historical science, proceeding from the resolutions of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses. It expands our knowledge of the general crisis of the world capitalist system and provides concrete knowledge of the military policy and strategy of world capitalism. And this serves as a genuine theoretical aid in the campaign to implement the program points advanced at party congresses

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dealing with securing peace and international cooperation, the freedom and independence of peoples, and expands possibilities of counteracting the forces of aggression and reaction.

The theses of Marxism-Leninism contained in the works of K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin, as well as in the documents of the world Communist movement serve as the ideological-theoretical and methodological foundation of this volume. This has made it possible to perform a comprehensive analysis of the policies of the capitalist powers in relation to colonial and dependent countries, the political essence of local wars, the character and motive forces of the national liberation movement and its relationship to socialism and the international worker movement.

Of exceptional importance for this investigation were the articles and speeches of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, published in the multivolume work "Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course] (1970-1979).

Fairly extensive Soviet and foreign literature dealing to one degree or another with the problem of local wars and military conflicts was employed as sources.

The authors would like to express their thanks to all persons and organizations which assisted them with counsel and advice at various stages of this project.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 26, page 314.
2. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, page 4.
3. See L. I. Brezhnev, "Sovetskiye profsoyuzy -- vliyatel'naya sila nashego obshchestva" [Soviet Trade Unions -- Influential Force in Our Society], Moscow, 1977, page 29.
4. "Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy. Dokumenty i materialy" [International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1969, page 288.
5. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 39, page 67.
6. Ibid., Vol 30, pp 350-351.
7. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rech'i i stat'i" [Following a Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, 1973, page 369.
8. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 14, page 113.

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Part I. LOCAL WARS OF IMPERIALISM: ESSENCE, HISTORY, THEORY

Chapter One. Essence of Local Wars

1. Marxism-Leninism on the Sociopolitical Essence of Local Wars

K. Marx and F. Engels, the founders of scientific communism, demonstrated that wars, a product of a class-antagonistic society, are initiated and waged in the name of the economic and political goals of specific classes. Whatever the motive behind a war, its roots lie in economics. "...Violence is only a means, while economic advantage is an end,"¹ noted F. Engels. At the same time he emphasized that military violence is a political act.

The ideological leaders of the proletariat deeply and comprehensively investigated the origin and character of the wars of their time, employing methods of dialectical-materialist analysis and closely linking it with the general tasks of the liberation movement of the oppressed masses, and particularly with the struggle of the worker class, whereby they determined the relationship to the concrete wars of their era from the standpoint of the prospects of this struggle. The founders of Marxism subdivided wars into wars between bourgeois states, colonial wars, general wars, and minor wars. The theses they formulated served as a basis for a genuinely scientific understanding of the essence of local wars.

Addressing the question of "minor" wars, K. Marx and F. Engels called them "localized," viewing them as such in relation both to a European war and a general world war. In a letter to W. Liebknecht dated February 1878, for example, K. Marx initially speaks of "localized" wars, and later of "general" wars.² In March 1887 F. Engels, in a letter to A. Bebel, points to the efforts of Czarist Russian diplomacy to cause a "localized" war and to avoid a European war. F. Engels comments, however, that "localized" wars in Europe contain the danger of escalation into a "general" war. He "who would act first, would provoke a general world war."³

Thus K. Marx and F. Engels distinguished "minor", "localized" wars in their correlation with European and general world wars, the possibility of occurrence of which they foresaw. They defined "localized" wars as wars with the participation of two or three countries in a limited area, the course of which could be controlled.⁴ They wrote that these wars are waged by numerically small armies and are not accompanied by disastrous consequences for the vanquished.

K. Marx and F. Engels also called coalition wars fought by European countries in Africa, Asia, and America "minor" wars. They devoted considerable attention to disclosing their social content and pointed to their aggressive, unjust character on the part of the European countries.

Condemning colonial wars, the founders of Marxism at the same time justified wars in defense of national independence and struggle by the peoples of colonies for liberation from the colonial yoke. They viewed colonial peoples as an ally of the worker class in the revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie. In particular, assessing the significance of the struggle of the peoples of India for a

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revolutionary movement in the home country, F. Engels noted that "India, with that drain of manpower and money which it will cost England, is presently our best ally."⁵

At the same time the leaders of the proletariat pointed to the fact that defeat of the bourgeoisie in the home country can ease the fate of enslaved peoples in the colonies, since it undermines the might of the world's colonial empires.

Being realists, K. Marx and F. Engels of course could not help but see the total domination of capitalism and the overwhelming superiority of its colonial armies over the practically unarmed, disorganized masses in the countries of Asia and Africa. In that historical period in which K. Marx and F. Engels lived, the national liberation movement in the colonies was only just gaining strength and was not unified.

Realistically appraising the immense inequality of forces in colonial wars, the founders of Marxism saw the enormous difficulties which blocked the road to success for the enslaved peoples in their struggle with the colonialists. At the same time they were firmly confident in the victory of forces pursuing just aims in war.

Of great theoretical and practical significance were the conclusions of the founders of Marxism on armed rebellion, and in particular the conclusion that under certain conditions a rebellion can develop into a war, and a war can be attended by an uprising. The basis for this conclusion was furnished by the experience of revolutionary uprisings by the worker class in the home countries, and the experience of the Paris Commune in particular, which was a consequence of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. This was also indicated by the experience of the armed struggle of insurgent military detachments in the colonies (the Sepoy Revolt in India in 1857-1859).

V. I. Lenin, great successor of Marxist teachings, began his revolutionary career in the period of transition by capitalism to its highest stage -- imperialism. He called the new era an era of wars and revolutions. Based on a dialectical-materialist analysis of the era, V. I. Lenin revealed the interrelationship between the politics of imperialism and armed violence, demonstrating that violence is an instrument for strengthening and broadening the class domination of the monopoly bourgeoisie. Applied to wars, the principal thesis of dialectics, noted V. I. Lenin, "is that 'war is simply a continuation of politics by other' (namely violent) 'means' ...Precisely this was always the view of Marx and Engels, who viewed every war as a continuation of the politics of given, interested powers -- and different classes within them -- at a given time."⁶

Further developing the ideas of K. Marx and F. Engels, V. I. Lenin revealed the essence, character and place of "minor," local wars in the new era. The collapse of the capitalist system, wrote V. I. Lenin, "will be a world-historic period, an entire era of the most diversified wars -- imperialist wars, civil wars within a country, an interweave of both, national wars, wars of liberation of nationalities crushed by the imperialists in various combinations of imperialist powers...."⁷

The wars of capitalist nations were directed against forces of social and national liberation and were of a clearly marked expansionist, unjust character. They led to completion of territorial division of the world. At the same time, the first wars

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for redivision of the world broke out at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. These wars were mutually aggressive and unjust. The warring sides pursued predatory aims in these wars.

Colonial wars were occurring more frequently in the new, 20th century. "The history of the 20th century," wrote V. I. Lenin, "this century of 'unbridled imperialism,' is filled with colonial wars."⁸ Lenin named imperialism as the sole culprit of these wars, for imperialism "accelerates the development of capitalism in the most backward countries and thus broadens and aggravates the struggle against national oppression.... From this it inevitably follows that imperialism should frequently engender national wars."⁹

Any just (national) war arises only in response to reactionary violence, in response to an unjust military action, which the exploiting, dominating and oppressing classes themselves always begin. In his "Notebooks on Imperialism," V. I. Lenin demonstrated the true essence of colonial wars and those, as he put it, "small" wars which the imperialist powers were waging on the European continent, in the Near and Far East, and in Africa. The objective of both types of war, V. I. Lenin noted, is to maintain the system of violence and extraeconomic coercion, the struggle for redivision of the colonies and for preserving the system of colonial rule.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that a world war presented an enormous danger to the peoples of the colonies. "It is a war (World War I -- Auth.), first of all, to strengthen the slavery of the colonies by means of a more 'just' division and subsequently a more 'amicable' exploitation of the colonies; secondly, for strengthening oppression of other nationalities within the 'great' powers themselves...; thirdly, to strengthen and prolong hired slavery...."¹⁰

At the same time V. I. Lenin also saw another aspect of the interrelationship between the imperialist world war and the struggle of the peoples of colonies for their liberation. Initiating a world war, he commented, imperialism impels the masses to resist, aggravating on an enormous scale class conflicts at home and in dependent countries. At the same time, forming of the indigenous population colonial troops for defense of their own interests, the imperialists are unwittingly teaching the inhabitants of the colonies military organization and "the extremely useful skill" of using arms.

V. I. Lenin viewed wars between imperialist nations and crisis situations in the home country as conditions favoring the victory of national liberation forces. Armed intervention by imperialist powers in the affairs of the colonies, he taught, can be paralyzed by a war erupting between them and by aggravation of imperialist conflicts. Oppressed peoples will definitely take advantage of crisis situations occurring in this manner in the home country.

The national liberation movement, developing and growing, deals a blow to the rear areas of world imperialism -- its colonial system, and thus the peoples of the colony become allies and a reserve force of the proletarian revolution. Lenin's idea of alliance between the proletariat and oppressed peoples in the struggle against imperialism and the idea of supporting national liberation wars and insurgencies is grounded on this.

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V. I. Lenin stressed that "there is no major difference... in a political respect" between a national insurgency and a national war fought by oppressed peoples. "Military war historians are entirely correct in also placing revolts in the same category as wars."¹¹

While supporting national wars, V. I. Lenin at the same time warned of the harmfulness of a non-class approach to their assessment, as was done by the leaders of the Second International. He emphasized that a non-class appraisal of a "national war" helps the national bourgeoisie fool the masses and conceal their private-ownership interests behind ideas of national unification. But as soon as the prospects of victory in a "national war" become apparent, most frequently the national bourgeoisie betrays the interests of its people and makes a deal with the colonial powers.

The ideas of this eminent strategist of proletarian revolution pertaining to the nature of imperialism, its politics and various forms of antiimperialist armed struggle formed the basis of the policies of Marxist parties regarding imperialist, civil and national liberation wars. Totally condemning predatory imperialist wars and exposing the predatory policy of the bourgeoisie in these wars, Marxists inalterably supported civil wars of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, national liberation wars and insurgencies in dependent countries and colonies. "Socialists always take the side of the oppressed, and consequently they cannot be opponents of wars the objective of which is a democratic or socialist struggle against oppression."¹²

Developing the legacy of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist parties made a creative contribution both to the teaching of Marxism-Leninism on wars and to the practical matter of struggle against imperialism and its policies of colonialism and neocolonialism.

Much was done to determine the paths and forms of the anticolonial struggle of peoples by the Comintern, the program of which proclaimed the right of the peoples of colonies and semicolonies to armed defense against imperialism. The Comintern proceeded thereby from the Lenin thesis of the interrelationship between the national liberation struggle and the proletarian revolutionary movement.

Of great importance for the struggle against local wars of imperialism on the eve of World War II was the point contained in the resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee on the importance of the military factor in national revolutions. The resolution noted that intervention by imperialist powers was assuming a flexible, camouflaged character, that initially civil war breaks out in the country, support is given to the counterrevolutionary forces, subsequently followed by armed intervention.¹³

Adopting this resolution, the Comintern Executive Committee based its decision on actual facts and events. In 1924, for example, the imperialists unleashed a civil war in China, and subsequently invaded that country. Later the Comintern's prediction was emphatically reconfirmed. The imperialists ignited the flame of civil war in Spain, supporting the counterrevolutionary forces with armed intervention. The interventionist policy of the imperialist powers in the 1930's was fraught with the danger of escalation of "minor" wars into major wars. "...The new phase of

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imperialist policy," stated the Comintern at that time, "is characterized by the fact that capitalism is preparing to transition from 'minor' wars to major wars."¹⁴

The subsequent course of world events fully confirmed this conclusion. The aggressive policies of German and Italian fascism in Europe and Japanese imperialism in the Far East led, as we know, to the formation of two focal areas of war.

World War II, initiated by the imperialists, constituted a most profound social shock for the entire capitalist world. One of its consequences was a powerful upsurge of the national liberation movement, which encompassed all the world's continents. World imperialism, endeavoring to preserve its colonial rule and to hinder the processes of national liberation, embarked upon a course of local acts of aggression against the peoples of the colonies and dependent countries. The Conference of Representatives of Communist and Worker Parties in 1957, exposing the imperialist, aggressive character of local wars against the peoples of Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Kenya, and Egypt, Algeria, Oman, and Yemen, stressed that the imperialists are endeavoring to prolong their colonial supremacy in new forms, are uniting efforts in the struggle against peoples seeking to throw off the colonial yoke and independently to determine their own destiny, but they are unable to impede the collapse of the colonial system.

Representatives of Communist and worker parties once again, at their Conference in 1960, devoted considerable attention to the struggle of the peoples of colonies and dependent countries for their liberation. They thoroughly analyzed the situation in the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and appealed for all-out support for peoples fighting against imperialist colonial oppression and armed aggression. The conference pointed out that imperialism is seeking to preserve colonial exploitation, resorting to utilization of an entire system of military instruments and methods (military blocs, bases, military-dictator regimes, local wars).

The documents of the 1969 Conference of Communist and Worker Parties contained a comprehensive description of imperialism and its aggressive nature. Defining the methods with the aid of which the imperialists are attempting to hold back the development of the national liberation struggle of peoples and the process of revolutionary reforms, the Conference stated: "Armed interventions and cruel acts of repression -- especially where the struggle is assuming the most acute forms and where revolutionary forces are fighting with weapon in hand -- everything has been thrown into the fray by imperialism -- counterrevolutionary plots, reactionary and fascist coups, acts of provocation and blackmail."¹⁵

Examining the question of the correlation between the policy of peaceful coexistence and the national liberation struggle, the Conference emphasized that "a policy of peaceful coexistence is not in contradiction to the right of oppressed peoples to utilize in the struggle for their liberation that path which they consider necessary -- armed or unarmed..."¹⁶ This thesis was also reflected in the final document of the June 1976 Conference of European Communist and Worker Parties.

At its 24th Congress, the Communist Party thoroughly analyzed the world situation, the policies and strategy of the imperialist nations, proceeding from a most important factor of contemporary history -- collapse of the colonial system of imperialism under the onslaught of the national liberation struggle of peoples. As

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the congress noted, imperialism is not repudiating local wars against liberated peoples, and in the zone of the national liberation movement imperialist aggression is focused primarily against countries which have chosen the path of noncapitalist development. The congress pointed out that those who are fighting colonial regimes which still remain in some countries can count on the full support of the Soviet Union.

Analysis of the military policy and strategy of imperialism occupied a significant place in the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress. The congress noted that, although the capabilities of imperialism to undertake aggressive actions have been significantly diminished, its nature is unchanged and there remains a real danger of occurrence of military conflicts.

World peace is by no means guaranteed at the present time -- this is one of the conclusions reached at the congress. The congress emphasized that the Soviet state will continue with redoubled energy its policy of restraining the forces of war and aggression, strengthening world peace, and securing the rights of peoples to freedom, independence, and social progress.

The experience of the world revolutionary movement of recent years has shown that if there arises a genuine threat to the supremacy of monopoly capital and its political henchmen, imperialism will stop at nothing, including employment of means of armed violence. The policies of a number of imperialist countries, and the United States in particular, even today continue to contain aspects which threaten the freedom and independence of peoples, and the actions of these countries frequently constitute crude meddling in the domestic affairs of developing countries on the side of the forces of oppression and reaction.

Collapse of the colonial system of imperialism by no means signifies that such a reactionary phenomenon in international affairs as colonialism has come to an end. In conditions of change in the correlation of forces in the world arena and a crisis of the imperialist "policy of force," colonialism is taking on new forms. The forms of armed expansion, which pursue imperialist policy aims, are also changing.

Inciting local wars and military conflicts, imperialism is endeavoring to restrain the aspiration of peoples for freedom, independence, and socialism, and to utilize them as a means of achieving political objectives. These aims include the following: weakening of the world socialist system by detaching individual countries from it; crushing of the national liberation movement in various countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and imposition of reactionary puppet regimes to weaken the front of the allies of the socialist nations in the struggle against imperialism; export of counterrevolution for the suppression of democratic, antiimperialist movements and prevention of radical revolutionary reforms. At the same time local wars and military conflicts are being utilized by imperialist powers as a means of preparing for a world war, as a convenient excuse for continuing and escalating the arms race, and as a temporary "lightning rod" against economic decline and a "stimulator" of production. All this attests to the extremely reactionary role of local wars and military conflicts initiated by the imperialists and to the fact that they are subordinated to the general political aims of imperialism in the struggle against its class enemies in the world arena.

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With all the diversity of contemporary local wars, one cannot help but see their common sociopolitical features.

First of all, with the existence in the world of two opposing sociopolitical systems and the struggle between them, which constitutes the principal conflict of the contemporary era, any local war initiated by the imperialists affects to one degree or another the class and national interests of the countries of these systems. Therefore it bears the imprint of a limited armed conflict between capitalism and socialism.

Secondly, in many instances contemporary local wars are of a coalition nature. In local wars imperialists seek to unify the efforts of all reactionary forces, since they do not count on handling on their own the powerful revolutionary and liberation movement. The imperialists act in concert out of fear over the fate of the capitalist system, which is engulfed in a deep general crisis. Local wars initiated by the imperialists receive in turn, as a rule, a collective rebuff on the part of the socialist countries and all progressive forces throughout the world.

Thirdly, contemporary local wars have a complex political content, in which are interwoven the class political objectives of imperialism as a whole and the selfish interests of the national groups of the monopoly bourgeoisie of the various countries. On the other hand, elements of civil and national liberation wars are combined in the struggle of peoples against imperialist acts of aggression.

Fourthly, indicative of contemporary local wars is an increase in the role of the masses in the course and outcome of military operations and involvement of all segments of the population in the war. This is characteristic both of aggressor nations and of the nations against which aggression is directed, for even local armed conflicts affect the vital interests of the working people. In aggressor countries they inevitably engender a protest movement and aggravate social conflicts. Today the imperialists are less able than ever before to count on the support of the population of their countries, and therefore they count on an army of mercenaries, while in those countries which are the victims of aggression the entire people, inspired by an awareness of the just aims of the war, rise up for the struggle.

2. On the Classification and System of Local Wars and Military Conflicts

The scientific principles of classification of wars were elaborated by K. Marx and F. Engels and were further developed by V. I. Lenin, applicable to the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

In spite of the fact that the founders of scientific communism based their theoretical investigations on the experience of preceding wars and wars of which they were contemporaries, the theses they formulated still serve today as a reliable methodological foundation for classifying wars.

What is it important to emphasize in the ideological legacy of the founders of Marxism-Leninism in this area? First of all we should stress the fundamental thesis of a class approach to evaluation of a given war.

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K. Marx and F. Engels viewed all wars, regardless of their scale and military-technological content, from the standpoint of whether they fostered development of the revolution and victory of the worker class or, on the contrary, impeded the revolutionary process and complicated the struggle by the proletariat for its liberation. They taught the proletarian parties to assess various wars precisely from these class positions.

V. I. Lenin made quite definite statements on this score. In our time, he wrote, the legitimacy and justice of a war can be established "only from the standpoint of the socialist proletariat and its struggle for its liberation; we do not recognize any other point of view."¹⁷

This Marxist-Leninist thesis reflects the objective pattern of man's revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. It possesses enormous mobilizing and organizing force, expressing the actual attitude of working people toward war, namely: the necessity of a resolute struggle against imperialist predatory wars and selfless support of revolutionary and national liberation wars.

The founders of Marxism attached prime importance in determining the social character of wars and the attitude of the worker class toward wars to an analysis of their political content and the political aims of the warring sides. The political content of a war determines its progressive or reactionary role in the affairs of society. On this basis, V. I. Lenin divided wars into just and unjust. He linked the legitimacy and justice of certain wars and the injustice of others to their progressiveness or reactionary character. Lenin wrote: "...There are just wars and unjust wars, progressive and reactionary wars, wars of progressive classes and wars of backward classes, wars promoting strengthening of class oppression and wars serving to overthrow class oppression..."¹⁸

The concept of just war is applicable in present-day conditions primarily to wars of socialist nations against imperialist aggression, to revolutionary wars and armed rebellions of the worker class and the worker masses against the oppressors, for democracy and socialism, and to national liberation wars of oppressed peoples against colonialists and in defense of national independence.

The sociopolitical character of wars of the proletariat and its governmental systems against oppressors and the aggression of exploiter nations, independent of the form of war (local or world), is always just. Thus the struggle in local wars is of a just nature if it is being waged: in defense of the achievements of socialism in individual countries; in the interests of victory of a socialist or democratic revolution; for national liberation or in defense of national independence.

Imperialist local wars against individual socialist countries, local wars for the seizure of territory of other countries, for redividing spheres of influence, for preserving and reestablishing colonial rule, and counterrevolutionary wars by the bourgeoisie against the proletariat which is carrying out a revolution in an individual country are unjust.

V. I. Lenin stressed that there are always two sides operating in war. For analysis of wars as a bilateral process, V. I. Lenin introduced the concept of

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type of war. He presented a model of Marxist analysis of types of wars of premonopoly capitalism and the era of imperialism. In a letter to Inessa Armand, V. I. Lenin pointed to the existence of three major types of political relations which are formed between nations, and the types of wars of the era of imperialism which correspond to these types of political relations.

"(I) The three main types: relationship of the oppressed to the oppressing nation (every war is a continuation of politics; politics is a relationship between nations, classes, etc). As a general rule, war is legitimate on the side of the oppressed party (regardless of whether it is defensive or offensive in a military sense).

"(II) Relationship between two oppressor nations. A struggle for colonies, for markets, etc (Rome and Carthage; England and Germany, 1914-1917). As a general rule, a war of this type is robbery on both sides; and the relationship of democracy (and socialism) toward it falls under the following rule: 'Two thieves are fighting, let them both die'....

"(III) Third type. A system of equal nations. An extremely complex question!!!! Especially if Czarism stands alongside civilized, comparatively democratic nations. This was the case (approximately) in Europe from 1815 to 1905."19

The era of transition from capitalism to socialism is distinguished by a complex interweave of different systems of political relations and social conflicts. The principal conflict of this era is the conflict between two opposing social systems -- imperialism and socialism. Also characteristic of the contemporary era are conflicts between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between imperialism and the national liberation movement, and between capitalist nations.

As is attested by the experience of history, a corresponding type of war is determined in relation to the type of conflicts being resolved in that war. Among the great diversity of wars of the contemporary era -- the era of transition from capitalism to socialism -- we can distinguish the following types of wars, according to sociopolitical attributes:

wars between nations (coalitions) of the two opposing social systems -- imperialism and socialism;

wars between antagonistic classes within a single country;

wars between imperialist nations and peoples (countries) which are defending their freedom and independence or are waging a national liberation struggle;

was between different capitalist countries.

Rarely can the principal types of wars be isolated in "pure form." For example, national liberation wars in Indochina (1954-1975) were combined with a struggle against imperialist aggressors and in defense of the achievements of socialism. The civil war in the USSR (1918-1920) and the civil war in Spain (1936-1939) were interwoven with a struggle against foreign intervention.

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Contemporary wars of colonialists against the national liberation movement frequently are of a clearly marked antisocialist thrust. And this is not surprising. In the course of the national liberation struggle oppressed nations and small countries inevitably draw close to the community of socialist nations, which promotes these countries' aspiration toward a noncapitalist path of development, toward socialism, and the imperialists fear this more than all else.

In the last 30 years the imperialists have initiated or incited wars:

against individual socialist countries (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Cuba);

against developing countries which have chosen the path of noncapitalist development (Angola, Congo, etc);

against peoples fighting for their national liberation (Algeria, Burma, Indonesia, etc);

civil wars (Greece in 1946-1949, China in 1946-1949);

between individual capitalist or developing countries (between Turkey and Greece, between India and Pakistan).

The collapse of the colonial system led to the formation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America of a large number of new sovereign and equal developing nations, which find themselves, however, at different stages of economic, political and cultural development and which have differing relations with one another as well as with the imperialist and socialist countries. In many developing countries the process of nation forming has not been completed, while in some of these countries intertribal strife has not yet been overcome. Various trends are in evidence in the internal affairs of these countries -- a trend toward peoples drawing closer together in the antiimperialist struggle and a trend toward national individualization, isolation, even hostility, a trend which is a legacy of colonialism. Superimposed on relations between developing countries is the imprint of borders which were artificially "cut" by the former colonialists, which leads to territorial disputes and military conflicts. By means of various intrigues and acts of provocation, the imperialists seek to incite one country against another, to place them in opposition to one another and to subordinate them to the imperialists' influence. Many of the wars and conflicts which arise between developing countries cannot be isolated as an independent type of military clash, since relations between these countries repeat the principal types of intergovernmental relations inherent in the contemporary era.

Of importance for classifying wars and military conflicts is a scaling or quantitative approach to their evaluation. It includes taking into account such criteria as the number of countries participating in a war and military conflict, the size of the territory involved in military operations and, finally, such an important criterion as the degree of involvement of armed forces and weapons in military operations.

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Local wars and military conflicts can be subdivided according to geographic attribute into the following:

into wars and military conflicts between two or several countries of a single geographic region;

into wars and military conflicts between two or several countries of different regions of the world;

into wars and military conflicts within a single country.

All local wars and military conflicts known to history were waged primarily with the aid of conventional weaponry. In World War I, however, and in a number of local wars which preceded World War I, incendiary devices were extensively employed. And in the course of some local wars of recent years, in which American forces participated, U.S. militarist circles entertained plans of employing nuclear weapons.

Local wars and military conflicts can be subdivided, on the basis of degree of employment of manpower and weapons, into the following:

into wars and military conflicts in which only regular armed forces take part, with employment of all types of weapons with the exception of nuclear;

into wars and military conflicts in which, alongside regular troops, irregulars also take part, employing conventional weapons, including obsolete weapons in a good many instances.

Taking account of all the attributes and criteria, both sociopolitical and military-technical, one can differentiate among local wars and military conflicts as follows:

1) Local wars and military conflicts initiated by individual capitalist countries against individual socialist countries. These were unjust wars and conflicts on the part of the capitalist countries, aimed at destroying the socialist achievements of peoples and thus weakening the world socialist system. The socialist nations were defending in these wars and conflicts the just aims of protecting their achievements.

As experience showed, wars of this kind demanded a considerable effort by the resources and capabilities of the warring sides. The scale of wars depended on the specific features of the area of military operations and on the degree of involvement of other nations in the conflict. Such local wars contained the danger of escalation to a world war.

2) Local wars and military conflicts of capitalist nations with peoples (countries) fighting for or defending their independence. These were also unjust, reactionary, predatory wars on the part of the capitalist countries, aimed at using the force of arms to hold or restore lost supremacy in former colonies and dependent countries. On the part of peoples (countries) fighting for their independence, however, these were just wars. Distinctive features of these wars included the focal character of military operations which, however, gradually

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extended to most or all of the country's territory, as well as the fact that one of the warring sides was operating on a relatively weak material-technological base.

3) Local wars and military conflicts between individual capitalist countries or groups of capitalist countries. Such wars arose chiefly either due to unresolved territorial questions or as a consequence of efforts by an aggressive nation to seize new markets, to expand its territory at the expense of other, weaker nations, or to strengthen its strategic position in a certain part of the world.

4) Civil wars and domestic military conflicts also fall within the local category, if one applies only criteria of scale. These are armed clashes of a special type. We know that the class struggle in a class-antagonistic society ultimately becomes a political struggle, a struggle for power. Under certain conditions it assumes the most acute forms and transitions to an armed uprising by the oppressed and exploited masses and subsequently to a civil war, in the course of which reactionary forces endeavor, with the aid of arms, to crush revolutionary actions by the workers and to preserve their supremacy.

From the standpoint of scaling, quantitative criteria, military actions in civil wars usually do not go beyond the borders of a single country, and at the same time they are distinguished by a great diversity of forms of struggle and a changing composition of participants.

"...A civil war," wrote V. I. Lenin, "differs from a customary war by an immeasurably greater complexity, uncertainty and indeterminacy of composition of fighting forces involved -- by virtue of transitions from one camp to another... by virtue of the impossibility of drawing a line between 'combatants' and 'noncombatants,' that is, between those who are and are not in the ranks of the warring sides."²⁰

Frequently external forces which have a stake in the victory of certain classes within a country intervene in a civil war. Sometimes this is done under the banner of bringing peace between the warring sides and defense of so-called "democratic freedoms." During the civil war in the USSR, for example, interference by external forces ended up as naked military intervention by the capitalist powers under the pretext of defending the "legitimate" order, but in actual fact was aimed at the restoration of capitalism. During the civil war in Spain, the fascist nations -- Germany and Italy -- supported the insurgent reactionary forces, utilizing as a pretext the phony slogan of defending "democratic freedoms."

The period following World War II contains many examples of civil wars accompanied by intervention by external forces. They include the civil wars in Greece (1946-1949), China (1946-1949), in Cuba (1959), in Angola (1964-1976), etc.

Bourgeois ideologues, attempting to justify the aggressive actions of imperialism (or to diminish the negative effect of its interventionist policy), usually deny or simply remain silent about the existence of an entire system of such actions. And yet such a system exists and is operating, as a reflection of the general aims of the struggle of the imperialist states against their opponents in the world arena. The facts and all the policies of imperialism in our time attest to this.

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Unification of the efforts of the imperialist nations on a class, counterrevolutionary and anticommunist basis and the formation of a common-goal strategy of world imperialism began following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the birth of the world's first socialist state. From now on, stressed V. I. Lenin, "the mutual relations of peoples and the entire world system of nations will be determined by the struggle of a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and Soviet state, at the head of which stands Soviet Russia."²¹ Already at that time the capitalists set for themselves the aim of elaborating "the optimal international strategy" of class struggle. This strategy crystallized in the process of crushing armed uprisings by the proletariat, organization of counterrevolutionary campaigns by a number of capitalist countries against the Soviet Union, and in struggle with the forces of the national liberation movement. On this foundation the imperialists were attempting to put together a unified anti-communist bloc on the eve of World War II.

Of the two trends in the interrelationships of imperialist states noted by V. I. Lenin, however -- unification on a common counterrevolutionary basis and their separation due to the aggravation of interimperialist conflicts -- the latter advanced to the forefront for a certain period of time. The imperialists were unable to create in a practical manner a common anticommunist front, although in an ideological respect it had not only existed prior to the outbreak of World War II but also gave evidence of its presence in the course of the war.

Following World War II the global strategy of imperialism assumed concrete forms, under the influence of a deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, collapse of the bloc of fascist states and a shifting of the center of world imperialist forces from Europe to the United States, which had assumed the role of "savior" of the capitalist system.

As was noted at the International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties in 1969, "in a situation of aggravation of struggle between the two world systems, the capitalist powers... are endeavoring to unify their efforts in order to preserve and strengthen the system of exploitation and oppression and to regain their lost position."²²

The global strategy of imperialism is a coordinated policy on the part of the imperialist nations, reflecting their common aspirations, goals and forms of struggle with progressive forces in the world arena. It unites the efforts of imperialist countries and regimes as well as those following imperialist policy in the struggle against socialism, the revolutionary and national liberation movement.

This strategy is directed against the nations of socialism. It specifies, in particular, several belts (strategic echelons) of encirclement around the nations of the socialist community.

A systemic analysis in the area of international relations presupposes study of the interaction of all elements and forces participating in international affairs, consideration of crisis situations, including local military clashes, and elucidation of their character and influence on the general process of world development.

In the contemporary era any aggravation of the international situation, especially when it is accompanied by an armed conflict even on a small scale, signals a warning

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to the world as never before, since it affects the interests of the countries not only of a given region or continent but of a number of regions or even all continents. A local war or any other conflict on a local scale carries within it the danger of a chain reaction. As we know, in the postwar years imperialism often deliberately increased tension in international relations in certain regions in order to divert world public attention away from a region in which it was preparing for a military action. One's attention is also drawn by the fact that the imperialist nations immediately increased the state of readiness of their armed forces as soon as a revolutionary situation developed or revolutionary or democratic reforms began in a given country. For example, this was precisely how NATO leaders reacted to the overthrow of the military dictatorship in Greece in 1974 and to the democratic changes in Portugal, which began in April 1976. And in both cases the NATO countries mobilized powerful political and military forces in order to prevent revolutionary-democratic reforms.

The place of the system of local wars and military conflicts in world politics can be correctly determined only if one investigates military conflicts during a specified period of time in their entire aggregate, while at the same time bearing in mind that they took place on different continents, separated by great distances and differing from one another in the special conditions of the political and military-strategic situation.

The specific features of regional military events in the first place unify them into a subsystem of local wars and conflicts on a given continent or in a given region and, secondly, point to the diversity of event elements of the overall system.

A systems analysis makes it possible to elucidate the interrelationship and interdependence of local military conflicts within continents and regions and, in addition, to determine fairly accurately the place and role of each conflict in the global strategy of imperialism and, finally, to gain an idea of the general trend of development of the struggle between two social forces in the world arena: the forces of war, reaction, and imperialism on the one hand, and the forces of progress, peace and socialism on the other.

3. Concept of Local Wars: Past and Present

Throughout the course of many decades the ruling circles of capitalist countries inalterably viewed "minor," local wars as one of the radical forms of influencing the processes of world development. And while this view remained fairly persistent, views on the role and place of local wars in the policies and strategy of imperialism changed with the passage of time.

Among the many concepts and ideas placed by the bourgeoisie in the service of expansionist policy, the most persistent and widespread ones include the following: the cult of force and militarism as a leading trend in the development of bourgeois thought; race theory, closely connected with fascism, geopolitics, Malthusianism, and with the theory of so-called "manifest destiny" (if one bears in mind American traditions of "philosophy of force"), the theory of "balance of power" and, finally, anticommunism -- an ideology which found embodiment in the policies of the capitalist countries following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

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American military historian Admiral A. Mahan (1840-1914) provided at an earlier date than many others, and in a very frank manner, a theoretical foundation for the hegemonist, power pretensions of the ruling circles of the capitalist countries. "Military strength," he wrote at the end of the 19th century, "is one of the predominant political elements for justification... of policy.... Conflicts in the international arena toughen nations and foster their maturation."²³ There is nothing other than selfish national interests, argued Mahan, which would move the development of relations between countries, and there is no reason to conceal this fact.

This apologia of force and "national interest," which is permeated by a spirit of militarism, was most appropriate for justifying a policy of expansion, which the major capitalist powers were vigorously commencing to implement at that time. Therefore it is not surprising that Mahan's ideas were adopted by the ideologues of imperialism. For example, the cult of force and militarism was widely adopted in Imperial Germany, finding expression in the writings of Moltke, Schlieffen, and later in the fascist literature of Germany and Italy. Today cultivation of force and an apologia of militarism are being continued in the writings of American philosophers and sociologists. In the opinion of American sociologists H. Morgenthau, A. Schlesinger and W. Whitworth, the struggle for power, for hegemony with any means comprises the basis of societal development.

"Race theory" has for centuries influenced the forming of the bourgeois concept of local wars as an alternative to wars on a world scale and as a form of a show of force.

The ideological credo of English, Spanish, and subsequently American, German and Japanese colonialists was that there are "civilized" and "politically undeveloped" nations in the world. The former should assume world leadership, regardless of the path which must be taken to accomplish this -- the annihilation of lower races and peoples or subjection by force of those which could not be destroyed.

At the beginning of the 20th century racist views were quite widespread in the Anglo-fascist countries. Many philosophers and sociologists in these countries sought to prove that the Anglo-Saxons are superior to other peoples and destined to place all other peoples in subjection to themselves, while in the final analysis the English language will be the language of mankind. British bourgeois sociologist C. Woodruff extensively utilized racist argumentation to justify imperialist expansion. Mankind, he wrote, "requires the annihilation of poorly adapted individuals by means of war" and "bloodshed to destroy excess population."²⁴ The extensive program of colonial seizures by British and U.S. imperialism proceeded from this. Subsequent aggressive U.S. and British military actions against small, "uncivilized" countries and peoples originated in race theory, frequently interwoven with Malthusian ideas. Later fascism, with its openly racist program of gaining world supremacy through conquest, became closely aligned with this theory.

In the United States race theory was also uniquely reflected in the idea of "manifest destiny." U.S. politicians in the time of the U.S. "founding fathers" proclaimed the slogan that "heaven itself" had prepared for America a special role in world affairs. This slogan became one of the ideological motifs of U.S. foreign policy in the era of transition by capitalism into its monopoly stage, and

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subsequently, at the threshold of World War I, an argument for justification of aggressive U.S. actions. The theory of America's "manifest destiny" to become world leader resounded with new force when the storm clouds of World War II began gathering over Europe. A portentous statement in this regard was made in 1939 by prominent journalist W. Lippmann. "That which Rome was to the ancient world," he wrote, "and Great Britain was in the 19th century, America shall be in the world of the future."²⁵

Following World War II the course being taken by the United States along the road of "globalism" was consolidated in political declarations. In 1945 President H. Truman openly declared U.S. world hegemony, thus demonstrating his adherence to the idea of "manifest destiny." "Whether we wish it or not," he stated, "we must acknowledge that the victory we have won has placed upon the American people the burden of responsibility for future world leadership."²⁶ These same views were shared by General D. Eisenhower, who became president in 1952, who in his messages to Congress and numerous speeches declared that the United States played the "leading role in world affairs."

As is noted by some American authors, John Kennedy was the first true globalist in the U.S. presidency following World War II. His following statement is typical: "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, accept any difficulties, support any friend and oppose any foe in order to ensure the success of liberty."²⁷ Defining freedom as the right of the United States to control the destiny of other people, the ideologues of U.S. imperialism justified the idea of interference in the internal affairs of other countries on all continents from the standpoint of "America's higher interests."

And although subsequently, under the influence of changes in the world balance of power, it was necessary to impose self-restrictions in the theory and practice of U.S. globalism, the idea of "manifest destiny" did not cease serving as ideological ammunition for forming concepts of wars and so-called "counterinsurgency actions."

The ideological roots of postwar military policy and theoretical substantiation of U.S. strategic doctrines can be found in such a philosophical concept as the theory of "balance of power," which was extensively utilized by political leaders in premonopoly England²⁸ and was subsequently further developed by the ideologues of U.S. imperialism. The essence of this concept is that a major power must always endeavor to occupy the position of "arbiter" or "balancing nation," and this will allegedly secure for that country a dominant position in the world.

This cynical philosophical concept, which finds expression, in particular, in the well-known political aphorism "divide and conquer," still exerts enormous influence on the thinking of U.S. statesmen and ideologues and on strategic planning proper.

Admiral A. Mahan also played a very important role in forming the foundations of the theory of "balance of power." Mahan proceeded from the geopolitical idea that the root conflict in the world is the clash between the interests of "maritime" and "continental" powers, between the so-called world island and its "maritime satellites." In his opinion, Russia was the bulwark of world continental power. The sea powers (Japan in the East, Great Britain and Germany in the West, and the United States both in the East and West) should create a counterbalance to this

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might, possessing superior naval forces and exerting pressure on Russia from the flanks. Mahan recommended that the U.S. Government always maintain a "free hand," occupying the position of a "balancing nation." Mahan considered all local wars and military conflicts taking place in the world merely derivative from the conflicts between the "world island" and "world ocean."²⁹

The ideas of A. Mahan were further developed by another ideologue of imperialism, Mackinder.³⁰ He recommended, with the aim of creating a favorable "balance of power" for the United States, transforming the sea power of the nations surrounding the socialist countries of the Eurasian continent into "land and water" power, in order to control the world's principal sea lines of communication and at the same time to possess a firm foothold on the continent. In other words, he advocated creating two belts of "containment" around the socialist camp following World War II: a belt of "land-and-water" nations, that is, Germany, France, Great Britain and other countries in the West, and the United States, India, and China in the East. He included in the second belt of "containment" the smaller countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which were dependent on the major imperialist powers.

Almost simultaneously with Mackinder, the idea of creating an anti-Soviet "balance of power" which was geopolitical in essence was developed by Yale University professor N. Spykman. He intentionally transformed the Mahan and Mackinder map of the world, with Eurasia occupying a central position, into a so-called geocentric map with the United States occupying the center, while the rest of the world comprised "outlying lands." It followed from this that the United States, in order to ensure world hegemony, should direct all diplomatic and military efforts toward subjugating the countries of this belt, that is, the countries of Western Europe, the Near East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East. "He who is master of the zone of outlying lands dominates Eurasia, and he who dominates Eurasia controls the fate of the world,"³¹ wrote N. Spykman.

In conditions of the postwar disposition of forces in the world arena, from the very outset the geopolitical ideas of the American ideologues were perfect for the global schemes and the entire course of foreign policy of the United States. It is not surprising that following World War II all U.S. administrations made use of these ideas.

When nuclear opposition arose as a result of achievements by the USSR in the area of developing nuclear weapons and means of delivering them, the U.S. Government, endeavoring to expand maneuvering room for its policy of "balance of power," proceeded to establish around the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community an entire series of "counterbalances" under U.S. control: the aggressive CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS, and ASPAC military blocs.³²

If we recall the recommendations of Mackinder and Spykman, this was to a certain degree implementation of the idea of creating a belt of "containment" (Mackinder) or a belt of "outlying lands" (Spykman). The United States positioned its principal military bases and contingents of all armed forces branches precisely here, and it was precisely here that local wars and military conflicts erupted in most cases if events failed to develop as desired by U.S. ruling circles.

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The geography of disposition of military bases and contingents of military forces, which coincide in the main with the recommendations of Mackinder and Spykman, also pursued another objective -- to draw away from the United States, in case of war, a part of the response nuclear missile strike. "The concept of geographic dispersal of strategic capabilities," wrote noted political scientists W. Kintner, R. Strausz-Hype, and A. Daigherty in 1956, "is the most effective in the age of nuclear weapons. The more rapidly this dispersal takes place as a result of establishment of a global network (on land, underground, on and under the surface of the sea, as well as in the air) of missile launchers, the more technically difficult will be the task of putting us out of commission with a single massive strike."³³

The true state of affairs as regards the concept of local wars in the global strategy of U.S. imperialism is clearly evident in this reasoning. On the one hand it is a strategy the main objective of which is a struggle against all progressive forces throughout the world, while on the other hand it pursues narrowly selfish aims, which one of the leading U.S. military ideologues, Strausz-Hype, stated during the war as follows: "It is in the U.S. interest to secure a world order where there would be only one center of power, from which balancing and stabilizing control would spread, with this control in the hands of the United States."³⁴ In other words, the author considered as the ideal strategic situation not a "balance of power" per se, but absolute U.S. military supremacy in the world arena.

Prior to the rupture of the overall chain of imperialism as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the theory of "balance of power" as a working hypothesis determined a U.S. policy of playing on conflicts within the camp of imperialist rivals, while after 1917 it assumed a clearly marked anti-Soviet thrust. Up to World War II this was expressed in an endeavor by U.S. ruling circles to undermine the strength of the Soviet Union, utilizing the assault force of world imperialism -- the fascist states -- while following World War II U.S. political and military leaders themselves continued that same line in their global strategy. Under the influence of abrupt changes in the world balance of power, the theory of "balance of power" received new expression in attempts to unify the efforts of imperialism on a worldwide scale to combat the revolutionary and national liberation movement, creating two echelons, as it were, or two belts of military encirclement of the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community.

At different stages of postwar development U.S. imperialism variously evaluated the role of each of these echelons in the struggle for world domination. The entire two decades of the 1940's and 1950's involved efforts to form an anti-Soviet "balance of power" in the first echelon -- among the Western European powers. According to the terminology of the acknowledged leading figures of so-called power politics, this was a period of establishment of centers of power on the "bridge-head" of U.S. imperialism, although even during these years it did little to establish a second echelon in the "outlying lands." Beginning in the 1960's, under the influence of deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and growth of the economic and military potential of the nations of the socialist community and collapse of the colonial system, there took place a certain reorientation in U.S. global strategy: emphasis was placed on the second echelon, for the most part countries of the "third world," but without lessening efforts at maintaining the "action readiness" of the forward echelon. This reorientation was in large measure due to the fact that it was considered easier and safer to resort to a show of force and to employment of force in the "outlying belt" of the world.

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The ideology of anticommunism and the hatred toward the revolutionary movement which it has propagated have served and continue to serve as an ideological support and motive force for the concept of "minor" wars of imperialism. The ideology and politics of anticommunism assumed the character of the principal ideological weapon of imperialist forces following the Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. A hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union and its revolutionary example were initially manifested in an endeavor to destroy the Soviet Union, unifying all counterrevolutionary forces toward this end.

As W. A. Williams, one of the founders of a new and progressive trend in U.S. historiography, writes, "intervention as a conscious anti-Bolshevik action was for U.S. leaders a foregone conclusion within five weeks after the Bolsheviks came into power.... The decision to intervene was dictated by their animosity toward the radical nature of the Bolshevik Revolution. In other words, their strategy was counterrevolutionary."³⁵

Anticommunism, anti-Sovietism and counterrevolution proved to be not a temporary reaction by the imperialist powers to the socialist revolution in Russia and an upsurge in the revolutionary movement evoked by it, but became the motive force of all subsequent counterrevolutionary actions of imperialism, military interventions, revolts, coups, and small-scale colonial wars. R. Tucker, a scholar specializing in the history of U.S. foreign policy, states on this score: "The goals of Wilson (the U.S. president in 1912-1920 -- Auth.)... continued to express the essence of U.S. foreign policy.... This did not signify a disinclination to pursue a joint policy with the main industrial powers for the purpose of restraining the Soviet Union and revolutionary movements in general.... These same objectives determined the actions of U.S. diplomacy during and after World War II. The war and immediate postwar period did not change the expansionist policy which the United States had been pursuing for decades."³⁶

Division of wars into "small" and "large" has been noted in bourgeois military theory since the beginning of the 19th century. Clear views on such wars were first stated by Clausewitz. He divided all wars into "large" and "small" by degree of intensity of combat operations and ultimate political aims. He defined as a "large" war a war waged at full intensity, a war aimed at crushing and defeating the enemy's army in detail, at occupying the enemy's territory and replacing the monarch; he defined as "small" a war of attrition, with the objective of troublesome actions along the enemy's border, a show of force, and compelling the adversary to accept terms without a full-scale battle.

Clausewitz also assigned to the "small" war category those which included popular partisan uprisings. He called them a result of the 19th century, as a response to the military expansion of the first French Empire. Clausewitz considered the partisan war fought against Napoleon's army in Russia to be a vivid example of a popular uprising. Incidentally, Kutuzov also called partisan warfare a "small" war, which successfully assists the operations of the regular army.

By its results such a war bore no comparison to a war in which regular armies participated, although much greater forces were involved in it. Clausewitz defined a "small" war as a war in which "the results... do not correspond to the expenditure of forces."³⁷

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He saw in a "small" popular war one feature which in his opinion consisted in the fact that the masses, "which armed force is unable to curb," rise up in struggle.³⁸

Up to the end of the 19th century there was little change in the view on "small" wars on the part of bourgeois military theorists after Clausewitz.³⁹ In writings at the beginning of the 20th century, however, the term "local war" began to appear with increasing frequency when describing "small" wars.

As time passed, the concept of "small," local wars underwent an evolution. At first there was a widely held view of a "small" war as actions which support the engagement or battle of a regular army: guard duty, mounted raids behind enemy lines, and supporting troops actions on the flanks. These views existed in connection with the fact that with the onset of winter an army's main forces would withdraw to winter quarters, but the transport of troops and supplies, and consequently guarding of supply routes would continue. During this time individual units would conduct combat actions with the objective of defending or disrupting lines of communication, as well as the objective of reconnaissance.

During the years of sharp struggle for redivision of the world, the term "expedition" began to appear frequently in the literature. Its meaning was obvious: colonial predatory wars by the major imperialist powers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were camouflaged under the guise of an allegedly insignificant "expedition." Troops dispatched to seize and plunder colonies and to put down anticolonial uprisings began to be called expeditionary forces.

In the period between wars, beginning in 1918, an attempt was made in bourgeois military theory to compare the recent world war with military conflicts of a local scale. This attempt was reflected in the writings of military theorists in England, France, the United States, and later Italy and Germany. The term "local war" was extensively utilized by British military theorist Liddell Hart, who noted that local wars serve as an indicator of tension in relations between nations and can escalate into a world war.

German military theorists "labored" a great deal over elaboration of a theory of local wars, especially when Hitler came into power. As they saw it, local military conflicts were an alternative to world war, that is, inevitable and necessary events since, as they claimed, a world conflagration can be avoided at the price of "small" wars. Essentially this was nothing other than theoretical substantiation of the widespread aggressive actions of the Hitlerite clique at that time.

It was primarily American military theorists who were successful in galvanizing the concept of local wars following World War II.

Views on the role and place of local wars in the strategy of imperialism following the war went through certain stages of development which were closely linked with changes in the international situation and the evolution of military hardware.

In the first postwar period (1945-1953), ruling circles in the United States and the other imperialist countries proceeded from plans calling for waging a coalition nuclear war against the USSR and the other socialist countries. The entire significance of the global strategy of imperialism boiled down to a focus on employment

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of weapons of mass destruction. It received material embodiment in the creation of military blocs and belts of encirclement around the perimeter of the world socialist community and in ensuring constant readiness of army and navy to launch a surprise first strike.

During those years the global strategy of imperialism found expression in a policy of so-called "containment of communism" and its military equivalent -- the doctrine of "balanced forces." This doctrine was grounded on the principle of "to each his own" in a future war: air forces would deliver a nuclear strike against strategic targets in the enemy's heartland, the army would conduct operations in land theaters, while the navy would ensure supremacy on the sea and would attack marine and coastal targets. This was not yet a military doctrine elaborated in detail, which would specify employment of military forces in local wars. Strategic planning and distribution of the efforts of military forces were conceived rather by spheres of action than by types of war (world or local). According to U.S. politicians, the doctrine contained "the embryo of theory of local wars" and an appeal to begin extensive preparations for such wars. But in its embryonic state, the theory of local wars focused on the position that they should, in the opinion of U.S. military theorists, prevent the spread of communist ideas, hinder liberated countries from taking the socialist road of development, crush the national liberation movement by force, and prevent the final collapse of the colonial system.

The postwar period running from 1954 to 1960 was marked by creation of the first fairly fully formulated U.S. doctrine -- the doctrine of "massive retaliation." It boiled down essentially to the following: in place of "scattered" employment of military potential, one should be prepared to launch a massive attack at a pre-determined time and at a place advantageous to the United States. This doctrine called for settling all international conflicts, without exception, which in one way or another affected the interests of monopoly capital with nuclear arms. The authors of the strategy of "massive retaliation" unequivocally stated that any local incident could serve as grounds for a "lightning nuclear strike" if it was considered "to affect U.S. national interests." Admiral Radford, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that "if even one single Communist soldier crosses the boundary with the West, the United States will immediately declare a general nuclear war."⁴⁰ It was believed in top U.S. political and military circles that the new doctrine would so paralyze the will of the socialist nations that they would not respond to new expansionist actions by the U.S. Government.

In those years, characterized by a new upsurge in the national liberation movement, the U.S. Government's military plans were putting more and more emphasis on the struggle against peoples fighting for their independence. In this aspect the doctrine of "massive retaliation" was considered as a warning to the Soviet Union not to undertake actions in support of the revolutionary and national liberation movement. They were counting on the USSR, faced with the alternative of a general war or acquiescence to the aggressive actions of U.S. imperialism, retreating under U.S. pressure.

Initially U.S. allies supported the doctrine of "massive retaliation." But the practicalities of life soon demonstrated that, in the first place, nuclear war was too dear a price to prevent an upsurge of the revolutionary and national liberation movement, and in the second place that this movement is a manifestation of the

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process of world development and not the result of the "schemes of international communism." As critics of this doctrine stated, every time "a threat would arise over Indochina, Lebanon, Quemoy and Matsu, and Berlin, the administration would either refrain from taking action or would desperately gather conventional forces in order to control the situation with their assistance."⁴¹

In 1961 there began a period connected with the formation and confirmation of the doctrine of "flexible response," adopted in 1967 by all NATO member nations. This doctrine signified a watershed between a general nuclear missile war with the participation of the principal adversaries and local wars on the periphery which, in the opinion of military theorists, could be fought at safe, low levels of employment of forces. In particular, the doctrine of "flexible response" placed primary emphasis on employment of conventional forces and weapons in local wars and counterinsurgency operations, that is, actions against irregular forces (usually guerrillas), leaving the strategic nuclear forces as a main reserve in case of a general nuclear missile war.

U.S. military and political leaders executed a new reorientation in their military plans, placing emphasis on development of "general purpose" forces, in particular special forces -- the so-called "Green Berets" -- for conduct of counterinsurgency operations. From a political and military standpoint, this reorientation was connected chiefly with the large military-technological advances achieved by the Soviet Union, which enabled it at this time to establish strategic missile forces for delivering a massive response nuclear strike. In fact, prior to the appearance of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles in the USSR, the question of limitation in employment of nuclear force did not arise with U.S. military-political leaders. U.S. policy in any military conflict was based on the principle of maximum employment of all forces, including nuclear. But when it became obvious that the weaponry contained the potential of unlimited defeat and military conflict could escalate into a nuclear war, which unquestionably would cause difficult-to-predict damage to the United States, the efforts of American, and not only American, politicians and strategists were concentrated on limiting war in space and in weaponry employed, but without reducing the readiness of armed forces to wage nuclear war.

The essence of the concept of local wars, which became a most important element of the doctrine of "flexible response," can be formulated as an endeavor by the United States to ensure preparedness for aggression by forces and weapons, "dosed" in conformity with the scale of the conflict. They were counting on making up for a certain constraint in achieving global strategy objectives with the aid of nuclear weapons.

Local wars and various military conflicts were henceforth interpreted as an alternative and to a certain degree complement to such a dangerous form of armed violence for imperialism as a general nuclear war, but with retaining armed forces readiness to fight such a war. The NATO Council resolutions of 12 December 1963 clearly stated that a most important precondition for the conduct of a local war was the capability to fight a general war for, without possessing this capability, it is impossible successfully to wage local wars and achieve the stated political objectives.

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Justifying their interference in military conflicts in any part of the world and assistance to all forces opposing the revolutionary and national liberation movement, U.S. leaders would point to their "military obligations." R. McNamara, for example, secretary of defense during the J. Kennedy and L. Johnson administrations, stated: "We need preparedness to conduct local wars and counterinsurgency operations, which do not reach the scale of a general nuclear war, not so much for defense of our own territory as to meet our obligations to other nations... pledges made after World War II. These agreements include the treaty on the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Western Hemisphere, NATO in Europe, SEATO and ANZUS in the Far East. We also have bilateral agreements with Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines."⁴²

During these years the junior partners of the United States -- Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal -- also stepped up the struggle against the revolutionary and national liberation movement.

Thus at the beginning of the 1960's local wars and so-called counterinsurgency operations advanced to the forefront in the global strategy of imperialism.

At the beginning of the 1970's when new changes took place in the world balance of power in favor of the forces of democracy and socialism, the United States and its aggressive bloc allies retained and further strengthened in their policy the role of local wars and counterinsurgency operations. This confirms the new concepts of employment of military force adopted by the United States and other imperialist nations.

One feature of contemporary capitalism lies in the fact that it adapts to the new world situation, characterized by change in the correlation of forces and by a certain strategic balance between the United States and the USSR. In these conditions the strategy of local wars becomes, to use the expression of General Secretary of the U.S. Communist Party G. Hall, "a specific form of struggle by imperialism, which has replaced the old forms and is characteristic of a historical period in which the correlation of forces has shifted against it."⁴³

This is perfectly reflected by the new U.S. doctrine of "credible deterrent," officially adopted by the United States in 1971. It does not essentially differ from previous doctrines. For example, although in this doctrine the United States acknowledges, out of considerations of self-preservation, a nuclear missile war to be suicidal, it by no means rejects war as an implement of policy. Former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger stated in his book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" that "war should be utilized as an instrument of policy" and that "an inability to use force can perpetuate international disputes."⁴⁴

In the doctrine of "credible deterrent" the point is not to exclude war as an instrument of policy but rather to reduce the degree of direct involvement of American troops in military conflicts. As it turns out, this is the essence of the so-called realism of the new global strategy. "One of the principal strategy aims," stated former U.S. Defense Secretary M. Laird, "is to prevent participation by Americans in future Vietnams."⁴⁵

The changes which have taken place in the global strategy of U.S. imperialism have occurred under the direct influence of Nixon's "Guam Doctrine,"⁴⁶ a component

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element (and a particular instance) of which was the program of so-called "Vietnamization" of the war in Indochina. This program was considered at the time as an experiment which can have far-reaching consequences for the struggle against the revolutionary and national liberation movement not only in Asia but on other continents as well.

The objectives pursued by the U.S. Government in proclaiming the Guam Doctrine were concrete:

1. To establish, with "military aid" to local reactionary and proimperialist regimes (Israel, Thailand, South Korea, the Saigon regime, etc), bastions of defense of U.S. interests in Asia, the Near East, Africa and Latin America, which would become bridgeheads for advancing the struggle against countries which are pursuing an independent policy, and against patriotic forces of national liberation. In each region of the world the United States should have, of its "friends and allies," a key figure on whom one could rely in all things.

2. Shift the main burden of bloody ground operations in local wars and military conflicts to the troops of its "friends and allies" ("Asians against Asians," "Africans against Africans"), giving them military-technical assistance and providing vigorous support with U.S. air and sea forces, as well as land forces if necessary.

The doctrine of "credible deterrent" reflects a certain revision by the U.S. Government of its views on the previously operating principle of "automatic involvement" of the United States in any local wars and conflicts. U.S. military and political leaders reached the conclusion that armed intervention should be carried out with the least risk for the United States, in order not to repeat the bitter experience of the Vietnam adventure and other aggressive actions.

The political strategy of the new administration of J. Carter, who assumed the presidency in 1977, was stated fairly clearly, as regards that part which applied to the world's so-called peripheral regions. The J. Carter administration considers it essential to turn to the "third world," actively to interfere in the affairs of small countries, without excluding the possibility of employing military force. This was stated time and again both by Carter and by his closest political and military advisers. The Carter Administration established the interventionist "Rapid Deployment Force" for armed intervention in the affairs of sovereign nations. Carter and his supporters justified and continue to justify openly repressive actions in the world arena, pointing to a non-existent "Soviet threat" and the necessity of defending "spheres of vital U.S. interests." Precisely these "arguments" were used by the Carter Administration in conducting aggressive actions against the people of Iran, which overthrew the despotic regime of the Shah in February 1979, and in inciting armed intervention into the affairs of democratic Afghanistan, which took the road of progressive reforms following the 1978 April Revolution. The U.S. Government is continuing to support in various parts of the world dictator, puppet regimes such as that of Pinochet, murderer of the Chilean people, Egyptian president Sadat, etc. This is nothing other than an attempt to continue the expansionist foreign policy under new conditions and to step up the activities of reactionary pro-imperialist forces in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

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In August 1980 the Carter Administration added to the doctrine of "credible deterrent" the so-called "new nuclear strategy," which calls for fighting a "limited" nuclear war. This strategy essentially boils down to making the very idea of nuclear war more acceptable to public opinion. This same objective is pursued by arguments about "limited," "partial" employment of nuclear weapons, which have nothing in common with reality and merely serve to delude people. In actual fact the hegemonist aspirations of U.S. ruling circles stand behind this new strategy.

* * *

The entirety of postwar history shows that the imperialist nations have sought, by gaining military-technical superiority over the socialist nations, to extend the limits of "attainability" of foreign policy objectives with the aid of means of military coercion. The revolution in weaponry, which became obvious as a result of the development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, at first seemed to aggressive imperialist circles to be that line beyond which lies embodiment of the dream of creating an "absolute force" and, consequently, the attainability of any hegemonistic goals. But the military-technological development of the imperialist countries has not been taking place in a vacuum, but in a world in which a world socialist system exists. It has been accompanied by the forced growth of the military might of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, commensurate with the interests of security of the socialist community. As a result, the relative possibility of employment of military force with impunity (or with "acceptable losses") is steadily diminishing.

An analysis of the change in the place and role of local wars in the global strategy of imperialism indicates that the basic ideological premises on which the policy of the major imperialist powers toward small countries and peoples was traditionally constructed have remained unchanged. Revision of certain points of strategy in the struggle against the revolutionary and national liberation movement applied only to the methods and forms of implementation of this policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marks and F. Engel's, "Soch." [Writings], Vol 20, p 164.
2. Ibid., Vol 34, p 248.
3. Ibid., Vol 36, p 531.
4. F. Engels called the Crimean War (1853-1856) the most vivid example of a war of this type. The British press at the time appraised the limitedness of the results of this war as follows: "We lost 20,000 men but did not conquer sufficient land to dig 20,000 graves" (cited in B. Brodi, "Strategiya v vek raketnogo oruzhiya" [Strategy in the Age of Missile Arms], translated from English, Moscow, 1951, p 285). The press reflected the attitudes of certain segments of British society, which felt that it was better to negotiate an acceptable peace with Russia than to continue military operations with the insignificant success they had achieved up to that time.

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5. Marks and Engel's, op. cit., Vol 29, p 212.
6. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], Vol 26, p 224.
7. Ibid., Vol 36, p 48.
8. Ibid., Vol 30, p 132.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., Vol 26, p 316.
11. Ibid., Vol 30, p 115.
12. Ibid., p 262.
13. See "Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional. Kratkiy istoricheskiy ocherk" [The Communist International. A Concise Historical Sketch], Moscow, 1969, p 265.
14. "Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional v dokumentakh, 1919-1932" [The Communist International in Documents, 1919-1932], Moscow, 1933, p 702.
15. "Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy. Dokumenty i materialy" [International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties. Documents and Materials], p 288.
16. Ibid., p 317.
17. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 36, p 292.
18. Ibid., Vol 38, p 337.
19. Ibid., Vol 49, pp 369-370.
20. Ibid., Vol 13, pp 72-73.
21. Ibid., Vol 41, p 242.
22. "Mezhdunarodnoye...", op. cit., p 287.
23. A. Mahan, "The Interest of America in Sea Power," Boston, 1897, p 171.
24. C. Woodruff, "Expansion of Races," New York, 1909, pp 5, 8.
25. LIFE, 5 June 1939.
26. See U. Foster, "Ocherk politicheskoy istorii Ameriki" [Sketch of American Political History], Moscow, 1953, p 674.
27. "Inaugural Addresses of Presidents of the USA," 1961, p 267.

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28. Beginning in the first half of the 16th century, England, resorting to initiating wars and diplomatic maneuvers, aggressively pursued a policy of "balance of power" in Europe and throughout the world. Exploiting conflicts among its rivals and creating endless pretexts for conflicts in various parts of the world, British diplomacy and strategy aimed at world hegemony. The heyday of this policy coincided with the years of might of Britain's colonial empire. Prominent statesman Lord Palmerston was considered its most vigorous champion. Palmerston liked to repeat: "We have no eternal allies or eternal enemies, but merely permanent interests."
 29. These ideas were developed by Mahan in two books: "Neobkhdimost' Ameriki v morskoy moshchi" [America's Need of Sea Power], 1897, and "Problema Azii" [The Asia Problem], 1900.
 30. Mackinder (1861-1947) was born an Englishman. In the 1940's he moved to the United States, where he revised his geopolitical ideas, which had originally been formed applicable to Great Britain, in a spirit to the liking of the United States. Mackinder constructed his schemes of a postwar anti-Soviet "balance of power" during the war years and failed to figure that two states would be formed on the territory of Germany and that after the war a great many countries would fall out of the orbit of imperialist influence. Nevertheless Mackinder's ideas were not forgotten when creating the network of military bases and blocs which surrounded the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in a solid ring of encirclement.
 31. Spykman (1870-1944) wrote two books on this subject: "Amerikanskaya strategiya v mirovoy politike" [American Strategy in Peacetime Policy] (1942) and "The Geography of the Peace" (1944). In the latter he wrote: "As long as the center of world power was in Europe... a Eurocentric map was quite satisfactory. With the beginning of the 20th century, however, independent sources of power arose, challenging Europe as the sole foundation of world politics.... A geocentric map with the United States in the center today gives a clearer picture of its position both in respect to Europe and the Far East. Today the United States is a continental country linked by railroads and the Panama Canal, so that both coasts enjoy easy access to both sides of the Eurasian continent, via the Atlantic and Pacific oceans." N. Spykman, "The Geography of Peace," New York, 1944, p 14.
 32. CENTO (the former Baghdad Pact) was originally a "mutual cooperation pact between Iraq and Turkey," signed in Baghdad on 24 February 1955. The following countries were added in 1955: Great Britain in March, Pakistan in October, and Iran in November. Iraq left the pact in March 1959. The CENTO bloc collapsed following the victory of the people's revolution in Iran (1979).
- SEATO -- "Southeast Asia Treaty Organization" -- a treaty signed in Manila on 9 August 1954 by eight countries: the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan. In September 1975 a meeting of the SEATO Council in Washington announced curtailment of the activities of this bloc.
- ANZUS -- "Pacific Security Pact" -- signed on 9 January 1951 by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

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ASPAC -- "Asian-Pacific Council" -- a regional political alliance formed in June 1966. Members included Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Vietnam (up to 1975), Taiwan, and South Korea. Malaysia left the organization in March 1973.

33. W. Kintner, R. Strausz-Hype, and A. Daigherty, "Protracted Conflict," New York, 1956, pp 127-128.
34. R. Strausz-Hype, "Geopolitics. The Struggle for Space and Power," New York, 1942, p 194.
35. V. Vil'yams, "U.S. Intervention in Russia," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 4, 1964, p 173.
36. R. Tucker, "The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy," Washington, 1974, p 32.
37. K. Klauzevits, "O voyne" [On War], Moscow, 1932, p 246.
38. Ibid., p 249.
39. The Military Encyclopedia published by Sytin in 1913-1914 lists in the bibliography of the article "Small War" works published in the 19th century on this subject, including Decker's "The Small War in Light of the War of the Future" (Berlin, 1822), "Malaya vojna i ucheniye o boye" [The Small War and Teaching on Combat] by Valentini (Saint Petersburg, 1811), Rueter's "Doctrine of the Small War" (Zurich, 1864), and Wuddern's "The Small War and Transport Communications Service" (Berlin, 1899-1906).
40. A. Schlesinger Jr., "A Thousand Days," New York, 1965, p 289.
41. Ibid.
42. Cited in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1975, p 91.
43. G. Hall, "New Phenomena and Problems of Imperialism," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 12, 1970, p 70.
44. H. Kissinger, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," New York, 1957, p 4.
45. COMMANDERS DIGEST, Washington, 1971, p 2.
46. U.S. foreign policy doctrine set forth by President R. Nixon in a speech on Guam on 26 July 1969.

Chapter Two. HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL AND WORLD WARS

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Prior to both world wars, local wars and military conflicts served as an indicator of the gradual aggravation of the international situation and the creation of

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military-political crises, and contributed to the final distribution of political and military forces. Since these regulators of relations between imperialist nations, which were limited in form, could not resolve the conflicts inherent in imperialism but on the contrary aggravated them to an even greater extent, they only fostered initiation of the world wars.

The aggressive imperialist nations, which were embracing a policy of gaining world supremacy by conquest, and consequently a policy of unleashing a world war, utilized local wars and military conflicts as an instrument with the aid of which they would test the economic and military strength of the opposing side, its mobilization capabilities, and level of development of its armed forces and art of warfare. The process of "testing" began long before the outbreak of the world wars. The knots of those conflicts, which subsequently became dangerous world-war focal points, were tied in individual local clashes on various continents, at different times, and seemingly without any direct relationship to the future world conflagration.

In addition, local wars and military conflicts, both before World War I and II, were utilized by the imperialist powers as an instrument for putting together hostile coalitions. These processes occurred differently at different times.

Antagonistic coalitions were in the forming process during the 28 years preceding World War I, gradually acquiring new members and from time to time losing members. The disposition of forces in the world arena did not take shape until after the Second Balkan War, and became fully defined in the course of the first two years of World War I.

The Great October Socialist Revolution engendered new historical conditions: alongside conflicts between the imperialist powers and their groupings, a decisive factor of world politics came into effect -- the root conflict of the contemporary era between the two opposing social systems. The first five years of the postwar period brought total collapse of the old coalitions, while the succeeding 10 years contained a series of local wars and military conflicts aimed at crushing the national liberation movement, under the cover of which the imperialist states were hammering together small blocs against the Soviet Union. A few years later imperialism shifted to direct local armed attacks on the Soviet Union.

Alongside this, under the effect of the law of nonuniformity of development of capitalism and aggravation of interimperialist conflicts, there was taking place a gradual process of formation of two opposing imperialist military blocs, aimed at seizing world hegemony. This process included, as an inevitable stage, new local wars and military conflicts, initiated in most cases by fascist, militarist states in the West and East. These local military clashes (the Austrian Anschluss, fascist Germany's seizure of the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, the Japanese invasion of China, the war between Italy and Ethiopia, etc) played the role of catalyst in the final distribution of the forces of imperialism between the two opposing military blocs. After the bloc of aggressive nations (Germany, Italy, Japan) was established, an alliance of opposing imperialist powers -- Great Britain, France, and Poland -- formed under the direct influence of the military actions of fascist Germany. Up to that moment the Western powers had been continuously attempting to establish a united front of imperialism against the USSR.

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The Anglo-French-Polish alliance, however, proved to be so weak that it collapsed under the first blows dealt by fascist Germany in 1940. An antifascist coalition began to form after Germany attacked the USSR.

The experience of history attests to the fact that local wars and military conflicts were deliberately initiated by imperialist powers for the purpose of utilizing them as proving grounds to test new weapons and modes of conduct of military operations prior to starting a "large" war. In World War I such new innovations as automatic weapons, radios, airplanes, and tanks in the area of military hardware, and continuous fronts and army operations in the area of modes of warfare were extensively utilized, and this happened in large measure because these "innovations" had passed the "test of battle" in the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Balkan wars. In like manner, the element of offensive surprise, massing of tanks and aircraft, methods of total war and many other items in the art of warfare characterizing World War II were tested in local armed conflicts prior to the outbreak of the world war.

If we compare the number of local-scale armed conflicts which took place prior to World War II and in the period between wars, one readily notes an increase not only in their total number but their scope as well.

Manifested in this was the incipient process of globalization of the strategy of imperialism. The duration of local wars reached three years or more, and armies numbering in the millions took part in the battles, armies equipped with all modern military hardware. Fronts extended 1500-2000 kilometers, and the warring sides would sustain enormous losses.

Forming as a counterbalance to the global strategy of imperialism was a strategy of antiimperialist, antifascist struggle, a struggle for peace and social liberation, which played a major role in the course and outcome of World War II.

Following World War II, local wars and military conflicts unleashed by the forces of imperialism and international reaction placed the world time and again on the brink of a thermonuclear catastrophe. Occurring in various regions, they continue today forming dangerous focal points of tension. They create a situation of constant military danger, which the imperialist powers utilize as a means of holding in check the revolutionary and national liberation struggle of peoples.

Part II. LOCAL WARS OF THE CONTEMPORARY ERA: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS

Chapter Three. LOCAL WARS IN ASIA

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Following the rout of Japan's Kwantung Army by the Soviet Armed Forces in August-September 1945 and the surrender of imperialist Japan, the countries of Asia became a zone of local wars and military conflicts initiated by the imperialist powers with the aim of crushing the extensive national liberation movement and preserving the colonial system.

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The United States seized the role of leader among the imperialist powers in the struggle against national-patriotic forces. Initially the program of expansion of U.S. imperialism in Asia included China. When this program failed, U.S. strategy was reoriented toward more aggressive penetration of other countries. A characteristic feature of this reorientation was its focus against the USSR and the socialist countries in Asia.

The shift executed in the foreign policy of China's ruling clique toward anti-Sovietism and hegemonism and the fact that this policy precisely coincided with the position of the most extreme reaction throughout the world seriously complicated the situation on the Asian continent. The policy of the Beijing leaders, which is openly directed against the majority of socialist countries, has essentially become an important reserve of imperialism in the struggle against revolutionary and national liberation forces. This was attested by acts of armed provocation by China on the border with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which occurred with increasing frequency in the latter half of the 1970's, and subsequently, in February-March 1979, escalated into an aggressive war against the SRV, and hostile actions at this same time by the pro-Beijing Kampuchea regime against Vietnam, incited by China, until the people overthrew this regime in January 1979, as well as acts of provocation directed against the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Burma, and a number of other countries.

In recent years the imperialists have begun more frequently resorting in Asia to a so-called tactic of "peaceful incursion" or "operation to stabilize the situation," which in actual fact means situation destabilization. The term "peaceful incursion" is defined in such a manner that it can justify interference by the imperialists in the internal affairs of a given country under the pretext of rendering assistance and establishing "law and order," while in actual fact the purpose is to crush national liberation forces.

Pieter Keuneman, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, noted in his speech at the 25th CPSU Congress that "U.S. imperialism... in league with various internal reactionary forces... is seeking to carry out a policy of 'destabilization' and overthrow of objectionable governments in many countries of this region. It seeks to set the countries of this region against each other and thus... to reverse positive trends toward détente and the development of regional cooperation which have been manifested in recent years."*

The essence of the "New Pacific Doctrine" of the United States, proclaimed by the U.S. President on 7 December 1975 in Honolulu, consists in U.S. military and economic aid to reactionary regimes being declared the principal factor making it possible to achieve a "balance" of power, while close cooperation with Japan is considered the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the Pacific. The essence of this doctrine is expressed in the fact of supporting the regime in power in South Korea and maintaining American troops there, as well as military assistance to such Southeast Asian countries as Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. An important place in this doctrine is assigned to normalization of U.S. relations with China and drawing China into a so-called "new structure of peace in Asia," based on maintaining the position of U.S. imperialism in the Far

* PRAVDA, 1 March 1976.

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East. The U.S. administration is presently seeking to make Japan an accomplice in the adventures of U.S. imperialism in the Near East as well, while China's rulers have moved toward rapprochement with Japan. Something in the order of a triple alliance on an anti-Soviet foundation is being formed.

America's "New Pacific Doctrine" was born as a result of failure of the strategic concepts grounded on the employment of military force in Asia. The wars in Korea and Indochina have demonstrated that today, when the world community of socialist nations has taken on the character of a decisive factor in history, peoples fighting for their freedom and independence and supported by the nations of the world socialist system, and the USSR in particular, cannot be defeated.

Chapter Four. LOCAL WARS IN THE NEAR EAST

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The ideologues of imperialism seek to portray local wars and military conflicts in the Near East as clashes between Arabs and Jews, between the population professing Islam and the population which adheres to the Judaic faith. In actual fact, however, these were wars and conflicts between the forces of the national liberation movement of the Arab East and international imperialism and its henchmen in this region of the world.

Up to the mid-1950's Great Britain and France, which were endeavoring to hold the countries of the Arab East in a position of dependence, were primarily to blame for local wars and military conflicts in the Near East. Following the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956, their place was taken by the United States. Initially the United States attempted to place the Arab countries in subjection by means of dictate and military force, but it soon saw that this tactic was fruitless. Defeated in its direct assault, the United States proceeded along the path of neocolonialism and support of reactionary regimes. When this path also proved bankrupt, the United States placed its stake on Israel, as the principal striking force in the struggle against the Arab countries.

U.S. imperialism pursues an openly neocolonialist policy in the Near East. First and foremost it finances and arms Israel as defender of the "values" of Western civilization, "as the best, most successful, most undemanding ally the West could ever hope to have."* On the other hand, the United States seeks to draw the governments of Arab countries over to its side with money and minor concessions, supports reactionary forces, and incites conflicts among the Arabs, setting them against each other and endeavoring to dominate this important region.

In contrast to local wars on other continents, in the Near East they have as a rule been fought by regular forces armed with modern combat equipment and weapons. For this reason they are the object of close study by military theorists. The experience of military operations in the Near East has strongly influenced the organizational development and structure of the armed forces of the principal

* "Protiv sionizma i izrail'skoy agressii" [Against Zionism and Israeli Aggression], Moscow, 1974, page 169.

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capitalist powers, development of the art of warfare, and has greatly promoted improvement of combat equipment and weapons.

Chapter Five. LOCAL WARS IN AFRICA

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The national liberation movement in Africa has achieved historic success in the years since World War II. Dozens of African nations have gained their independence. The peoples of the liberated African countries have made enormous achievements in strengthening industry, agriculture and culture. The ideas of scientific socialism have spread throughout Africa.

The fact that the national liberation struggle of the African peoples was successful was a consequence of changes in the world balance of power in favor of democracy and social progress, the most important of which was establishment of the camp of socialist nations and increase in its economic and military might.

The history of Africa's postwar development attests to the failure of the colonial policy of imperialism and all its doctrines and concepts pertaining to preserving colonialism in its new variations.

The position of imperialism on the African continent is still strong, however. Monopoly capital still holds commanding heights in the economy of a number of African countries. Continuously renewing the arsenal of forms and methods of neo-colonialism, the imperialist powers continue to influence the policies of a number of African countries. In addition, attempts continue to be made to draw African countries into aggressive imperialist blocs, to separate them and kindle hatred between them. The strategic planning agencies of the NATO countries assign to the African continent an important role in global strategy. Positioned in the immediate vicinity of Europe, Africa and the surrounding sea-lanes and islands are considered to be the innermost strategic rear area in the zone of responsibility of the U.S. military on the European and African continents. Employment of military force continues to be considered one of the principal means of strengthening neocolonialist positions in Africa. But under the new, changed conditions, more thorough preparations are made for aggressive actions, in order to execute them quickly and to present the world community with a fait accompli. For this purpose the United States has recently formed special mobile "strike forces" that can be quickly dispatched to any conflict area.

The imperialist powers and monopolies are seeking to force upon the young African countries an economic, political and military alliance under the banner of rabid anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. They pursue two objectives: the first is to frighten the developing countries with the myth of a "Communist threat," while the second is to obtain from the governments of the African countries greater opportunities for ventures by foreign capital and for establishment of military bases.

A distinctive feature of the situation in Southern Africa is the steadily growing national liberation struggle of the peoples of Zimbabwe, the Republic of South Africa, and Namibia. The racist regimes, supported by international imperialism,

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are stepping up terrorism against the indigenous population and are carrying out a policy of apartheid and ruthless crushing of any and all manifestations of the liberation movement of the African people. Ruling circles of the imperialist powers view Southern Africa not only as an area of application of capital and source of superprofits, but also attach great strategic importance to Southern Africa in implementation of their interventionist policy.

Local wars on the African continent differed appreciably from wars in the Near East. In the Near East wars were fought as a rule by regular troops on both sides, armed with modern weapons and combat equipment, while African peoples which took the path of armed struggle against the colonialists established their armies in the course of war, under conditions of a severe shortage of weapons and qualified command personnel. The Algerian National Liberation Front possessed the largest armed forces, but even they did not total more than 130,000 men. The numerical strength of the military forces of the colonial powers was also relatively small, although they were double or triple the forces of the insurgents. The French army brought in to fight the war in Algeria was an exception: it totaled as many as 882,000 men.

In the Near East the principal role of the armed forces of the Arab countries consisted in repelling external aggression and liberation of Arab lands from the colonialists. The Arab countries sought to achieve this goal by defeating the enemy's forces on the battlefield. The objectives of the armed struggle of the peoples of Africa were of a different nature. Since the colonialists enjoyed a clear superiority in personnel and weapons, these goals consisted not so much in defeating the enemy's forces -- this would have been an impossible task -- as in actions aimed at forcing the colonial powers to leave Africa. Guerrilla actions were the principal form of armed struggle by the insurgents. Guerrilla tactics, however, adopted many aspects of operations by regular troops, particularly planning of operations and tactics of combined-arms combat. Mobile defense was the principal type of defense by the insurgent forces. Static defense was employed only when defending bases and important base areas.

The national liberation struggle of African peoples against the colonialists has enriched the art of warfare of the military organizations of oppressed peoples with new methods and techniques of guerrilla warfare and has raised it to a new and higher level.

Chapter Six. LOCAL WARS IN LATIN AMERICA

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The historic victories of the Soviet Union in World War II and the radical changes in the world balance of power which took place in the postwar years exerted decisive influence on development of the national liberation movement in Latin America. The antiimperialist struggle took on a general character. The worker masses and all progressive forces in the region vigorously championed the cause of complete national independence and social progress for their countries. What had until recently been a relatively firm strategic rear area of U.S. imperialism and a very important source of raw materials and cheap labor was transformed into one of the world's blazing continents. There occurred further consolidation of all progressive,

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patriotic forces of the region. The general development trend of revolutionary events on this continent corresponded on the whole to the general direction of world history, the principal content of which is a transition from capitalism to socialism. An important milestone in this process was the victory of the Cuban revolution, which demonstrated that Latin America is also taking the highroad of the forward movement of all mankind which was opened up by the Great October Revolution.

In the face of these events, U.S. imperialist circles were forced to revise their policies time and again and to alter their strategic plans regarding the Latin American countries, at one time establishing an "Alliance for Progress," at another time engaging in open intervention, and at another time taking direct part in reactionary military coups. They counted primarily on military force and dictator regimes. The continent was enmeshed by various U.S. bases. Almost continuous military clashes between patriotic forces and the forces of reaction were taking place in one area or another.

An important feature of local wars and military conflicts in Latin America was the fact that they were small in scale. There were no large, protracted battles such as in Asia and the Near East, and the opposing sides did not employ large numbers of tanks and aircraft. Military operations, however, were of a savage character. Progressive forces fought united, under the direction of Communist and worker parties, and offered fierce resistance to reaction. A wealth of experience was gained in the conduct of military actions in various areas, on jungled mountain terrain, in urban and rural localities. As a rule the patriotic forces consisted chiefly of ground troops armed with light weapons. Guerrilla actions and street fighting in built-up areas constituted important forms of armed struggle. In the course of the struggle, Latin American patriots employed both attack and defense. In the majority of countries, however, their tactics boiled down to defensive engagements and counterattacks. Progressive forces in the armies of the Latin American countries frequently made common cause with the insurgents.

The revolutionary process on the Latin American continent has entered a new phase. Progressive, patriotic forces are joining into a united front in the struggle against the dominance of U.S. imperialism and the local oligarchy. The proletariat, led by Communist and worker parties, marches in the vanguard of the struggle.

Chapter Seven. LESSONS OF LOCAL WARS

1. Military-Political and Strategic Lessons of Local Wars

The entire history of local wars initiated by the imperialist bourgeoisie attests to the bankruptcy of the idea of counting on force as a means of achieving political objectives. This is the first and most important practical lesson learned from "minor wars." Preparing for and undertaking local wars, imperialism has sought to reestablish previously lost positions in some region of the world, or at least to prevent narrowing of the sphere of its political and economic dominion. For the most part, however, the results of local wars have thwarted these plans. This constitutes irrefutable proof of the failure of the strategy of local wars.

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Today the ideologues of imperialism can no longer call the national liberation struggle a conspiracy by a narrow group of revolutionaries, as they frequently did in the past. The broad masses have been drawn into the struggle, representing various segments of the population, which forces the aggressors to wage war not so much against armed forces as against the entire people. The history of our time has shattered hopes of vanquishing a people fighting for its independence and in addition bolstered by the comprehensive assistance and support of progressive forces.

Experience has shown that capitalist powers, embarking upon outright aggression, have frequently been forced to limit the scope of employment of their armed forces and weapons in order not to evoke a large international response. The political, economic and military might of the socialist countries, and particularly the nuclear missile might of the Soviet Union, has been a restraining factor here.

A certain role in the collapse of the strategy of local wars was played by conflicts within the imperialist camp, and occasionally the outright refusal by U.S. partners to accept responsibility for the actions of the "world's policeman." Many countries which initially had willingly supported a given act of U.S. expansion and had taken part in local wars, subsequently refused altogether or took part only symbolically, as was the case, for example, during the war in Korea. The United States was also unable to put together a genuinely united counterrevolutionary front during the war in Vietnam. The principal U.S. partners, using various excuses, avoided direct participation in this dirty adventure.

Some small capitalist countries, refusing to support aggressive policies, gave up their membership in imperialist blocs. Deep conflicts paralyzed ASPAC. Malaysia declared its withdrawal from the pact on 12 March 1973. The SEATO bloc has been virtually inactive since 1975.

Collapse of the strategy of local wars was most appreciably promoted by conflicts appearing between major imperialist countries. In 1956 the United States did not support Great Britain and France, its NATO allies -- in their aggression against Egypt, since the United States wished to weaken the position of these countries in that region. Direct clashes between the interests of monopoly capital of a number of countries occurred during local wars in the Near East and Cuba. In 1961, for example, major Latin American countries refused to support the aggression against Cuba organized by U.S. ruling circles. Nor did Great Britain and other capitalist countries support this aggression.

At the same time events of recent years indicate that, in spite of growing difficulties in utilizing military force to achieve political aims, militarist circles in imperialist nations are by no means rejecting the concept of local wars, but on the contrary are galvanizing it. Forced to close down military bases in one country, they seek to establish bases in others and make efforts to stabilize existing military blocs and to create new ones. U.S. strategic planners consider it essential to establish new bases on sparsely-populated islands located near zones of national liberation struggle. Plans to establish new U.S. military bases on islands in the Indian and Pacific oceans, in the Persian Gulf and in South Africa are being carried out in conformity with this "insular" strategy.

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Also indicative is the fact that there has been noted in the global strategy of imperialism a trend toward establishing regional alliances and blocs. In this way militarist circles in the imperialist countries are attempting to bind together both their loyal allies and puppet regimes and countries pursuing a noncapitalist road of development, seeking to profit on the desire of the peoples of developing countries for regional cooperation.

It has become typical of the policy of imperialist circles to give any aggression the appearance of a "legitimate" action. In order to conceal from the working people of their countries and the world community the predatory, reactionary aims of local wars, the thesis is propagated that armed intervention by the imperialist powers in the internal affairs of sovereign nations is at the request of "legitimate" governments to "protect" these countries from "Communist aggression" or for "protection" of the white population. Great Britain and France attempted to justify the war against Egypt in 1956 by the necessity of protecting "freedom" of navigation through the Suez Canal, which in actuality nobody was threatening. Preparations for and execution of aggression against the Congo were under the pretext of the necessity of "protecting" the white population. The United States camouflaged its intervention in the affairs of Vietnam and Angola with a slogan of struggle against the intrigues of international communism.

The global strategy of imperialism, if one takes into consideration the entire system of local wars and military conflicts, has today taken on certain specific features.

The first feature to which one should direct attention is change in the nature of the strategy in regard to the spatial extent of wars and military conflicts. We know that military operations in World War II encompassed three continents and vast expanses of ocean. Strategic planning was conducted on the scale of the land or sea theater: European, Asian, African, Atlantic, and Pacific. But coalition planning was just beginning to incorporate individual elements of coordinating military operations both by time and theaters.

The postwar strategy of imperialism proceeded and continues to proceed from the position that we are operating in a "single world strategic theater." U.S. military strategy prescribes, in case of a world war, simultaneous conduct of military operations on the inhabited continents, on the vast ocean expanses, and in the aerospace environment. That part of military strategy which should ensure seizing and holding strategic bridgeheads on the various continents is implemented in a practical manner through local wars and military conflicts. It is not mere happenstance that the system of local wars and military conflicts was coordinated with the network of military bases on foreign soil and the system of military blocs.

Globalization of the strategy of imperialism in the postwar period is indicated by the fact that from 1945 through 1971 seven blocs were formed on the European continent, in the Mediterranean Basin and in Asia, the majority of which were military alliances directed against the socialist countries. Countries drawn into military aggressive blocs, in addition to the majority of European capitalist countries, included Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, South Korea, South Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. The forming of a given bloc was accompanied by the construction of naval and air

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bases on the soil of bloc member countries, stockpiling of supplies, and deployment of forces representing all the armed services, command and control agencies, and communications centers. In the final analysis world imperialism succeeded in deploying more than 2200 military bases on foreign soil. If one considers the fact that a large number of reconnaissance satellites launched by the United States are continuously circling the planet and that surface warships and nuclear submarines are constantly on patrol in the oceans and seas, in a full state of readiness, it becomes obvious that the global strategy of imperialism has assumed the character of a bloc strategy based on maintaining an enormous war machine in a constant state of combat readiness.

This promotes the creation of an exceptionally explosive situation in many of the world's regions, whereby involvement of one country in a war can draw the remaining members of the blocs into that war. As practical experience has shown, it is precisely the bloc strategy of imperialism which is the principal cause of occurrence of focal points of tension in a given region.

Additional evidence of further globalization of the strategy of imperialism is provided by changes in the character of its links with the material foundation which supports it, including a contingent of mobilized manpower resources.

We know that the main principle of a national strategy is reliance on one's own resources, on the potential capabilities of one's own country, national armed forces, national material and manpower resources. A number of measures of a military-economic nature would usually be carried out only on the outbreak of war: shifting industry to war production, a sharp increase in the military budget, mobilization and deployment of troops to wartime strength levels, organization of command, control and communications. Concentration of operational-strategic forces in the designated areas was the concluding action.

In present-day conditions the situation regarding adjustment of the material foundation to the strategy of imperialism has radically changed. One can state that a large part of the measures signifying establishment of this foundation have already been carried out in peacetime. The lion's share of the military-economic potential of the capitalist world, which is integrated through various economic associations and alliances such as the "Common Market," "Euroatom," the European Coal and Steel Community, etc, is utilized in the interests of continuous readiness for war. Planners count most heavily on creating so-called "prewar readiness potential." Arms, equipment and ammunition (including nuclear) are stockpiled in the probable theaters of war and in the vicinity of potential conflict areas. In addition, deployment of ground, naval and air forces, equipped with the latest weapons and combat hardware, which are regularly replaced by even more sophisticated equipment, has already been completed within the framework of the imperialist military blocs.

The theaters in which military forces of the bloc allies have been deployed have been prepared from an engineering respect, contain a developed road network and a smoothly functioning communications and control system. If one considers the fact that joint forces are operating within the aggressive NATO bloc, air defense is carried out according to a uniform plan, and imperialist bloc troops are in a continuous state of combat readiness, the possibility of their immediate engagement will become obvious.

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In the process of development of the global strategy of imperialism, there was also occurring globalization of the armed forces control system of the aggressive nations. The development and improvement of this system are inseparable from the forming of integrated military-political groups of imperialist countries, the bloc and base strategy of imperialism. Establishment of the Western European alliance in 1948 signaled the beginning of transition to a global system of leadership. Permanently operating political and military forces control agencies as well as corresponding rear services management and troop combat training elements were set up within the framework of this bloc, the first since World War II.

With establishment of the North Atlantic alliance (NATO) in 1949, the movement of the imperialist countries toward globalization of strategic leadership became even more distinct. The global aspirations of NATO military and political leaders also determined the structure of the armed forces control system. It contained military-political agencies engaged in coordination of political, ideological, scientific-technical and military tasks proper. Implementation of aggressive schemes and plans is handled through the permanent council and military planning committee. Following are the implementers of these plans: the joint strategic planning staff, supreme commanders, Europe and Atlantic, Northern Europe, Central Europe, and Southern Europe theater commands, Western and Eastern Atlantic and English Channel commands, and Atlantic strike forces command.

The presently existing structure of top-level NATO military agencies enables the coalition's political and military leadership immediately to initiate military operations on land, on the sea and in the air, without executing special deployment of coalition forces. The entire strategic command and control system is supported by high-speed multichannel communications, with extensive employment of wire, radio and satellite communications links.

As new blocs were formed, the system of mutual communications between them and NATO was also expanded, which led to completion of globalization of armed forces strategic leadership and control. Key positions in this system are concentrated in the hands of NATO military-political leaders and, through them, in the hands of the Pentagon. Attesting to this is the principle of division of the world among bloc partners into so-called "zones of responsibility." According to the existing "cut," the U.S. "zone of responsibility" includes the following: the European and African continents, Central and South America, Asia, the Pacific and Atlantic, that is, the principal regions of the world.

As experience indicated, modes of initiation of local wars and military conflicts as well as the character of combat operations of the opposing sides were distinguished by a great diversity, which depended on such factors as aims of aggression, relative strengths of the opposing sides, specific features of the theater, the general military-political and strategic situation at the outbreak of war, the operational-strategic and political significance of the region in which local wars erupted.

Among the diversity of modes of initiation of local wars, however, one can distinguish the most typical:

a) a direct, open armed attack by one or several imperialist countries against a sovereign nation (the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in

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1956, the U.S. aggression against Lebanon and British aggression against Jordan in 1958, Belgian aggression against the Congo in 1960, Israeli aggression against the Arab countries in 1967, etc);

b) utilization of reactionary puppet regimes and dependent countries with subsequent armed intervention by major imperialist powers (the war in Korea in 1950, the war in South Vietnam in 1964);

c) attack on a sovereign country by reactionary forces which had been trained and prepared by major imperialist nations on their own soil or on the territory of adjacent countries (the attack on Cuba in 1961, aggression against Guatemala in 1954, against Honduras in 1956, etc);

d) initiation of local wars and military conflicts by the colonial military forces of imperialist powers (wars by the British colonialists in Oman in 1971, by the French in Algeria in 1954, by the Portuguese in Angola in 1976).

Wars, and military conflicts to a certain degree, can be divided into two groups according to character of military operations. The first group includes those wars in which regular military forces took part on both sides, and the geographic conditions of the theater permitted the employment of large masses of troops and all types of arms and equipment (the wars in Algeria and Korea, the Arab-Israeli wars). A clearly marked front existed in such wars. Military actions were conducted in the form of operations and engagements, characteristic of so-called "civilized" theaters, while in content and character they were similar to the operations and engagements of World War II.

The second group of local wars is characterized by the fact that military operations took place in the specific conditions of the theater (jungle, rice paddies, desert). Regular military forces of the aggressor took part in them, while as a rule irregular units and guerrilla detachments took part on the side of the victims of aggression (wars in Burma and the countries of Indochina). Continuous fronts and clearly marked force groupings were lacking in such wars. Theater conditions excluded the conduct of combat operations by large combined units and formations. Tactical-echelon units usually took part in the fighting, and combat operations were initiated and conducted simultaneously in many sectors scattered over a vast territory. Actions on the part of the aggressor were characterized by attempts to mount a broad offensive with employment of all combat arms and naval forces, and on the side of the resistance forces -- by surprise raids on enemy installations, extensive maneuver of forces, etc.

Quantitative and qualitative (in the sense of sophistication of equipment) superiority of the forces of the aggressors left an imprint on the art of warfare of the people's liberation armies. In connection with this, reliance on the masses and a combining of combat actions by regular troops with organization of a struggle against the interventionists by all the people were distinctive features of the strategy of people's liberation armies.

The experience of local wars and military conflicts attests to the fact that the aggressors employed the personnel and equipment of all armed services for their initiation and conduct. The role and percentage share of each of these, however, differed from one war to another; they varied in relation to the conditions of the

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theaters, the level of military technological advance achieved in the given period, and assimilation of previously acquired combat experience. In the first postwar decade, for example, employment of the various armed services was based for the most part on the experience of World War II. During this period the principal role in accomplishing the missions and objectives of local wars was assigned to ground troops. Subsequently as well, the experience of World War II was utilized in local wars, but taking postwar combat experience into account. Air, naval, and air defense forces assumed much greater importance.

In any given local war, the role of a given branch of the armed forces would be determined by the specific operational-strategic missions being performed by the armed forces. During the U.S. aggression in South Vietnam, for example, defeat of the People's Liberation Armed Forces, seizure and holding of specified areas were considered the principal mission of U.S. forces. Air, naval, and ground forces took part in carrying out this mission. The principal role, however, was played by ground forces, which bore the brunt of the effort to seize and hold major installations and areas.

The United States pursued a different objective in aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The objective was to undermine the military-economic potential of the DRV, the morale of the people and army, and thus to force the DRV to stop assisting the patriots of South Vietnam. U. S. military leaders figured that they would be able to accomplish these missions not in a "contact" war, that is, not in close contact with the enemy, but by bombing major installations, as well as by means of a sea and air blockade of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and naval shelling of its coastal areas. Therefore the United States employed primarily air and naval forces in the aggression against the DRV. This country sustained enormous damage as a result of the blockade and bombardment, but the aggressor failed to achieve his objective.

The experience of local wars, in the opinion of Western experts, attests to enhancement of the role of air defense forces, which is due in particular to the fact that the capabilities of air defense weapons have increased sharply. They believe that antiaircraft missiles have become the principal means of combating hostile aircraft. They displayed a high degree of effectiveness in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Military experts claim that skillful employment of antiaircraft missile systems made it possible to thwart the plans of Israel's military leaders to gain air supremacy. In this war neither side's air forces were able to penetrate air defense.

Foreign military experts note that a wealth of experience in electronic warfare has been acquired in local wars. Electronic warfare was conducted by all branches of the armed forces, but especially aggressively by air defense forces against hostile aircraft. Foreign experts claim that this is because modern air defense systems are equipped with numerous and diversified radio electronic devices which detect air targets, provide target designation and control functions for antiaircraft missile systems and fighters, that is, provide the capability to combat hostile air forces in a highly effective manner. Foreign experts believe that the high degree of combat effectiveness of antiaircraft missile systems has compelled the air forces of several countries, and the United States in particular, to equip all aircraft with electronic countermeasures gear and to increase equipping of naval forces with such gear. As of the end of 1967, for example, more than half of U.S. tactical and

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carrier-based aircraft were equipped with ECM gear. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 approximately 30 percent of Israeli aircraft carried electronic detection and jamming gear.

Electronic warfare included, on the one hand, measures aimed at jamming enemy radio electronic gear, and on the other hand -- protection of radioelectronic equipment and securement of its operation in the most complex conditions of electronic warfare. All known methods and means of conduct of electronic warfare have been employed in local wars. Air and naval forces have employed detection and jamming gear, decoy targets, and antiradar missiles against electronic warfare facilities, while ground electronic warfare units and subunits were also employed in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. The electronic gear of these units and subunits enabled them to determine the location of radar sites, command and control facilities, antiaircraft missile system positions, and seriously to hamper their operations. Utilizing ground electronic gear, the Israelis endeavored to disorganize control of Arab ground forces units and combined units in addition to jamming; in particular, this involved deceiving the Arab command, interfering in the radio communications of ground and air combined units and units, and issuing them phony instructions. The foreign press notes¹ that the Israeli military command sometimes even succeeded in taking over control of Egyptian ground units and aircraft.

Foreign authors believe that protection of radioelectronic installations against jamming activities was provided by means of communications security and countermeasures, which diminished the effectiveness of jamming and prevented antiradar missiles from homing to the target.

Communications security involved reducing to a minimum or terminating for a specific period of time the operation of radioelectronic equipment, reducing radiated power, utilizing several different frequencies, resiting radio electronic facilities, etc. Maintaining radio silence was also practiced. Antiaircraft missile systems were protected in a number of cases by switching on radars only just prior to firing missiles. But this proved possible only with a sharp reduction of time to transmit information on the coordinates of air targets from early-warning radars.

Protection of radioelectronic facilities included operating at spaced frequencies, combined utilization of various equipment, etc. According to information in the foreign press,² for example, radio electronic equipment of the air defense system of Egypt and Syria achieved a high degree of jamming resistance in the war in the Near East in October 1973 by employing mixed groups of several types of antiaircraft missile and antiaircraft artillery electronic control gear, operating at different frequencies and in different bands.

Foreign military experts conclude from the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War that electronic countermeasures are a most important factor ensuring penetration of enemy air defense. They also believe that victory in combat operations and a war as a whole is impossible without the conduct of electronic warfare. This conclusion confirms, for example, the fact that many Israeli pilots refused to fly combat missions without ECM gear.

In the opinion of foreign military experts, employment of electronic warfare equipment is becoming one of the most important elements of preparing for and

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conducting combat operations. It is not mere happenstance that many countries, and the United States in particular, are modernizing existing and developing new electronic warfare equipment on the basis of the experience of local wars; immense funds are being spent on this effort. It was noted in the foreign press, for example, that since 1969 the United States has been spending 400 million dollars a year on development and manufacture of electronic countermeasures gear, with annual expenditures increasing to 600 million dollars beginning in 1975. U.S. military leaders claim that such expenditures are repaid many times over by reducing combat equipment losses as a result of employment of electronic warfare gear.

Important lessons learned from local wars and military conflicts include acknowledgement of the enhanced role of the morale factor in the course and outcome of military operations. One can see in the example of many wars how the military technological superiority of the armies of the imperialist aggressors was in the final analysis reduced to zero by the moral-political superiority of the national liberation and patriotic forces, supported by their peoples and offered strong sympathy and comprehensive aid by the nations of the socialist community and all progressive forces. This is a general rule which was long ago proven by the founders of Marxism-Leninism: conviction in the justice of the aims of a war or military conflict unites nations which rise up in struggle for their liberation or defend their independence, and cements the morale of the troops.

As a rule present-day local wars are not declared but arise as a result of a direct surprise attack by a large imperialist power on a small country or develop out of a little-significant military conflict or clash between domestic antagonistic forces, with subsequent foreign intervention by the mobilized armies of imperialist nations or their satellites. Advance preparedness, the element of surprise in initiating military operations, and substantial military-technical superiority initially give the aggressor an appreciable military advantage and sometimes throw confusion into the ranks of the liberation forces, which result in considerable casualties and withdrawal deep into the heartland. The potential moral superiority of the liberation forces is not yet able to come into effect at this stage. But as confusion is overcome, as forces are united and the masses are politically mobilized for the struggle against the enemy, and with increased moral and material support and assistance from the outside, patriotic liberation forces become more confident of victory and gain strengthened awareness of the community of their interests with those of all antiimperialist, progressive forces of the present day. Thus the moral factor takes on important significance in military operations.

As is indicated by the experience of local wars and military conflicts, liberation forces clash in combat with forces whose morale is generally low, and which declines catastrophically at the very first major combat setback. According to the experience of the war in Korea, in Vietnam and other U.S. interventionist actions, one can see how low was the morale of U.S. armed forces personnel. The soldiers lacked a true understanding of the reasons for, the aims and consequences of the war. And assessment of the moral qualities of the U.S. serviceman indicated that he was an enterprising specialist with a highly developed technical practicality and mercantile interests. He had blind faith in his military-technical superiority and was unable to stand up under the protracted stresses of a combat situation.

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As was indicated by the experience of wars in the Congo, Angola and elsewhere, interventionist forces contained many mercenaries, consisting of déclassé elements and professional killers. Financial reward was their principal incentive determining conduct in battle.

Liberation forces possessed unquestioned advantages in combat against a morally weak adversary who had invaded a foreign country since, fighting for a just cause, they were also fighting on their own native soil, were better adapted to local conditions and, most important, were always supported by their own people. Guerrilla warfare, grounded on moral support by the local population, took on a truly popular character. The interventionists could not apply any effective measures against this form of struggle by patriotic forces.

Thus the experience of local wars and military conflicts teaches that the moral factor is one of the most important factors affecting the course and outcome of military operations. Expressing the general law of dependence of success and defeat on the morale of the fighting masses, it became a factor in the victory of the liberation forces.

2. Experience in Combat Employment of Ground Forces

Practical experience of initiation and conduct of local wars and military conflicts indicates that ground forces bore the brunt of the efforts to achieve objectives and accomplish the operational-strategic missions of military operations. In the armed forces of aggressive imperialist nations, ground forces comprised from 75 to 90 percent of the total forces involved in various wars. The armies of countries which were the victims of aggression frequently consisted exclusively of ground forces.

Infantry (motorized infantry) and armored combined units and units comprised the core of aggressor ground forces. Airborne and marine combined units and units were also extensively employed in land operations. The ground forces of countries which were victims of aggression usually consisted of infantry combined units, units, and subunits.

A characteristic feature of aggressor ground forces was an extremely diversified national makeup and differing level of technical equipment. This is due to the fact that frequently not one but several countries fought on the side of the aggressor, with each country providing far from equal forces. In the war in Korea, for example, U.S. and South Korean forces totaled dozens of divisions, while the other countries which took part in the war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent only symbolic forces (a company or battalion) to the theater of operations.

The ground forces of the major imperialist states (France in Algeria and the United States in Korea and Vietnam) consisted of regular army combined-arms large units. These combined units formed the core of the main force groupings in carrying out strategic and operational missions. As regards independent units and subunits and various improvised detachments, they would be employed by the aggressor either as auxiliary forces or as sources for regular troop replacements.

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The ground forces of dependent countries or the troops of native armies used by the aggressor had an organization and equipment differing from the regular forces of the home countries. The South Korean army and the Algerian colonial troops, for example, in spite of the fact that they were armed by the United States and France and trained by their military specialists, were substantially inferior to the troops of the home countries as regards quality of weapons, combat equipment, and the combat efficiency of personnel.

In some local wars the aggressors resorted to mobilization of antipopular, reactionary forces of the attacked countries. Emigrés, white mercenaries and local reactionary elements were utilized, for example, for aggression against Cuba, Burma, Laos, the Congo, and Angola.

Various missions would be assigned to ground forces in local wars and military conflicts. The most typical of these are the following:

defeat enemy ground forces;

seize and hold important areas, installations and administrative-political centers;

participation in assault landing or antilanding operations.

Methods of carrying out these missions depended on the specific geographic conditions of the theaters of operations and the state of the ground forces proper.

If the theater permitted employment of ground forces in large formations, and the armed forces of the opposing sides consisted for the most part of regular units, as was the case in the wars in Korea and the Near East, for example, combat operations would be conducted in the form of engagements and operations in conventional configuration. In these cases there would be a clearly defined combat front. Operational formations, as well as combined units, units and subunits would be assigned zones of responsibility and would have a "traditional" tactical order of battle.

In wars in difficult-access theaters and in combat against partisan detachments, the aggressor would be forced to employ his ground troops as independent combined units, units, and even subunits. The engagements and battles which ground troops fought in these cases would assume the character of actions by an army of occupation. There was actually no battle line. Combat actions would flare up at separate points simultaneously or sequentially, over a substantial portion of a country or throughout its territory. Ground troops actions in difficult-access theaters were frequently of a search-and-destroy character. Ground troops would conduct operations and combat actions with the objective, depending on the assigned missions, either of finding and destroying liberation forces, forcing them out of areas they were occupying, or sealing off the combat area from an influx of troops from elsewhere.

In addition to this, indicative of U.S. ground forces was participation in a so-called "other war,"³ the objectives of which would be formulated in specifically drafted programs. Following were characteristic of "another war": so-called "pacification," which pursued the aim of intimidating the bulk of the population with violence and threats, and bribing an unstable segment of the population over to

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the U.S. side; implementation of programs calling for the conduct of special operations aimed at killing patriotic forces military, political and administrative cadres; implementation of an "open arms" program, which included an aggregate of measures to draw traitors, prisoners and defectors over to the side of the aggressor.

The experience of local wars attests to the fact that the actions of aggressor ground forces in the conduct of "another war" were distinguished by large scope and savage cruelty toward the population, with the aggressor deliberately deceiving the public regarding the course of events.

Characteristic of the offensive operations of people's liberation armies were thorough preparation of conditions for attack, swiftness of actions and the element of surprise, seizure of enemy weapons and combat equipment, followed by withdrawal to friendly bases of operations. Attacks would be launched for the most part at night, frequently without preliminary bombardment. With surprise attacks on enemy garrisons, national liberation forces would keep the enemy in a constant state of tension.

National liberation armies displayed a high degree of activeness and mobility in the defense. Constant harrassing fire and frequent counterattacks were a characteristic feature of defensive actions by patriotic forces.

Instructive conclusions on the employment of tunnels in the defense proceed from the experience of the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Tunnels would be constructed in conformity with the overall defense plan and would be coordinated with the overall defensive system. Indirect fire positions and shelters for personnel and equipment would be set up in tunnels. Tactics of tunnel warfare, in conditions of aggressor air supremacy, where the aggressor extensively employs napalm, proved highly effective, in the opinion of Western experts.

In the course of local wars people's liberation armies amassed a wealth of experience in organization and conduct of anti-landing defense of a seacoast. Anti-landing defense would be carried out as a rule in conditions of overwhelming enemy force superiority on the sea and in the air; although most frequently unable to prevent the landing, these defensive efforts did hinder the enemy's actions.

In the majority of local wars the objectives of the operation and engagement would be achieved by the joint efforts of all ground forces combat arms. Artillery was a most important means of enemy neutralization by fire. Even in the war in Korea and the Arab-Israeli wars, in spite of the massive employment of air, artillery remained a means of supporting infantry and tanks both in the attack and in the defense. In conditions of forested mountain and jungle terrain, howitzer and mortar fire proved most effective, while in operations on open terrain gun artillery, and especially antitank guided missiles, assumed a primary role.

In the opinion of foreign experts, self-propelled artillery was highly effective in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. They concluded that this war once again confirmed that self-propelled artillery possesses greater mobility than tractor-drawn artillery, which makes it harder for the enemy to scout it out and engage it. This same experience, however, also attests to the fact that a self-propelled gun loses its

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mobility upon taking chassis damage. In this case a self-propelled gun would either be destroyed or withdrawn from combat.

The Arab-Israeli wars, especially the 1973 war, confirmed the great effectiveness of antitank guided missiles. They penetrated the armor of all types of tanks employed in the war. In the opinion of Western experts, ATGM⁴ were superior in combat effectiveness to all other antitank weapons. It was calculated that ATGM accounted for 50 percent of all Israeli tanks destroyed on the Egyptian front, although ATGM comprised only 11 percent of Egypt's antitank weapons.

Tactical missiles with conventional warheads were first employed in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Foreign military observers note their high degree of effectiveness, especially against targets occupying a certain area deep in the defenses, and against large targets on the battlefield.

In spite of the fact that in many local wars combat operations took place on adverse terrain, the view is that armored forces were widely employed and played a very important role in the outcome of battles. Most frequently they were employed in small groups in coordination with infantry (motorized infantry) as infantry close support in the attack. In the defense tanks were employed to engage the tanks of the opposing side and were the principal force in mounting counterattacks.

Tank troops were employed in large groups on terrain suited for tank operations. Particularly large tank groups were employed in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Precisely this convinces many that the greatest effectiveness of actions was achieved with the massive employment of tanks for swift offensive exploitation on the main axis of advance and the mounting of determined counterattacks and counterthrusts in the defense.

The view is that this same war demonstrated particularly forcefully the dependence of combat employment of tanks on the ability of the command and staffs to control units and combined units and on the combat proficiency of personnel. The Israeli military command would usually form operations groups, for attacking on the main axis of advance, consisting of 3-4 armored and 1-2 mechanized brigades, 6-8 self-propelled artillery battalions, an ATGM battalion, air defense and engineer units and subunits. All infantry employed in these groups would be transported by armored personnel carriers, and only occasionally would ride tanks in the assault. This composition of operations groups ensured their independence in combat as well as smooth teamwork and coordination between combined units and units within operations groups, as well as with air and air defense forces, while the presence of self-propelled artillery in these groups made it possible to carry out offensive exploitation at a rapid pace and to achieve the stated objectives.

Alongside massive employment of tanks, the Israeli military command extensively employed (in particular, on the west bank of the Suez Canal) small tank groups (up to a company) reinforced by motorized infantry subunits and ATGM mounted on armored personnel carriers for independent actions. Artillery representatives would be assigned to the groups for adjustment of fire, and forward air controllers to guide aircraft to the target.

Tank troops were less effectively utilized in the armies of the Arab countries, in the opinion of foreign military observers. They note that the reason for this was

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substantial miscalculations by the military command in employment of tank forces both at the operational and tactical level: tank forces would not be concentrated for swift, deep offensive exploitation on the main axis of advance, but would be dispersed to operate together with infantry along the entire offensive frontage. Essentially tank divisions would be assigned to infantry divisions as independent brigades and battalions and would be employed in the attack echelon to penetrate fortified positions, but not for deep offensive exploitation.

Helicopters were first employed and underwent extensive development in local wars initiated by the imperialists following World War II. Originally employed as transport vehicles, they were subsequently transformed into a potent weapon.

In the opinion of experts, helicopters are capable of performing diversified combat missions and give mobility to ground troops combat actions. This made it possible, especially on adverse terrain, to accomplish rapid troop redeployment and rapidly to negotiate natural and man-made obstacles. Airmobile operations (engagements), for example, were the principal mode of combat actions by U.S. ground forces in Vietnam.

In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, helicopters armed with ATGM were extensively employed for close support of ground troops. In the opinion of foreign military experts, helicopters armed with antitank guided missiles proved to be a highly effective means of combating tanks and antitank weapons. The great effectiveness of combat actions by helicopters employing ATGM as fire support weapons was achieved, they concluded, by their sudden and surprise appearance over the battlefield and the fact that they remained there only briefly.

The experience of local wars confirmed for ground forces the role of principal armed forces branch in combat operations, revealing both the strong and weak points of this military service.

Strong points, in the estimate of foreign experts, were as follows: high mobility of combined units and units in conducting combat operations on difficult-access terrain; saturation of combined units and units with weapons; capability of ground troops to respond swiftly to sudden, unexpected situation changes; capability of rapid replacement of obsolete weapons and combat equipment with improved models in the course of a war.

Western experts consider as weak points the low level of preparedness of ground troops for night combat; fear of close combat and a high degree of sensitivity to casualties; a high degree of combined unit and unit dependence on fire support, and the inability of motorized infantry (infantry) to operate independently. The experience of the fighting in Korea, Vietnam and the Near East indicates that with inadequate support by artillery, air and tanks, infantry usually would sharply diminish its activeness or cease combat actions.

The leading role and high percentage share of ground troops in overall armed forces strength compelled ruling circles and military leaders in the imperialist nations to devote greater attention to their further development in a qualitative respect.

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According to the general conclusion, the principles and modes of employment of ground forces in local wars did not undergo radical changes in comparison with their combat employment in World War II. At the same time local wars essentially served as a proving ground, where the organizational structure and combat proficiency of personnel, forms and modes of combat operations were tested alongside new models of weapons and combat equipment.

The specific features of theaters dictated a given organization and degree of technical equipment of ground forces. Most frequently the organization of divisions was too cumbersome, and they possessed inadequate mobility. Therefore, as is noted in the foreign press, the general direction of measures to improve organizational structure was the "freeing" of ground troops combined units from organic units hampering maneuver on the battlefield, alongside heavier saturation with weapons. A single aim was pursued -- to improve ground troops combat employment capabilities, particularly their mobility. Taking into account the experience of the war in Korea, for example, and foreseeing future aggression in Vietnam, U.S. military leaders removed Honest John rockets and some tank battalions from infantry divisions. Motorized infantry battalions mounted on armored personnel carriers were incorporated into the division in place of the removed tank battalions. The number of airborne battalions and companies was increased in the ground forces.

The experience of the war in Vietnam showed, however, that partial changes in the organizational structure of ground forces combined units cannot fully solve the problem of increasing their mobility. In 1965 the United States created a division of a new type -- airmobile. It contained 3 airborne battalions, 6 infantry (airmobile) battalions, 3 battalions of 105 mm howitzers, an army aviation group (428 helicopters and 6 fixed-wing aircraft), plus other special units and subunits. The division's numerical strength ran to 16,000 men.

Replacing heavy weapons and equipment with lighter models, the American reduced (in comparison with an infantry division) by one third the total weight of weapons of the airmobile division, which now could be airlifted by organic helicopters from one area to another in three trips.

The airmobile troops which were created during the aggression in Vietnam were initially considered highly promising. After some time, however, U.S. military circles reached the conclusion that although airmobile combined units are in fact effective as regards mobility, requisite for waging antiguerrilla warfare on difficult-access terrain, and with an adversary who is significantly inferior in war-fighting capability, but they are highly vulnerable when employed against an adversary with an equal degree of technical equipment.

The process of improving weapons and combat equipment continued in the United States and a number of other imperialist countries, on the basis of the experience of local wars. Considerable attention was devoted to reducing the weight of artillery systems and mortars, increasing their operational reliability in adverse climatic conditions, simplification of design and construction, higher rate of fire, and a large basic combat load. Improvement of armored equipment proceeded in the direction of increasing weapon firepower, improving conditions of delivering fire, improving cross-country performance, maneuverability and extending range.

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Failure of the plans of local wars, permanent aggravation of internal economic and social problems, and revision of some strategic views pertaining to the forms and degree of direct U.S. participation in armed conflicts led to a change in views on further modernization and the very system of employment of ground forces. In the opinion of U.S. military experts, an army should be highly mobile. They believe that ground forces combined units and units should be deployed in such areas and at such a distance from potential focal points of military conflict that they can intervene in events at any time.

The experience of local wars demonstrated as early as the 1950's that ground troops, by virtue of the fact that they are dispersed about overseas territories and possess insufficient mobility, are unable successfully to carry out unexpectedly arising combat missions in given theaters of operations. Therefore special-role forces were established in a number of capitalist countries. In the United States, for example, a special strategic army corps was formed in 1958. Initially this corps consisted of ground troops combined units and units. In 1961 the United States established a strike command (subsequently redesignated "readiness forces" command), which included an army and an airborne corps, as well as a tactical air command. The "readiness forces" were placed directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the opinion of the U.S. Defense Department, they are capable of immediate redeployment to any region and of conducting combat operations in any theater and against any adversary. Personnel of the "readiness forces" combat units have three different sets of weapons and gear, each of which is designed for combat in specific regions and conditions. Airlift and sealift capability is specified for transporting these troops to any theater of war. Following the U.S. example, special forces were established at various times in Belgium, Holland, Spain, and Portugal.

The experience of local wars has exerted and continues to exert considerable influence on development of the theory of combat employment of ground forces. It confirmed that offense continues to be the principal type of military operation. The following remain as the most important principles of offense: decisive massing of men and weapons on the main axis of advance; the element of surprise in commencing combat actions; reliable suppression and neutralization of the enemy's defense with artillery fire and airstrikes; penetration of a deliberate enemy defense on a broad frontage and at a rapid pace (the brunt of the effort to penetrate prepared defensive positions is borne by motorized infantry (rifle) combined units, while employment of tank troops is specified for swift, deep offensive exploitation); sealing off the combat area from an inflow of defending force reserves; reliable protection of troops against air attack. In the opinion of foreign military experts, a new element in the organization of ground forces is the establishment of small tank groups (5-10 tanks), and in operations -- employment of such small tank groups reinforced by motorized infantry. These groups would advance ahead of the main forces, with the mission of probing for weak points in the enemy's defense. In addition, a most important mission of tank groups, working jointly with helicopter tactical assault forces, was the destruction of antiaircraft guided missile sites. A new element in the operations of tank subunits, in their opinion, was the frequent employment of tank battalions, reinforced by ATGM, as antitank screens.

In the opinion of Western experts, a characteristic feature of engagements fought by ground forces on difficult-access terrain is independent actions by small subunits. The success of combined units and units would frequently be dependent on the results

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of actions by battalions, companies, and even platoons. Tactical training of small subunits, in the opinion of the experts, remains an extremely important precondition for success.

A wealth of experience in employment of helicopters has been amassed in local wars (this applies particularly to the war in Vietnam). Foreign experts are of the opinion that helicopters constitute promising army aviation unit armament. They are survivable in a combat situation, especially when employed during hours of darkness and at low altitudes. Helicopters extend the "combat radius" of infantry, give it high mobility, and enable the command successfully to resolve problems of concentrating personnel and weapons in decisive sectors, capturing advantageous positions, localizing penetration, and mounting counterattacks and counterthrusts.

At the same time experts note that the greatest effect from the combat employment of helicopters was obtained in local wars against countries the armed forces of which either possessed no modern air defense weapons at all or only in limited quantities.

It is also noted that the success of combat operations depends to an even greater degree than in the past on firmness and flexibility of control of personnel and weapons. The nature of modern combat operations imposes high demands on stability and efficiency of troop control agencies and on the reliability of weapons and weapon control systems.

Thus the experience of local wars exerts considerable influence on development of the ground forces of capitalist countries. A most important demand has been made of them -- the capability to utilize all spheres of action: land, sea, and air. This demand is implemented in the establishment of airmobile and amphibious units, special-role forces, and organizational improvement of marine units.

3. Experience in Combat Employment of Air Forces and Air Defense

Employment of substantial air forces in the course of local wars affected the entire process of combat, the character and end results of ground, sea and air operations.

Profound qualitative changes connected with converting air forces over to jet equipment took place after World War II in the air forces of all the major capitalist countries. Air-force capabilities also increased with adoption of new weapons: guided missiles and bombs, improved cannon armament systems, napalm and, in addition, equipping aircraft with qualitatively new navigation and aiming equipment.

Fundamentally new weapons, missile weapons in particular, were rapidly developing in parallel with aviation. Rapid advances in rocketry resulted in aviation ceasing to enjoy a monopoly status in nuclear weapons delivery. Rockets took away from aviation some of its previous important missions.

There still remain in land and sea theaters, however (both on the battlefield and in the operational and strategic rear areas), a substantial number of targets which aircraft alone are capable of detecting and destroying with a high degree of efficiency. Therefore air forces continue to play an important role in combat operations with employment of conventional weapons, which is characteristic of local wars.

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It is not mere happenstance that the air forces of the leading capitalist countries -- instigators of and also frequently direct participants in local wars -- continue to be maintained at a fairly high level, both in a quantitative and qualitative respect. The status of the U.S. military aircraft industry is indicative, with tactical and army aviation occupying a predominant position. As of the end of 1975, for example, the total number of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft employed in the U.S. military totaled 9,500. The bulk of these were the latest models of strategic bombers, fighter-bombers, fighters, transports, reconnaissance aircraft, and army aviation helicopters.⁵

Expenditures on development of the new B-1 supersonic strategic bomber speak eloquently of the attention which U.S. ruling circles are devoting to improvement of offensive weapons. By 1976 total expenditures on this bomber had reached 20 billion dollars. In addition to the prime contractor, Rockwell International, approximately 5,000 other subcontractor firms are involved in the project, while the total number of jobs involved exceeds 190,000⁶.

The joint air forces of the various imperialist military blocs constitute a great threat to peace and the security of peoples. NATO air forces total 2,850-2,900 combat aircraft, approximately 1,000 antiaircraft missile launchers, and a substantial number of operational-tactical missiles.⁷

The military-political leaders of the aggressive blocs maintain in a state of readiness an extensive network of air bases in various parts of the world.

The experience of the wars in Korea, in Vietnam, and the Near East indicates that aggressive nations would as a rule conduct combat operations with air superiority over the air forces of the countries which were the victims of aggression. For the attack on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for example, the U.S. military concentrated on the territory of South Korea and at adjacent locations a large part of its air forces in the Far Eastern zone, which totaled 1,172 aircraft when the war began.⁸ At this time the Democratic People's Republic of Korea possessed only 150 obsolete aircraft, which did not represent a substantial combat force.⁹ As the war progressed, U.S. leaders increased their air strength, and by the end of 1953 the fighting strength of U.S. air forces totaled 2,400 aircraft.¹⁰ They were opposed by approximately 700 aircraft, mostly fighters, of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Chinese People's Volunteers.¹¹

The difference in relative strengths was equally striking during the war in Vietnam. In August 1964, for example, there were approximately 680 combat and auxiliary aircraft at U.S. air bases in the combat zone, while two and a half years later U.S. air strength had increased to 2,000 aircraft. During this same period the number of helicopters increased from 300 to 2,400.¹² And yet the patriots of South Vietnam had no aircraft whatsoever, while the Democratic Republic of Vietnam possessed a limited number of fighter aircraft.

In the aggression against Egypt in 1956, Great Britain, France and Israel employed approximately 900 aircraft, against which Egypt could put only 360.

Thus during local wars in Vietnam, Korea, and Egypt (1956), the air forces of the aggressors enjoyed a clear superiority over those of the countries which were the

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victim of aggression. There were exceptions, however. The Israeli aggression against the Arab countries in 1967, for example, began with Israel's air forces totaling 320 aircraft, while the Arab countries possessed approximately 630.¹³

The great inequality in forces between the opposing sides affected the principles of employment of air forces in local wars. While the aggressive nations, taking advantage of their absolute air supremacy, could assign their air forces diversified missions and conduct aggressive combat operations on a large scale, the victims of aggression were compelled to concentrate the efforts of their air forces chiefly on air defense.

One can judge from the war in Korea the enormous influence exerted by air actions on the development of events in local wars. The 1950 counteroffensive by the forces of the Korean People's Army, for example, which began successfully, did not end in the defeat of the enemy in detail on the Pusan beachhead chiefly due to strong opposition by U.S. air forces, which at the time enjoyed air superiority. Sustaining heavy casualties, tank and artillery losses from airstrikes, in mid-June the forces of the Korean People's Army shifted almost entirely to night actions. Their rate of advance dropped off substantially. The aircraft of the interventionist forces pinned down the troops, depriving them of the capability to maneuver and redeploy, and in conditions of mountain terrain and a shortage of transport vehicles, this affected the relative strengths. Truck and rail traffic was disorganized, as a consequence of which the troops of the Korean People's Army failed to receive adequate supplies of ammunition, fuel, and rations.

The slowing of the advance of the Korean People's Army enabled the U.S. command to gain time and, concentrating additional forces, to shift to a counteroffensive.

It was noted in the foreign press that the great distance between the areas of local wars and the home countries, immense expenditure of equipment and supplies, losses and the need to replace them enhanced the role of transport aviation. This was particularly apparent during the war in Vietnam, where the U.S. military command put into operation a military air transport combined unit. Supplies were airlifted a distance of 16,000 kilometers, from supply depots in the United States, across the Pacific to the Indochina Peninsula. The flow of supplies to South Vietnam increased year by year. In 1965, for example, 110,000 tons of various goods were airlifted to the theater of operations, 355,000 tons in 1966, 540,000 in 1967, and 910,000 tons in 1968.¹⁴

Foreign military observers believe that air forces played a decisive role in the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967. Thanks to secrecy of preparations for the aggression on the one hand and the poor level of combat readiness of Egypt's air defense forces and facilities on the other, the Israelis succeeded in gaining the element of surprise in launching airstrikes against Egyptian air bases, as a result of which Egypt lost more than half of its aircraft on the very first day of the war. Having gained total air supremacy, Israel's air forces proceeded to perform missions of close support of Israeli ground forces and intensive airstrikes on the enemy forces. The Egyptian army was compelled to fight on open desert without air cover.

Israeli air forces were compelled to operate in a totally different air situation in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Utilizing the substantially increased combat capabilities of

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their air defense forces and facilities, the Arab countries thwarted the Israeli command's plans to gain the element of surprise in employment of air. Foreign experts state that in contrast to the 1967 war, when the Israelis enjoyed total air supremacy, in October 1973 the Arab air forces were more frequently successful. The air defense forces and facilities of the Arab countries were in a state of high combat readiness. Antiaircraft missile forces provided reliable cover to Egyptian and Syrian troops, airfields and installations in the rear areas. Israeli air forces sustained heavy losses on their very first attempts to penetrate the missile screen. The high degree of effectiveness of air defense weapons in this war led some Western military theorists to the conclusion that air forces played only a secondary role. In their opinion, the main reason for diminished Israeli air force activity lay in the sharply increased effectiveness of air defense.

Air forces in local wars were called upon to perform a large number of missions in the interests of other armed forces branches, and also carried out independent actions, which sometimes assumed the form of special-purpose air operations. Following were the most typical air-force missions: combat for air supremacy; support of ground troops and naval forces during operations; sealing off the battlefield against influx of reserves; landing and dropping airborne assault forces; supporting airmobile operations; strikes on targets in the deep rear areas, with the objective of undermining the enemy's military-economic potential and the morale of the population; conduct of air reconnaissance; transporting troops, equipment and supplies.

The war in Korea and Vietnam, the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt, Israel's treacherous attack on the Arab countries in June 1967, and the military events in the Near East in October 1973, it is believed in the West, demonstrated quite clearly that the battle for air supremacy remains a primary mission of air forces, while gaining of air superiority is a decisive precondition for successful offensive operations on land and sea. General Stratemeyer, former commander of U.S. Far East Air Forces, once stated: "Nothing in the Korean War altered the basic thesis that in order for land and sea forces to be able to operate successfully in today's war, it is essential to gain air superiority."¹⁵

The experience of the majority of local wars indicates that surprise massive air strikes on the enemy's airfields remain, with rare exception, the principal means of gaining air superiority at the beginning of a war.

The usual example cited is Israeli air-force actions in the effort to gain air supremacy during the 1967 aggression against the Arab countries. Israel, as initiator of the armed conflict, at first fully succeeded in repeating the experience of fascist Germany and imperialist Japan in gaining air supremacy; in particular, the aggressor's actions in neutralizing opposing air forces proved identical. This applies both to choice of method of defeating the enemy's air forces and methods of achieving the stated objective. Commencement of military operations was preceded by surprise Israeli airstrikes on the airfields of the Arab countries, as a result of which the latter sustained heavy aircraft losses. According to information in the foreign press, 25 airfields were attacked simultaneously by Israeli aircraft on the first day of the war, and total Arab losses amounted to 60-66 percent of their aircraft. Israeli aircraft losses during the conflict amounted to slightly more than 10 percent.¹⁶

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Such heavy losses led to a change in relative strengths of air forces in favor of the aggressor. At the beginning of the war, for example, the Arab countries possessed almost 200 more aircraft than the enemy, while by 12 June the Arabs had 233 aircraft, and the Israeli air forces -- 260.¹⁷

What conclusions are reached in the Western military press?

First of all, the endeavor to gain air superiority at the outbreak of war and to maintain it in the interests of supporting military operations remained a characteristic feature of military actions. A decisive role in achieving this objective was played by air forces.

Secondly, with a sneak attack on an unprepared adversary and the availability of sufficiently complete information on aircraft basing, the principal mode of combat for air supremacy at the commencement of a war would be massive airstrikes by the attacking side against permanent enemy airfields.

The second most important mission of air forces in local wars was support of ground troops in defensive and offensive operations. Principal airstrike targets were large concentrations of troops and combat equipment, artillery and mortars in fire positions, tanks and motor transport vehicles, as well as troops in loading and unloading areas and during travel. Combat missions would be performed by various methods. In some cases the selected targets for attack would be subjected to concentrated strikes by large groups of aircraft, while in other cases aircraft would operate in small, stacked groups. In conditions of weak opposition by air defense forces, as a rule aircraft would attack from altitudes of 1,500-3,000 meters, with multiple target passes. With increased air defense opposition, aircraft would attack from higher altitudes or would spend less time over the target, or would attack at night.

Army aviation, especially helicopters, was extensively employed in the war in Vietnam in the ground troops support role. In the opinion of U.S. military leaders, they proved to be an indispensable weapon and transport vehicle during operations on adverse terrain, when it was necessary to maneuver troops or launch surprise attacks on the enemy. The Western press reported that in Indochina the U.S. Army flew 8.2 million helicopter sorties in 1969 alone, 6.7 million of these for the execution of combat missions. In the seven years of this war, army helicopters transported 27.6 million men and 2.6 million tons of equipment and supplies.

Concern for increasing ground forces mobility led to an increase in the quantity and improvement in the quality of transport aircraft and the development of new transports. A special place among these aircraft is occupied by the C-5A transport, an aircraft adopted by the U.S. military in 1966.¹⁸

An important place among the missions of the air forces of aggressive nations was occupied by that of sealing off the combat area from influx of fresh reserves and supplies. It would be accomplished by attacking the principal lines of communication with the aim of disorganizing and interdicting all modes of transport. Such operations were conducted particularly extensively by U.S. air forces in the war in Korea and Vietnam, and to a lesser degree by Israeli, British and French air forces during the war in the Near East in 1956.

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In wars against freedom-loving peoples the aggressors sought to utilize air forces to hit targets deep in the rear areas, with the objective of undermining military-economic potential, demoralizing the civilian population and the military, disrupting the functions of government, transportation and communications. The experience of the strategic bombing operations undertaken by the United States and Great Britain against Germany and Japan in World War II were fully taken into consideration. Just as during the war years, however, the aggressors were unable to achieve their stated objectives.

Aerial reconnaissance played an important role in air activities in local wars. Its role and significance were determined by the fact that in local wars success depended in large measure on prompt acquisition of intelligence on the disposition of the enemy's forces, his strength, and the axes of advance of his combined units.

The majority of local wars began and were conducted with the aggressor nations enjoying considerable superiority in air forces. Under these conditions the countries which were the victims of attack were compelled to utilize a large percentage of their air assets for air defense.

The role of air defense varied from one local war to another. It depended, in particular, on the relative combat capabilities of air forces and air defense. For a long time after World War II aircraft capabilities to knock out targets were substantially greater than the capabilities of air defense to repulse air attack. In a quantitative respect the air defense forces and facilities of the countries which were victims of aggression usually were less than actual requirements and could not secure even the most important targets against air attack. Such was the case, for example, in the first and second stages of the war in Korea, at the beginning of the war in Vietnam, and during the aggression against Egypt in 1956.

Air defense capabilities increased as forces and facilities grew, with an accompanying increase in air defense results. The role of air defense in local wars also increased in conformity with this. A gradual increase in the quantity of antiaircraft artillery and fighter aircraft in an air defense system made substantial changes in the air situation. By mid-1953 the air defense system of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers totaled approximately 2,000 anti-aircraft guns, more than 3,000 antiaircraft machineguns, and approximately 700 fighters. This resulted in increased aggressor aircraft losses, which totaled 12,200 combat aircraft lost by the U.S. Air Force alone by the end of the war in Korea.¹⁹

In spite of the fact that quantitative growth of forces and facilities steadily enhanced the role of air defense, for a long period of time the advantage remained on the side of the offense. Aggressor air forces continued carrying out their assigned missions in almost full volume, although it now required a significantly greater exertion and resulted in greater losses. Another approach to solving the problem was needed, namely: employment of new means of combating manned aircraft. An exceptionally important stride in this direction was made during the war in Vietnam, where a fundamentally new air defense weapon was employed for the first time -- antiaircraft guided missiles. It is believed that this new weapon sharply increased air defense combat capabilities and effected radical changes in the character of combat between offensive and defensive weapons.

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Prior to the development of antiaircraft missiles, fighters played a prominent role in combat against offensive air weapons, with antiaircraft artillery in second place. When antiaircraft missiles came on the scene, they proceeded to form the backbone of air defense. For the first time in the history of air defense, ground weapons occupied a preeminent status. Subsequently improvement in the effectiveness of air defense was obtained through quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of antiaircraft missile systems and an improvement in the level of missile crew combat proficiency.

Military events in the Near East in October 1973 demonstrated that air defense, armed with an adequate number of diversified antiaircraft missile systems, had been transformed into a most important factor in military operations. According to Pentagon figures, for example, in a period of 18 days Israel lost 107 aircraft, 99 percent of which were downed by air defense weapons.²⁰ According to other sources, in the course of this war Israel lost approximately 120 aircraft, about 80 percent of which were destroyed by antiaircraft missiles or antiaircraft artillery fire on the first three days of military operations.²¹

In this connection well-known military theorist French general A. Beaufre comments: "At any rate it is now clear that air cannot play a decisive role in a ground battle when powerful antiaircraft missile cover is provided."²² Beaufre states that "the firepower of antiaircraft missiles has totally altered the course of the air battle."

Foreign experts note that as long as the ground forces of Egypt and Syria were protected by ground air defense weapons, the Israeli army, lacking support from its own air forces, could not carry out its offensive plans with the same swiftness and effectiveness as occurred during the 1967 war. Israel's air forces in turn found themselves in a difficult predicament when attempting to carry out their combat missions. Discussing this fact, army general (Moren), chief of staff of France's armed forces, emphasizes that employment of highly efficient ground air defense weapons "led to the failure of low-level attacks by Israeli aircraft on Egyptian troop concentrations in the vicinity of the Suez Canal and on canal crossing points."²³

Air defense in local wars was essentially antiaircraft defense. It did not essentially change even when the attacking side employed winged rockets, since they were engaged with the same weapons as piloted aircraft. The diversity of conditions in which local wars were fought was reflected on the organization of air defense. Its structure, layout, distribution of efforts, and modes of performance of missions had their own specific features in each war. At the same time, as foreign observers note, general principles of organization and conduct of air defense were characteristic of local wars: unity of structure of air defense on a nationwide scale; concentration of efforts on protecting major installations of military-economic potential and force groupings; extensive maneuver of air defense personnel and weapons; combined utilization of all combat arms in conformity with their combat capabilities. Of decisive significance was the combat readiness of air defense subunits and units to repel enemy air attacks.

In most cases the air defense of the countries against which aggression was unleashed had to combat an air adversary with considerable inequality between

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offensive and defensive air weapons. As experience indicates, various targets were destroyed or neutralized not only by employing large air forces but also by running repeated bombing strikes on one and the same targets. This same experience led to the conclusion that the attacking side, even possessing a superiority in numbers, was unable to attack all targets simultaneously and was compelled to attack the most important on a selective basis. The selective nature of aggressor air actions dictated a concentration of air defense personnel and weapons in those areas where air forces were displaying particular aggressiveness.

Before guided missiles took their place in the air defense system, the principal means of combating hostile aircraft in local wars were fighters and antiaircraft artillery, supported by radar. In addition to these air defense arms, subunits of heavy-caliber machineguns, antiaircraft searchlights and barrage balloons (in the wars in the Near East) have been extensively employed in local wars.

Western theorists conclude that fighter aircraft employed two basic techniques in repelling aggressor air attacks: scrambling from airfields by alert-status aircraft, and airborne patrols in the vicinity of defended installations. The former was considered the principal method, since it made it possible to combat hostile aircraft with the least expenditure of resources and to concentrate the required number of fighters in the requisite area fairly quickly. This method also made it possible to increase aircraft combat radius and duration of air combat against the enemy.

The latter technique was less advantageous and was employed only in an unclear or very complex situation. Fighters would intercept hostile aircraft on the far approaches to defended installations. This mission was accomplished most successfully with several groups of fighters on standing patrol along specified hostile aircraft approach routes.

The most difficult task for air defense fighters was to repel massive attacks by large forces of aggressor aircraft. In this case fighter aviation, as the experience of the war in Korea indicated, also employed massed actions. Several groups of differing function would engage in air combat simultaneously: a lead group, the mission of which was to intercept the attacking waves of enemy aircraft and disrupt their formations, to force them to release their bombs and auxiliary tanks and to interdict the approach of fresh forces; an attack group, which usually had the mission of shooting down enemy bombers and fighter-bombers before they could reach the target; a group to provide close cover to friendly main forces, with the principal mission of supporting their actions; small groups of "hunters," who had the mission of destroying enemy aircraft on the return flight. A strong reserve would be designated for building up combat efforts and carrying out suddenly arising missions.

This mode of repelling massive air attacks would be employed only when sufficient numbers of fighters were available. With limited forces fighters would repulse attacks, according to the experience of the war in Vietnam, operating in small groups and individually, and employing the "hunt" method, swift attacks and immediate disengagement at maximum speed.

As was determined during the war in Korea, night fighter actions were of great significance, conducted in close coordination with antiaircraft searchlights in searchlight light fields.

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Prior to employment of antiaircraft guided missiles, antiaircraft artillery would protect force groupings, friendly aircraft basing areas, major political and economic centers, communications and route centers, and water impoundment structures, operating jointly with air defense fighters. Coordination between them would be organized either by zones or within a single zone (by targets, lines, sectors, altitudes).

The quantitative growth of antiaircraft artillery was accompanied by increased capabilities for its more extensive employment, which also led to a change in its modes of action. With sufficient forces, antiaircraft artillery would employ fixed-position defense of important installations on the battlefield and in the heartland. A suitable force grouping would be set up around the target, which would include various antiaircraft artillery systems, providing multitiered fire and intensification of fire on the most important operational axes of hostile air forces.

In spite of the fact that antiaircraft guided missiles were utilized differently in a tactical respect in local wars in Vietnam and in the Near East, in particular in the 1973 October War, one can, in the opinion of foreign experts, specify certain common traits connected with modes of execution of their missions by air defense forces.

First of all, with a limited number of antiaircraft missile systems, as was the case in Vietnam up to the middle of 1965, ambush-type actions, employing maneuver on enemy air routes, were considered the principal mode of employment of antiaircraft missile forces. A shortage of weapons initially made it necessary to leave undefended even important installations in the heartland. As soon as the numerical strength of antiaircraft missile forces increased, fixed-position defense of installations became their principal mode of action. Only a portion of antiaircraft missile forces would be assigned to ambush-type actions. Subsequent increase in the number of antiaircraft missile systems led to a changeover to protection by antiaircraft missile forces of a group of installations situated in an extensive area, that is, a shift to the zone principle of air defense force operations. At the same time there were still forces available to defend individual installations, as well as for ambush-type actions.

Secondly, although in most instances air defense fighters performed their missions utilizing old tactics, new elements appeared. It became necessary for aircraft to fly regular standing patrol in alert zones, and to effect a rapid buildup of forces when air combat was engaged. This was dictated by the fact that air engagements would begin with small groups (4-8 aircraft on each side) but would end with a battle in which as many as 20-30 aircraft participated on both sides. In addition, combat would occur at altitudes ranging from 50 to 5,000 meters, was of a dynamic nature, and would be accompanied by swift horizontal and vertical maneuver. This required altitude-stacking groups of aircraft patrolling in the alert zones.

Third, antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft machineguns, as is noted in the foreign press, continued to play an important role in engaging air targets at low and medium altitudes as well as under conditions of jamming. Antiaircraft artillery performed its missions in close coordination with antiaircraft missile systems, providing cover to missile positions and force groupings. Teamwork

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between antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft missile forces in a specific combat situation would be organized by distributing missions, sectors, and altitudes between them.

Fourth, in conditions of enemy employment of intensive jamming, radar troops performed their tasks by operating radars in different frequency bands. In a number of cases force groupings would be established in advance (Near East). Their missions included organization of radar surveillance of the enemy and detection of air targets at low, medium and high altitudes. Western experts believe that radars deployed at mountain sites possessed the best capabilities to perform these missions. In the frontier zone, along valleys, in gorges, and at locations where there were gaps in low-altitude radar coverage, it was necessary to augment the air defense radar system with observation posts in order to detect hostile aircraft; these posts would be equipped with communications and signaling gear. When aggressor aircraft were flying at low and extremely low altitudes, these posts were sometimes the only possibility of spotting the enemy and providing information on him. The following were extensively employed to ensure survivability of radar troops: radar equipment would be sheltered and concealed, positions would be smoke-screened and protected by antiaircraft fire, personnel and equipment would maneuver to alternate positions, and camouflage would be employed.

The experience of local wars has been the topic of numerous studies by foreign military experts. It offers the opportunity to refine and develop military theory on virtually the entire range of problems encompassing strategy and tactics. The interest of experts is particularly drawn by the problem of the element of surprise in initiating wars, which has proven inseparable from questions of employment of air and air defense weapons. As in the past, aircraft are acknowledged to be the most important means of achieving the element of offensive surprise, and air defense is acknowledged to be the principal means of repelling a surprise attack. As is evident from the experience of local wars, the main objective of surprise first strikes was to achieve air supremacy in rapid order and thus to create favorable conditions for subsequent employment of all combat arms. The experience of local wars indicates that in many instances the aggressor succeeded in achieving substantial results precisely in the process of executing initial airstrikes against enemy aircraft basing locations.

One can determine from statements in the foreign press that significant changes took place in the combat readiness and air defense capabilities of countries which were forced to repel aggression. Arab leaders realized, for example, that the unsuccessful outcome of the battle for air supremacy in the 1967 war was a consequence of a poor level of air force and air defense combat readiness to thwart a surprise attack, although they were not inferior to the adversary in technical equipment.

As a result of taking into account past experience and measures taken, the events in the Near East developed differently in October 1973. Even prior to the war the Egyptian and Syrian commands were maintaining their armed forces in a high state of combat readiness, were building shelters for aircraft, reorganized the air defense system, and provided reliable protection against air attack for force groupings, airfields and rear areas installations.²⁴ As a result Israel was unable to employ with impunity the tactics which had brought success in the events of June 1967.

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From the very outset of military operations, the Israeli Air Force failed in attempts to weaken the air forces of the Arab countries with surprise attacks on airfields and to gain air supremacy. They then changed their tactics: they proceeded to attack Arab troops and provide support to friendly troops, counting on luring Syrian and Egyptian aircraft into combat over the battlefield and defeating them. This challenge was accepted, and air engagements in the battle for air supremacy became frequent occurrences. Aggressive, decisive actions by Syrian fighters prevented the Israeli Air Force from gaining success in the battle for air supremacy on the Syrian Front. Only on the Egyptian Front were Israeli air forces successful, due to the lack of aggressiveness on the part of Egypt's air forces, but this success was achieved at a high price.

In the opinion of foreign observers, the fact that air defense forces and weapons assumed decisive significance in the battle for air supremacy altered the very concept of this struggle. In World War II, as well as in local wars in Korea and Indochina (prior to the appearance of antiaircraft guided missiles), and during the aggression against Egypt in 1956, the principal content of the battle for air supremacy was mutual weakening of air forces, while in the 1973 October War, when antiaircraft missile forces began to be employed, penetration of air defense became the most important task.

Air engagements and battles were extensively employed in the struggle for air supremacy. These engagements and battles, in contrast to the aerial engagements of World War II, were fought over a wide range of altitudes -- from maximum altitude to treetop level. Such sharp altitude variations in air force actions were due to two circumstances. The first was connected with the employment of jet aircraft, which were extensively employed as early as the war in Korea. At high altitudes jet aircraft consumed less fuel, which extended aircraft endurance. This engendered the endeavor to employ jet aircraft in the most advantageous and economical operating conditions, that is, at high altitudes.

The second circumstance was dictated by the fact that air defense weapons, in particular antiaircraft guided missile systems, by virtue of their performance characteristics were considered to be less capable of hitting air targets at low altitudes, and at extremely low altitudes were totally unable to engage aircraft. At the same time low and extremely low altitudes proved to be the most advantageous for undetected approach by aircraft to the target and withdrawal from the target following ordnance delivery. This engendered the necessity of aircraft shifting to operations at low and extremely low altitudes.

Sometimes local wars took place in conditions where the victims of aggression had virtually no organized air defense. Then the defending side would resort to extensive guerrilla actions aimed at destroying enemy aircraft on the ground. This mode of combat against hostile aircraft was most typical of operations by the Army of Liberation of South Vietnam and the patriots in Laos and Cambodia. Guerrilla subunits and units sometimes achieved major success in raids on air bases. On the night of 31 October 1964, for example, forces of the Army of Liberation of South Vietnam attacked a strongly fortified U.S. airfield at Bien Hoa, destroying more than 20 B-57 bombers and 15 other aircraft.²⁵ During the six years of the aggressive war against Laos, the United States lost approximately 1,200 aircraft, the majority of which were destroyed on the ground at air bases.²⁶

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The experience of local wars prompted change in air force tactics in relation to countermeasures by air defense forces, a subject to which considerable attention is devoted in reports appearing in the foreign press.

When air defense possessed limited capabilities and general weakness, which was observed, for example, on the side of the victims of aggression in the first and second stages of military operations in Korea and in the war in Vietnam (up to mid-1965), the most characteristic actions in employment of air forces were either massive attacks on selected targets by large groups (60-100 aircraft) or stacked operations in dense formations with aircraft formed in several waves and the absence of supporting groups, or multiple target passes from altitudes of from 1.5 to 4 km.

In the war in Korea the U. S. command, pursuing the objectives of overcoming the opposition of hostile fighters and antiaircraft artillery as well as securing the penetration of bombers and fighter-bombers through to the target, began employing passive and active jamming of detection and guidance radars, fire control radars, and fighter control radio communications.²⁷ And in order to paralyze air defense fighter actions, the Americans attempted to seal them off from attack targets, assigning large fighter forces (up to 100 aircraft) to operate as so-called "screen groups." These groups, flying on a broad frontage and at various altitudes, with a fairly deep-disposition formation, would proceed in advance to the area of operations of friendly attacking units and combined units in order to divert to themselves the attention of air defense fighters and thus to "clear" fighters from a given area for subsequent bomber access.

The leaders of the national liberation forces in turn undertook specific countermeasures, in particular assigning special fighter subunits the mission of interdicting the activities of "screen groups." During the Korean War, by virtue of a high concentration of jet fighter aircraft of the opposing sides in combat airspace, air engagements and battles would be joined and fought at medium and high altitudes.

Increasing saturation of air defense with fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery compelled the air forces of the attacking side to intensify reconnaissance of air defense forces and facilities. The obtained intelligence would be utilized in selecting routes bypassing zones with strong air defense, while when it was necessary to fly through air defense zones, aircraft would employ various maneuvers and deliver fire on air defense weapons (maneuver in an antiaircraft artillery fire area, consisting in altering course, altitude, and speed; suppression of antiaircraft artillery in fire positions by specially assigned forces; sealing off fighter airfields; attacks on airfields).

Gradual saturation of air defense with new forces and weapons led to a decrease in the scale of combat employment of piston aircraft and an enhanced role by jet fighter-bombers. From 1952 on, piston bombers were for the most part employed in night operations. At the same time multirole jet fighter-bombers proceeded to occupy a leading position in U.S. tactical aviation.

During the war in Vietnam, according to reports in the foreign press, the Americans proceeded to employ second aircrews, particularly for fighter aircraft. This innovation received high marks abroad, since it made it possible to utilize much more

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intensively aircraft combat capabilities and enabled a substantially greater number of aircrews to gain combat experience in a relatively short period of time.²⁸

In addition, the experience of the war in Vietnam, according to the conclusions of foreign experts, is also of exceptional interest as regards the occurrence of fundamentally new changes in air tactics, dictated by the employment of antiaircraft guided missiles in Vietnam's air defense.

Employment of antiaircraft missiles against piloted aircraft resulted in aggressor air forces shifting immediately to operations in small groups at low and extremely low altitudes, in formations dispersed in altitude and depth, with an increase in the number of support groups and intensified active jamming of radar and radio communications. In addition, as is noted in the foreign press, there was a sharp increase in forces involved in electronic warfare.²⁹

Appreciable changes took place in the combat employment of air defense fighters. Hence the aggressor air forces shifted to operations at medium, low and extremely low altitudes; air combat zones also shifted to these altitudes.

But this did not end the vigorous competition between offensive and defensive weapons. The adversaries sought further theoretical and practical solutions: the aggressor sought ways to penetrate the increased air defense countermeasures, while the victims of aggression sought ways to increase the effectiveness of air defense.

A number of changes were instituted in the air defense system: composite force groupings were formed, containing antiaircraft systems with various altitude and range fire performance capabilities, while radar troops employed diversified radars; in order to avoid losses from air attack, large-scale measures were implemented to fortify antiaircraft missile launcher and artillery positions, radar sites, and fighter bases.

This made it possible to increase to an even greater degree the effectiveness of air defense against hostile aircraft, while air forces were compelled to modernize their tactics. Increased aggressor aircraft losses caused by automatic antiaircraft artillery and machinegun fire made it necessary to increase aircraft operating altitudes and to shift once again to massive attacks on targets with large groups, designating even larger support groups and intensifying electronic countermeasures. Special operations by large forces of aircraft aimed at neutralizing air defense antiaircraft missile forces began to be employed. Various kinds of maneuver in antiaircraft missile system impact zones assumed great importance in air operations: vertical maneuver and delivery of attack from the so-called "dead zone," withdrawal from the impact zone by diving or altering course by 90 degrees or more, simultaneous vertical and horizontal maneuver, etc.³⁰

In the opinion of foreign experts, the experience of recent local wars is of interest from the standpoint of ensuring aircraft survivability at permanent basing locations, as well as the survivability of air defense forces and facilities. The problem of survivability of these combat arms, and of course the problem of ensuring their combat readiness was resolved by improving fortification of disposition areas, including the construction of solid reinforced concrete shelters both for aircraft and for air defense personnel and equipment.

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4. Experience in Combat Employment of Naval Forces

At the beginning of the 20th century British historian and naval theorist Julian Corbett noted the important role of the navy in "small" wars. Britain had long sought to maintain a navy which would ensure creation and preservation of a vast colonial empire in various parts of the world. The navy was extensively employed in local wars prior to world wars I and II. The imperialist nations employed their naval forces to crush the national liberation movement as the most persuasive argument of "gunboat diplomacy."

The increased combat power of naval forces after World War II increased their role in local wars to an even greater extent. The navies of imperialist nations became a means of presenting a show of force and applying political pressure. This role was performed especially frequently by aircraft carriers, since it was believed that they, carrying large numbers of aircraft and nuclear weapons on board, possessed not only considerable combat capabilities but also the impressive force of psychological effect. Thus the former "gunboat diplomacy" was replaced by "carrier diplomacy." Utilization of the navy by imperialist nations, however, went far beyond display of force. In the majority of local wars the aggressor's naval forces were in the forward strategic echelon. Frequently an aggressor invasion of the territory of independent countries would begin with carrier-launched airstrikes and landing of amphibious assault forces.

Employment of the navy as "mobile political force" is closely linked with development of its basing system. The United States has established a great many naval bases overseas, and also plans to set up a number of additional naval basing locations. The changes which are taking place in the world, however, and particularly growth in the scale of antiimperialist struggle, make these bases a vulnerable link in the strategy of imperialism. There has recently been observed a trend toward development of a mobile naval basing system which, in the view of U.S. leaders, will enable naval forces to conduct combat operations independent of permanent bases in a given region.

Imperialist nations also view the navy as an effective means of fighting local wars, because it is capable not only of swift deployment in regions remote from the home country but is also capable of remaining for extended periods of time in neutral waters in a state of full combat readiness, without violating the sovereignty of other countries. As experience indicates, the very fact of redeployment of naval forces, particularly carrier task forces, often served as a reliable indicator of deterioration of the international situation and imminent aggression in a given region.

Thus one of the main functions of the navies of capitalist countries as an instrument of policy was always the exertion of military pressure, and in case of refusal to yield to dictate -- initiation of local wars. The aggressors would endeavor, by launching surprise massive attacks by carrier-based aircraft and landing amphibious assault forces, to achieve decisive results in a short period of time, and thus to paralyze the will of peace-loving peoples to resist. The Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956, for example, began with a simultaneous land offensive by Israeli forces and an invasion from the sea by Anglo-French interventionist forces. The Anglo-French fleet, supporting land operations, constituted the aggressors' main striking force.

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During the U.S. aggression in Lebanon, in the Dominican Republic and in other conflicts, U.S. naval forces quickly seized major centers by landing amphibious assault forces and supporting them from the sea. The comparatively small size of these countries and the fact that their principal cities were situated on the coast, and the fact that the victims of aggression were generally unprepared to offer armed resistance, enabled the invaders to mount swift operations.

During military operations in Korea and Vietnam -- in these two longest and most savage local wars -- the navy participated very actively. During initiation of these wars, the aggressors' naval forces were in the forward strategic echelon. In the course of the war the navy took part in combat operations jointly with the army. The navy's especially important role in these wars was determined primarily by the fact that success in the conduct of military operations on land depended directly on transport of troops, equipment and supplies by sea to the theater of operations. On the other hand, the aggressor endeavored by means of naval operations fully to cut off the theater of operations from the sea.

A principal feature of employment of naval forces in local wars was the fact that the aggressors as a rule enjoyed total sea supremacy. This made an imprint on the character and modes of fleet operations. Employment of naval forces essentially constituted unhindered actions "from sea to land," since the victim of aggression either had no navy at all or possessed only weak naval forces.

In local wars between countries with common land, and even sea borders, the role of the navy would be determined by its strength and degree of influence on the course of combat on land. As a rule small strengths of naval forces, which was characteristic, for example, of the Arab-Israeli wars and the Indo-Pakistan military conflict, limited the role of naval forces to assisting ground troops and delivering isolated attacks from the sea on enemy bases and shore installations.

Characteristic of employment of naval forces in local wars was further development of the trends which appeared in World War II. The first of these consisted in close coordination of combat operations in all three realms (on land, on the sea, and in the air) for the sake of achieving the end objective -- seizure of territory. A second trend was that the further development of naval weaponry was accompanied by increased naval utilization capabilities, as well as an increase in the navy's share of participation in carrying out operational and tactical missions on land. The specific features of combat in local wars, in which the national liberation forces were inferior to the aggressors in terms of military technology, further strengthened this trend. Attacks on enemy ground installations, ground troops and lines of communication, as well as support of the operations of friendly ground forces were considered the principal function of the aggressor's navy.

The naval forces of the warring sides performed the following missions in the course of local wars:

- striking land military and industrial installations, ground force groupings and lines of communication;

- landing amphibious assault forces;

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air and artillery support of ground troops in offensive and defensive operations;

naval blockade of coast;

support of friendly sea transport, troop redeployment and evacuation;

destroying enemy naval forces at sea and in base;

coast defense.

Experience indicates that attacks on land military and industrial installations, ground force groupings and lines of communication pursued the objectives of undermining military-economic potential, disorganizing control, demoralizing the civilian population and army, and weakening ground forces.

Carrier task forces comprised the principal forces employed to achieve these objectives. Typically carrier-based aircraft would be employed both independently and in coordination with strategic and tactical air against ground installations and troops. Employment of carrier-based aircraft for such strikes was practiced by Anglo-American naval forces toward the end of World War II. In local wars employment of carrier-based aircraft against land installations and ground troops assumed even greater importance. Carrier-based aircraft were extensively utilized for this purpose for the first time since World War II during the war in Korea, in which U.S. and British carrier task forces participated. After the Korean People's Army launched a devastating counterstroke against the South Korean forces, U.S. President Truman issued orders to furnish air cover and support to the forces of the South Korean authorities.

On 1 July Vice-Admiral Joy, commanding the Naval Forces in the Far East, ordered a carrier task force "to launch a number of continuous strikes on the enemy, in view of the rapid deterioration of the situation in Korea. Principal attention should be focused on railway structures in the environs of Kimch'on, Sariwon and Sinanju."³¹ Carrier-based airstrikes helped U.S. forces hold the Pusan beachhead.

Operations against land installations and ground forces continued to comprise one of the principal combat missions of carrier task forces. During the three years of the war in Korea, U.S. and British naval aviation flew approximately 267,000 combat sorties, approximately 200,000 of which involved bombing land installations and striking ground forces.³²

During the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956, prior to landing assault forces, the command authorities considered their principal mission to be the destruction or neutralization of Egyptian air power within 2 or 3 days, followed by "psychological warfare," which would include, in particular, dropping leaflets and night bombardment of the civilian population and military installations. Anglo-French carrier-based airstrikes on Egyptian towns and military installations promoted the successful landing of assault forces and the advance of Israeli troops.

The tendency of U.S. military and political leaders to employ carrier-based aircraft against land targets and to support ground forces was even more strongly in evidence

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when the aggression against Vietnam began. On 5 August 1964, that is, even before the beginning of extensive offensive operations on land, U.S. command authorities launched carrier-based airstrikes against naval bases and populated localities on the shore of the Gulf of Tonkin. Their intention was to show their resolve to intervene militarily in Vietnam and to demoralize its population; only later did they commence land operations against the popular liberation forces.

From 5 August 1964 up to the end of the war, there were constantly from 1 to 4 carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, while during the offensive operations of the popular liberation forces in March-April 1972 there were six carriers stationed off the coast of Vietnam, from which were being flown as many as 350 sorties per day.³³ As is noted in the foreign press, the principal objective of the airstrikes was to sap the military-economic potential of the DRV and to seal off combat areas.

The U.S. carriers operated as components of carrier task groups (1 carrier and 3-5 supporting ships). Combat maneuvering was performed in a special area 150-200 miles from the southeast coast of the DRV. Prior to launching airstrikes, carriers would approach the coast to a distance of 40-120 miles, in order to shorten aircraft distance to the target. Distance between task groups ranged from 25 to 40 miles.

U.S. naval command authorities carried out an extensive aggregate of measures to provide the carriers with combat support. Anti-air warfare would be handled by the escort ships as well as embarked fighters on continuous standing patrol. Detection of air targets was handled by distant early warning aircraft, patrolling in likely directions of threat approach. Antisubmarine warfare would be handled by escort ships and shore-based ASW aircraft. The most modern equipment, including satellites, were employed for intelligence and weather support.

Carrier-based air tactics were characterized by the fact that aircraft would attack in groups, the size of which would be as much as half of the strength of an air wing based on a carrier. The largest raids involved the participation of up to half the aircraft strength of a carrier task force (100-140 aircraft). According to the testimony of U.S. pilots, the combat radius of the Corsair II aircraft was approximately 450 miles (800 km); maximum time over target with combat payloads (8 Mk 82 bombs) was approximately 30 minutes.³⁴ Beginning in December 1971, intensity of carrier-launched missions was as high as 100 sorties per day.

In local wars and military conflicts in which large naval forces did not participate, navies carried out in a number of cases the mission of attacking enemy shore installations. Guided missile patrol craft or inshore fire support ships would hit separate installations, coastal route centers and built-up areas. This description applies in particular to Egyptian and Israeli naval forces during the war in the Near East, as well as the Indian Navy during the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Such employment of naval forces produced successful results in a number of instances, when the enemy was short of aircraft and weak in coastal defense. In October 1967, for example, Egyptian guided missile patrol craft succeeded in destroying fuel depots on territory occupied by Israeli forces.

Amphibious landings were extensively employed. In a number of cases landing of troops with immediate offensive exploitation was the principal mode of combat. Employing large assault forces, the imperialist nations have succeeded in putting

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down revolutionary uprisings in a number of countries in the Near East, South America, and Africa.

Marines -- specially trained elite troops prepared to fight in any part of the world -- comprised the nucleus of landing forces. Special amphibious units, containing forces and equipment to land and support an assault force, were incorporated in the U.S. Sixth and Seventh fleets for amphibious landing operations. In a number of instances command authorities enlisted the main forces of fleets to support the landing of large amphibious assault forces. Operational, tactical, punitive and raiding-reconnaissance landing forces were employed.

Concentration and deployment of amphibious landing forces would as a rule be accomplished in secrecy, while the landing itself would be executed with the element of surprise. A landing would usually be preceded by preliminary airstrikes and artillery bombardment. The first amphibious landing operations in Korea were carried out with employment of the same equipment as in World War II and using those techniques which had been developed in the course of that war.

Airborne and amphibious assaults were employed in the aggression against Egypt in 1956, often in combination with one another; the first heliborne assault was executed during this aggression, delivering a force of more than 400 men. Its mission was to build up the forces of the first wave of an amphibious assault force which had previously been put ashore.

Special heliborne assault techniques were worked out during the war in Vietnam, techniques which were given the names "vertical envelopment" and "eagle's flight." The "vertical envelopment" method consisted essentially in helilifting a force ashore, taking off from amphibious assault ships and dock landing ships, after which the helilifted force would seize a beachhead. The "eagle's flight" technique would be employed when landing force subunits, after capturing a beachhead, would be carried by transport helicopter deep into the defense to capture new positions. In both instances assault actions would receive fire support from special helicopters as well as Marine VTOL aircraft. In the view of U.S. command authorities, six such aircraft are sufficient to provide air support of a Marine battalion.³⁵

During the war in Vietnam U.S. command authorities, in addition to amphibious landings on the seacoast, extensively employed river assault operations. A special river flotilla was established for this purpose.³⁶ Riverine assaults were employed with particular frequency in the delta of the Mekong River, where up to that time national liberation forces had been operating with impunity. Riverine assault forces would be delivered by helicopter and special air cushion river craft.

In local wars the aggressor, possessing total sea supremacy, extensively employed naval blockade of the coast -- in the war in Korea, in Algeria, during the attack on Egypt in 1956, in the struggle against revolutionary Cuba, and particularly extensively in Vietnam. With the aid of a naval blockade the imperialists sought to deprive the victim of aggression of support from friendly nations and to sap its ability to fight.

A naval blockade would employ two principal modes of action: patrolling on approaches to the coast, bombing and mining ports.

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As foreign investigators note, patrolling assumed an extensive scope: large numbers of naval aircraft and warships would take part. During the war in Korea, for example, patrolling was handled by 2 strike forces, consisting of 2-4 carriers, 2-3 cruisers, 15-20 destroyers, escorts and minesweepers. In the war in Vietnam this mission was handled by a task force (approximately 180 ships and patrol craft) and part of the forces of a carrier task force. A task force of river patrol forces consisting of 150 vessels was established for river-patrol duty. The largest forces were employed during the Caribbean crisis to establish a naval blockade of revolutionary Cuba: practically the entire U.S. Atlantic Fleet was involved in the blockade.

Patrolling would usually be conducted in two zones: close in -- at a distance of approximately 2 miles from shore, and further out -- at a distance of 12-40 miles. Patrol craft and minesweepers would patrol close to shore, while patrol ships, destroyers and cruisers would patrol in the outer zone. Aircraft would be extensively employed for sea surveillance. The overall depth of the patrol zone, taking into consideration aircraft range, would extend to 110 miles, while in Vietnam the patrol zone stretched 2,000 miles. The entire area under surveillance would be divided into a number of sectors, in each of which a group of forces would operate. Vessels detected in the patrol zones, including fishing vessels, would be subjected to inspection, and in a number of cases would be destroyed.

Attempting to cut the sea lines of communication of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on the night of 9 May 1972 the Americans planted massive numbers of mines on the approaches to the North Vietnamese ports of Kamfa, Hon Gai, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong Hoi, and Thanh. All internal waterways were also mined. Contact, magnetic and acoustic influence mines were planted by embarked aircraft operating from carriers stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Neither blockade patrols nor barbaric bombing and mining of ports and port approaches, however, were able to prevent the shipping of cargo by sea from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Waging local wars constantly required that imperialist nations organize supply of troops and naval forces by sea. As experience indicates, the scale of shipment of supplies was enormous, in spite of the limited character of the wars. During the Korean War, for example, sea transport totaled more than 52 million tons of dry cargo, 21 million tons of fuel, and approximately 5 million men.³⁷

Chartered privately-owned vessels as well as U.S. Navy warships, cargo ships and transports were used to haul supplies from the United States to Vietnam. In 1966 alone sea shipments from the United States totaled 30 million tons, on which the Department of Defense spent 750 million dollars. Containers were extensively employed for shipping supplies; they would be loaded on board specialized 10,000 ton vessels (which can carry 750 containers weighing 7 tons each). The vessels were off-loaded with the aid of cranes and special helicopters.³⁸

During the war in Korea U.S. naval forces were compelled to accomplish urgent re-deployment and evacuation of troops by sea. A total of five divisions, one brigade and one regiment were redeployed from Japan to defend the Pusan beachhead (in 1950), while a South Korean division was evacuated from Yonghae and transported to Pusan.

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In December 1950, during the retreat out of North Korea U.S. command authorities, saving troops from total rout, evacuated more than 100,000 men from Hungnam. The evacuation was carried out by approximately 200 amphibious landing and transport vessels. During the period of evacuation a portion of the troops were defending the beachhead, supported by warships and naval aviation. Six carriers, the battleship "Missouri," two heavy cruisers and 46 destroyers were employed to cover the evacuation and support the defending troops.

In a number of local wars and military conflicts national liberation forces were compelled to accomplish the difficult task of coast defense. The difficulties were caused by the fact that they were fighting an adversary who possessed a powerful navy. Defense of the seacoast aimed at complicating or preventing the landing of amphibious assault forces and artillery bombardment of coastal installations by the enemy. These operations experienced greatest development in the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Laying of minefields and coast artillery fire delivered on enemy warships were the principal modes of coast defense.

Aggressive minelaying activities by the navy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea created, according to reports in the foreign press, considerable difficulties for interventionist naval forces and hindered their combat operations. Minefields protected naval bases and ports, as well as sections of coastline suitable for an amphibious landing. In order to impede sweeping activities, as a rule minefields would be covered by coastal artillery. Skillful employment of mines forced the enemy to utilize substantial forces for sweeping activities, to alter the timetable of fleet combat missions and, in addition, negatively affected fleet fighting efficiency. Warships were afraid to approach close to shore, for example, and this diminished the effectiveness of their fire.

Although U.S. command authorities possessed an enormous superiority of sea forces, they were unable to prevent Korean naval personnel from laying mines, with these personnel displaying a high degree of skill, courage and persistence in carrying out these activities. Mines sank five and seriously damaged an additional five interventionist warships.

In October 1950 minefields (approximately 3,000 mines), covered by coastal artillery fire, delayed for an extended time the landing of a large enemy assault force in the Korean port of Wonsan. The landing force waited eight days for sweeping to be completed, cruising aimlessly back and forth in the Sea of Japan until the city was captured by land. Rear Admiral A. Smith, commander of forward forces, reported to his command that "the U.S. Navy has lost sea supremacy in Korean waters."³⁹

Coastal artillery waged a fairly successful battle with interventionist warships. Artillery batteries delivered fire from indirect positions and maneuvered along the coast. Coastal artillery fire just in the Wonsan area damaged three battleships, four cruisers, 16 destroyers, and other ships, while total interventionist warship losses comprised five ships sunk and 73 damaged.

U.S. naval forces also received resolute resistance in Vietnam. Dozens of warships, including cruisers, took damage from shore battery fire. In the first few days of

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August 1972 alone five U.S. warships were seriously damaged, while by August 1973 artillery of the popular liberation forces had damaged 20 cruisers and destroyers. This was one of the reasons for the decision to bring the battleship "New Jersey" out of mothballs and dispatch it to the coast of Vietnam; the thick armor plating of this ship was able to resist damage.⁴⁰

The foreign press notes the importance of actions by light forces, especially armed with missiles, as well as mines and coastal artillery against large surface warships, even under conditions of enemy sea and air supremacy.

The war in Korea brought the military-political leaders of a number of imperialist nations to the conclusion of the necessity of strengthening naval forces as an instrument of interventionist policy directed against small countries and peoples. Taken into consideration thereby was the capability of a navy to operate in open waters in the vicinity of areas of aggression and swiftly to intervene in the course of events. Many foreign military experts, examining the experience of local wars, agree in the opinion that "minor" wars and even military conflicts cannot develop in a direction favorable to the imperialists without involving large naval forces in military operations. It is not surprising that in the last two decades imperialist powers have pursued a policy, in organizational development of naval forces, of development of so-called "balanced" fleets, consisting both of strategic nuclear forces and of "general purpose" naval forces, whereby the "general purpose" forces were clearly intended for the conduct of combat operations during local wars. This has found expression in a steady increase in funds allocated for fleet development. In the period 1955-1972, for example, one third of the military budget was spent each year on the U.S. Navy. In the 1973 budget the share of funds appropriated for development of U.S. naval forces exceeded by 2 billion dollars funds appropriated for the Air Force, and by 3 billion dollars funds appropriated for the Army. Characteristic is an increase in the percentage share of expenditures on "general purpose" naval forces.

A number of trends were determined in the character of employment of naval forces in local wars, trends which are considered by foreign military experts in development of naval hardware and fleet organizational development.

A fundamental trend in employment of naval forces was expansion of fleet operations against land targets. In local wars which were relatively protracted, employment of naval forces was almost entirely subordinated to the interests of land forces. Usually the principal naval forces would be employed to support their operations. The experience of local wars and military conflicts indicated that in operations on coastal sectors the operations of ground forces, air and naval forces comprised a unified process, and this required unity of command and organization of close operational-tactical coordination among the services. U.S. military and political leaders encountered this problem during the war in Korea.

Another trend in the employment of naval forces in local wars was expressed in an increase in the volume of sea shipping to support the combat operations of ground forces overseas, especially when wars assumed a protracted and persisting character. In the war in Korea, for example, 4 tons of military equipment and supplies were required per soldier, with a daily replenishment requirement of 29 kg per man. In the war in Vietnam, 80,000 tons of ammunition were brought in each month, as well as 320,000 tons of fuel and 1.5 million tons of food provisions.

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The diversity of missions performed by the navy in local wars determined a third trend -- the necessity of harmonious development of all combat arms and all weaponry. Analyzing the experience of the war in Korea, American historians emphasized: "Proportional development of all branches of the armed forces and the individual component combat arms is essential.

"...Under no circumstances should the importance of minesweeping forces and naval aviation be ignored. Inchon and Hungnam emphasized once again with particular forcefulness the vital necessity of amphibious forces. Nor should our shipboard artillery be written off as obsolete. We have become convinced of the vital need to utilize more fully in war all of our naval weapons."⁴¹

Employment of carrier-based aircraft and Marine aviation for striking land targets was improved and perfected in the course of local wars. Conventional high-explosive, fragmentation and incendiary bombs, special cluster bombs, guided bombs, as well as missiles and shipboard weapons were extensively employed.

The attack aircraft was the principal embarked aircraft. According to the figures of foreign authors, aircraft were improved by improving performance characteristics, increasing bomb payload, and modernizing electronic equipment. VTOL aircraft became operational with the Marines. In addition to embarked attack aircraft, the Phantom F-2 carrier-based fighter was also extensively employed. The increased scale of amphibious landing operations in local wars, both at the commencement and in the course of wars, determined the further development of amphibious landing equipment and such a combat arm as the Marines. Assault transport helicopters, helicopter gunships, helicopter-carrying amphibious assault ships, dock landing ships, dock amphibious transports and other amphibious warfare ships, as well as amphibious transports and amphibious cargo ships, were extensively employed. Development of equipment and modes of landing amphibious assault forces proceeded in the direction of achieving self-contained transport of landing force units with all combat equipment on board a single ship, in order to ensure bringing the force ashore at a rapid pace onto an unfortified coast and rapid buildup of forces on seized beachheads. Amphibious landing equipment and landing operation support forces amounted to large amphibious task forces which, in the opinion of experts, facilitated organization of combat operations.

The weapons and combat employment of the Marines were being updated. Expeditionary combined units and units ranging in size from a Marine battalion to a corps were formed for conducting combat operations. Independent Marine operations acquired great significance, especially in South Vietnam, in conditions of roadless and difficult terrain.

Special forces were formed and developed on a priority basis for joint operations with the Marines in special geographic conditions, such as coastal waters, shallow-water areas, and rivers. In 1966, for example, the United States formed its first river flotilla, to support ground troops and control vessel movement in the Mekong Delta.

A special research team of the U.S. Department of the Navy, studying future prospects for employment of the Marine Corps, reached the conclusion that it would be utilized both in local wars and for combat operations in conditions of a

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general nuclear war, and that training and equipping of the Marines would continue in the future to be focused primarily on the conduct of amphibious landing operations.⁴²

In the 1960's, under the influence of the experience of local wars, a reappraisal of the significance of naval artillery was made in the Western countries. The wars in Korea and Vietnam showed the necessity of maintaining on board warships artillery with the performance capability to engage an air and sea adversary and to deliver fire on shore targets. There was noted in the development of artillery a trend toward versatile automatic medium and small-caliber systems for anti-air warfare, for performing missions of artillery support of ground troops, and engagement of enemy light naval forces. It was assumed that the artillery of amphibious landing force inshore fire support ships would be employed to support a landing force on shore.

According to the testimony of foreign authors, local wars, in particular the war in Vietnam, showed the great importance of minefields, and coastal artillery fire for coast defense and for thwarting the landing of amphibious forces. For example, substantial forces of the powerful U.S. fleet were immobilized in the coastal areas around Wonsan, with the U.S. Navy taking losses, in spite of an overwhelming sea and air superiority. This provided an impetus for the further development both of mine weapons and minesweeping forces, and increased the importance of employment of helicopters and air cushion vehicles for amphibious landing operations.

Combat against enemy sea and air forces in coastal areas revealed a trend toward development of a uniform system of anti-air warfare and coastal defense in combination with maneuver actions by light naval forces.

This required the development of light forces, in particular patrol craft carrying gun and missile armament. The need for development of light naval forces was also dictated by combat on coastal lines of communication.

Trends in employment of naval forces in local wars found reflection both in the development of weaponry and in the organization of forces.

NATO and U.S. naval forces, in a state of continuous readiness for combat, are situated in key areas of the World Ocean, forces organized into fleets or task forces. These forces have taken part in all local wars and military conflicts. The Sixth Fleet, for example, which operates in the Mediterranean, directly or indirectly supported the aggression against the Arab peoples, while the Seventh Fleet, based in the Pacific, fought in Korea and Vietnam.

Amphibious forces operate as components of the U.S. fleets, forces which include amphibious assault ships, dock landing ships, and other amphibious warfare ships. U.S. military and political leaders also adopted the practice of forming temporary task forces for performing specific combat missions in a given area of the World Ocean where a local war or military conflict was unfolding. In the fall of 1971, for example, during the Indo-Pakistani conflict, a U.S. Navy task force was formed to operate in the Indian Ocean, a force which included the aircraft carrier "Enterprise," an amphibious assault ship, a replenishment-at-sea ship, and seven escorts.

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A special service fleet provides support services for U.S. combatant ships. In addition, support both of the Sixth and Seventh fleets is grounded on an extensive system of naval bases, the existence of which, in the view of foreign military experts, remains one of the principal conditions for comprehensive servicing of the combat fleets.

5. Some Problems of Troop Control

The combat experience of local wars and military conflicts faced the military leaders of the imperialist powers and national liberation forces with a number of problems in the area of troop control. They apply both to general, basic questions and to methods and means of troop control on the battlefield.

Statement of these problems was evoked on the one hand by globalization of the imperialist strategy of local wars, and on the other hand by those possibilities of improving the control process which opened up as a result of achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. An important role was also played by the fact that, as indicated by the experience of military operations, a decline in morale is taking place in the armies of the imperialist nations, and this phenomenon, in the opinion of militarist circles, can be compensated to a certain degree by reorganization of control.

Although local wars and military conflicts have taken place on different continents, at different times, in different geographic conditions, and the level of technology and control methods have differed from one another by virtue of this, one can elucidate certain general trends in the development of organization and the means of troop control proper.

The endeavor by aggressive military bloc leaders to possess an efficiently operating control system, taking into account such factors as globalization of strategy and the specific features of troop operations on different continents and in different theaters of war, can be called the first of these trends. In World War II strategic planning was organized strictly by theater, and coordination of the objectives and modes of conduct of operations in the various theaters was accomplished by both coalitions only in connection with situation change, while today a global control system has been established in peacetime, in which the control activities of all elements are mutually coordinated. When each local war or conflict arose, it would immediately fall within this system and become an object of control.

Creation of a continuously operating control system became possible thanks to the scientific and technological revolution, the achievements of which have been deliberately placed in the service of aggressive policy by the leaders of the imperialist nations. A global communications system, the mass media, a complex of technical devices, including satellite reconnaissance and communications facilities -- all this has been utilized for organization of control on a global scale in any crisis situation. As early as 1947 the so-called "National Security Law" in the United States defined the basic principles of control of forces and facilities and coordination of actions with allied forces on the occurrence of a crisis situation. These principles applied to three areas of activity by "crisis management" agencies: the area of collection and analysis of information on current and potential crises, the area of control and management of resources during current crises,

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and the area of forecasting and planning U.S. policy in regard to future crisis situations.

The United States, and subsequently the imperialist military blocs as well elaborated a system of control and management, including special "crisis management" agencies at various levels, global means of communication and theater operational control centers for the performance of these tasks.

At the top of the pyramid of U.S. "crisis management" agencies is the operations center of the National Security Council -- the so-called White House "situation room," which is linked to the crisis situation assessment centers of the Department of Defense, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency. Since technical support and communications for these centers are handled by the Department of Defense, the "main axis" of the entire "crisis management" system at the highest level is the operations control center of the military command authorities.

The "crisis management" operations center system is being continuously modified. In April 1969 President R. Nixon established within the framework of the National Security Council a Washington special operations group (WSOG), which was assigned to the task of drawing up contingency plans for possible conflicts and coordination of the activities of the various government agencies in periods of crisis.

The WSOG contained the following: the president's adviser on national security affairs, the under secretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the director of Central Intelligence. The WSOG drew up in detail the plan for the invasion of Cambodia by U.S.-Saigon troops in 1970, the invasion of Laos by Saigon troops under the direction of U.S. advisers in 1971, directed the activities of the U.S. foreign policy and military machinery during the Jordanian conflict in 1970 and the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1971.

When H. Kissinger was serving as the U.S. presidential national security adviser, "crisis management" was concentrated in the National Security Council and in its regional groups (on Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Far East, the Near East, and South Asia). These groups prepared National Security Council memorandums for the president, which contained U.S. policy and strategy proposals for crisis situations in a given region. A total of 138 memorandums were prepared, including 13 on Indochina, 9 on the Near East, and 7 on South Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.⁴³

In NATO the Permanent Military Planning Committee (at the minister of defense level) is the leading agency dealing with determination of military questions. It contains a military committee, to which the NATO theater and mobile forces commands are subordinate.

Direction of NATO military activities in the period between military committee sessions is handled by a permanent military committee consisting of representatives of the general staffs of the NATO member nations. The military committee's working body is the joint staff, which coordinates the activities of the NATO joint commands, engages in long-range planning of development of joint forces, draws up plans of employment of joint forces in periods of crisis, organizes and verifies execution of decisions adopted in the area of military organizational development.

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Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, the NATO zone of responsibility encompasses the territory and territorial waters of the NATO member nations, as well as the Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer. This entire zone is subdivided into theaters of war and theaters of military operations.

The zone of responsibility of the NATO Supreme Command in Europe includes the territories of the NATO member nations (with the exception of Great Britain and Portugal) and Turkey, as well as the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and the southern part of the Black Sea. This command is the only one in NATO which contains joint forces consisting of ground and air combined units and units transferred to its control by the member nations. An American general has always held the position of supreme commander of NATO Joint Forces in Europe. The supreme commander is responsible for maintaining forces in a continuous state of combat readiness.

A second trend in organization of troop control consisted in implementation of the principle of so-called "divided responsibility" for control, according to which the United States assumed strategic direction of military operations and, in addition, provided air and naval forces and supplied troops with arms and equipment, while the aggressor's allies -- puppet regimes -- provided manpower. This trend first appeared during the war in Vietnam. At the beginning of the intervention U.S. military-political leaders assumed control of the operations both of U.S. troops and those of the Saigon regime, believing that direct combat intervention by the U.S. military would lead to a rapid victory over the national liberation forces. But this was not to be. In 1969 U.S. military-political leaders were forced to acknowledge that they had made many mistakes in Vietnam, particularly in the matter of directing military operations.

Somewhat later the Department of Defense proposed adoption of the principle of "divided responsibility" for management and control of military operations. Subsequently established in troop control practices, it was expressed in particular in the fact that the United States greatly reduced its contingent of ground forces in a number of countries, while stepping up military assistance to puppet regimes and increasing the combat readiness of air and naval forces, deploying them closer to the targets of aggression and, in addition, increasing the mobility of troops stationed at home.

An expression of this same principle of "divided responsibility" is the idea, advanced by the United States, of establishing a so-called "unified army of the free world." This army would contain two strategic echelons: the first would comprise the forces of U.S. allies in Asia, the Near East, and Africa, while the second would consist of U.S. forces.

The third trend in the development of control and management pertains to means and methods of battlefield troop control. It is expressed in the fact that the system of troop control in local wars and military conflicts is being continuously improved in a technical respect, but at the same time it is becoming considerably more complex. This applies, although to an unequal degree, to the control agencies both of the armies of imperialist powers and to national liberation armies.

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This general trend was manifested in a number of directions of development of the means and methods of troop control, namely: in partial change in the role of headquarters staffs and various control elements; in the development of new communications gear; in automation of troop control.

During the period of the war in Korea, no substantial changes had yet taken place in the system of troop control in comparison with the recently ended World War II. Troop control in the U.S. and South Korean armies followed the traditional scheme: army-corps-division-regiment, and so on down to the platoon. Attached to U.S. 8th Army Headquarters was the 304th Independent Signal Battalion, which provided command wire and radio communications right down to the infantry platoon. Unit and combined unit command posts played the role of headquarters agencies sited in the field for tactical control. U.S. forces were equipped with wire and radio communications gear which had been employed in World War II (SCP-536 and SCP-300 radios, W-110 and W-130 cable).

The same control methods and means as were employed in World War II were used for securing teamwork and coordination between ground and air forces. The following were set up at 5th Air Force Headquarters: a tactical air control center, an air guidance center for the zone of responsibility of each army corps, air guidance posts for the zone of responsibility of each infantry or armored division, and air surveillance, warning and communication posts for areas remote from the battle line.

Air control and requests for air were handled with the assistance of old-model radars (AN/CPS-5, AN-MPS-5, etc).

Control and coordination were organized according to approximately the same scheme in the forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Chinese volunteers. The level of technical equipment of the signal units of these forces, however, was much poorer than that of the Americans.

If we compare in this regard the war in Korea with the war in Vietnam or with the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in the Near East, the evolution experienced by the means and methods of troop control during this period of time will become obvious.

Control means underwent radical changes. Tropospheric, microwave relay and short-wave radio communications began to be extensively employed. Electronic warfare equipment began to be employed by air defense and air forces. Aggressor army headquarters staffs began extensively utilizing control automation equipment.

There was also a change in the former principles of level-by-level transmission of orders and reports from the army down to the platoon and vice versa. In the 1973 October War in the Near East, for example, general headquarters in Tel Aviv maintained direct communications with the Israeli units which were crossing the Suez Canal. In the Egyptian and Israeli brigades control of subunits was handled for the most part by radio on shortwave, vhf and uhf bands. Radio communications gear was mobile as a rule.

Organization of troop control in the Syrian and Egyptian armies in the 1973 war was much better than in the 1967 war and ensured stable control prior to initiation of combat actions. Control was frequently disrupted in the course of combat, however,

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as a result of errors by individual commanders, a rapidly changing situation, and sometimes as a consequence of active enemy jamming activities. This led to setbacks in combat operations in certain sectors.

During the war in Korea and the war against the national-patriotic forces of South Vietnam, in which troops of the Saigon regime, South Korea and Thailand also took part, U.S. military-political leaders sought to establish a unified command. But this proved unattainable due to disagreements among the allies which arose when assessing the combat situation. Therefore troop control was organized according to the principle of national affiliation of control agencies.

Coordination of operations, however, remained in the hands of U.S. command authorities. Overall direction of military operations was handled by the commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific. In July 1965 a command of U.S. forces in South Vietnam was established, with headquarters (field commands beginning in March 1966) of operational combined units in each of four corps regions. These headquarters (field commands) coordinated the operations of U.S. and Saigon puppet troops.

Troop control was handled initially from command posts at some distance from the combat areas. But with this organization of control U.S. Army command authorities could not respond swiftly to situation changes. Therefore beginning in 1966 a system of mobile command posts was established, set up on helicopters, armored personnel carriers and armored cars. This greatly facilitated troop control with the conduct of operations in complex terrain conditions and in separated sectors.

A shift to mobile command posts, however, led to a situation where they were cut off from headquarters sited at permanent locations. This in turn resulted in headquarters personnel (in any case at the lowest command and control echelon) being reduced, while the headquarters themselves gradually began merging with command posts.

The United States set up a unified strategic, operational and tactical communications system to direct military forces in Indochina. It included as a subsystem a regional unified Southeast Asia communications system, with the aid of which control of combat operations was accomplished. Small radios adapted for operation in the specific conditions of South Vietnam were the principal means of communication in the line units.

During the war in Vietnam U.S. forces extensively employed night surveillance devices. It is believed that this improved troop control during the hours of darkness. In 1966 the United States began series manufacture of AN-TYS-4 units, which were mounted on combat vehicles and aircraft and provided the capability not only of observing objects at night but also of delivering aimed fire at them. That same year the "Night Window" TV system was tested in Vietnam, designed for battlefield reconnaissance and terrain surveillance under low-light conditions.

By the end of 1966 establishment of a semiautomated tactical air control system was completed in South Vietnam and Thailand. As was noted in the U.S. press, it provided the command authorities of the 7th Air Force centralized control of tactical aviation in striking targets in South Vietnam, Laos, and the DRV. In 1969

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the system included the tactical air control centers, three control and warning centers, more than 20 control and warning posts, approximately 10 guidance posts, and more than 10 forward control posts. The system was served by a special tactical air control group.⁴⁴

Control of air defense facilities was also improved during the war in Vietnam. In 1969 a unified air defense system was established in South Vietnam. It was utilized for the benefit of the operations center of the 7th Air Force Air Defense Region, which had responsibility for controlling all air defense forces in South Vietnam and Thailand. The system included air target detection radars, air target identification and automatic tracking radars, as well as information collection and display equipment. It operated for the benefit of the 7th Air Force tactical air control center, as well as other air defense regions.

As U.S. military experts note, during the course of the war U.S. military command authorities established in Vietnam a fairly effective air force and air defense combat operations control system, the experience of which is being studied and adopted in air force organizational development.⁴⁵

The Americans tested in Vietnam electronic sensors which would be placed along potential routes of enemy movement and would record (employing the principle of the photofinish equipment employed in sports) the passage of troops past an "electronic barrier." Information on enemy movement would be transmitted to a field computer which, after processing the data (enemy strength, direction of movement, which force grouping was the most dangerous at a given moment), would give the signal to swing into action the entire fire delivery system. In the estimate of U.S. command authorities, electronic sensors were effectively employed in the demilitarized zone between the DRV and South Vietnam to record the flow of fresh forces from North Vietnam. Computers were also extensively employed for ground weapons fire control.

This entire "automated battlefield" system, as it is called in the United States, was not employed in Vietnam, however, as a consequence of the sharp change in the situation after 1969, which led to the defeat and withdrawal of U.S. troops from this country. However, the idea of automating the process of fire delivery on the enemy, implementation of which would sharply reduce troop strength requirements, was enthusiastically supported in U.S. military circles. In particular, General Westmoreland, commander in chief of U.S. forces, was an ardent supporter of the idea of an "automated battlefield," portraying the picture of combat operations as follows: "I see a future battlefield with 24-hour or almost 24-hour surveillance of all types in operation. On this battlefield we can destroy everything we detect, with the aid of instant communications and immediate employment of firepower. I foresee the growing need for highly-mobile combat forces, the mission of which will be to detect and destroy the enemy with the aid of automated devices."⁴⁶

John Foster, Defense Department director of defense research and engineering, was an enthusiastic advocate of an "automated battlefield." At the beginning of 1970 he stated that "combat operations on land can be completely revolutionized in coming years... as a result of development of a new series of sensors for long-range detection and rapid weapons employment."⁴⁷

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As we can see, the United States used the war in Vietnam as a laboratory to improve troop control processes in "future Vietnams."

While the imperialist aggressors were developing a troop control system in the course of local wars chiefly by mechanizing and automating processes, national liberation forces, taking into account new trends in the development of control means and methods, were placing main emphasis on unity of definition of operational-strategic combat objectives, the skill of command authorities in rapidly assessing a combat situation, their persistence and efficiency in accomplishing combat missions.

Experience in guiding and directing liberation forces accumulated over the course of decades. It included the finest examples of control and management of the masses by revolutionary leaders of the proletariat and many generations of leaders of the national liberation movement, in particular such eminent fighters against colonialism and imperialist reaction as Simon Bolivar, Jose Marti, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Ernesto Che Guevara, and others. These leaders of the masses demonstrated that in the overall correlation of forces with the enemy, the art, skill and level of control can become a factor which determines the outcome both of individual battles and the liberation struggle as a whole.

FOOTNOTES

1. WEHRTECHNIK, No 11, 1972.
2. JAMES, 1973-1974, pp 569-571.
3. The term "another war" characterizes actions accompanying troop actions on the battlefield. "Another war" included all types of sabotage activities, acts of provocation, terrorism, etc.
4. ATGM -- antitank guided missiles.
5. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 1, 1976, pp 69-70.
6. Ibid., No 4, 1976, page 109.
7. Ibid., pp 47-50.
8. See Dzh. Styuart, "Vozdushnaya moshch' -- reshayushchaya sila v Koreye" [Air Power -- the Determining Force in Korea], translated from English, Moscow, 1961, page 30.
9. See ibid., page 8.
10. Ibid.
11. See "Voyna v Koreye 1950-1953 gg." [The War in Korea, 1950-1953], Moscow, 1959, page 671.

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12. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, No 6, 1966.
13. WEHR UND WIRTSCHAFT, No 7, 1967, pp 402-403.
14. See TYL I SNABZHENIYE SOVETSKIKH VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 2, 1972, page 91.
15. A. Brofi, "Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily SShA" [The U.S. Air Force], translated from English, Moscow, 1957, page 94.
16. DER SPIEGEL, No 25, 1967, pp 21-27.
17. SURVIVAL, No 8, 1968, pp 256-257.
18. The C-5A can carry a payload of more than 60 tons a distance of approximately 3000 miles without refueling. The C-5A is capable of carrying up to 680 soldiers or two M-60 heavy tanks. It can be used to airlift practically any type of ground forces division armament. The C-5A has a number of important features which are significant for its employment in local wars and military conflicts. It can be loaded quickly, and can operate out of small, crude airstrips. This naturally is very important for its employment in such regions as Asia, Africa and Latin America. As was reported by former U.S. Defense Secretary J. Schlesinger, C-5A aircraft were the "key factor" in organizing the "air bridge" used to transport arms from the United States to Israel during the October 1973 War in the Near East (see V. V. Zhurkin, "SShA i mezhdunarodno-politicheskiye krizisy" [The United States and International Political Crises], Moscow, 1975, page 54).
19. See "Voyna v Koreye 1950-1953 gg" [The War in Korea, 1950-1953], Moscow, 1959, pp 402, 403, 597, 671.
20. ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITAERZEITSCHRIFT, No 1, 1974, page 1.
21. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, November 1973, pp 879-881.
22. FORCES ARMEEES FRANCAISES, No 18, 1974, pp 8-15.
23. DEFENSE NATIONALE, July 1974, page 727.
24. Suffice it to say that approximately 2,600 antiaircraft guns and 150 antiaircraft missile sites were deployed to protect targets around the Suez Canal and Golan Heights.
25. See U. Berchett, "Voyna v dzhunglyakh Yuzhnogo V'yetnama" [War in the Jungles of South Vietnam], translated from English, Moscow, 1965, page 328.
26. See PRAVDA, 7 January 1970.
27. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 5, 1974, page 14.
28. The Pentagon sent (at least for one tour) 73 percent of all colonels, 83 percent of majors and 85 percent of U.S. Army noncommissioned officers to combat

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- in Vietnam (ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 4, 1976, page 109).
29. ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 6, 1973, page 10.
 30. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 5, 1974, page 14.
 31. M. Kegl and F. Menson, "Morskaya voyna v Koreye" [Naval Warfare in Korea], abridged translation from English, Moscow, 1962, page 36.
 32. Ibid.
 33. See MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 6, 1972, page 92.
 34. See MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 6, 1974, page 93.
 35. INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW, No 5, 1971, pp 434-435.
 36. NAVY, No 10, 1967, pp 346-348.
 37. Kegl and Menson, op. cit., page 383.
 38. DATE, No 3, 1968.
 39. Kegl and Menson, op. cit., page 125.
 40. NAVY TIMES, No 4, 1967.
 41. Kegl and Menson, op. cit., page 364.
 42. INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW, No 5, 1971.
 43. See V. V. Zhurkin, "SShA i mezhdunarodno-politicheskiye krizisy" [The United States and International Political Crises], Moscow, 1975, page 66.
 44. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1975, page 48.
 45. ORDNANCE, No 290, 1968, page 126.
 46. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 1970, pp E 9213-E 9214.
 47. WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, 2 January 1970.

CONCLUSION

The development of world history in the last 80 years has convincingly confirmed Lenin's definition of imperialism as the final stage of an exploiter system which is departing from the arena of history. This process cannot be prevented by artificially stimulating market conditions, to which monopoly capital resorts from

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time to time, nor by building up military might for the purpose of "restraining" the revolutionary process, nor by wars. Plans to employ military forces as the most radical implement of policy of the imperialist nations were thwarted as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution and birth of the world's first worker and peasant state, when its military organization was created and the bourgeoisie's monopoly of military force came to an end.

Since that time imperialism has attempted, if not to restore its lost monopoly, then at least to retain military superiority over revolutionary and national-democratic forces. Following World War II, when radical changes took place in the world and a world system of socialist countries was formed, the process of changes in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of democracy and socialism took on an irreversible character. It was taking place, however, in an acute struggle against the forces of reaction and imperialism, engendering among the ruling circles of the imperialist countries an attempt to adapt to the radical changes taking place in the world and to shift to a counteroffensive from time to time. Militarism as an aggregate of the material and spiritual capabilities and aspirations of imperialism began to develop in conditions where its material foundation was constantly growing, while realistic capabilities to employ military force were diminishing.

Local wars and military conflicts after World War II assumed a number of distinctive features in comparison with past armed clashes. Remaining forms of limited armed influence by the forces of imperialism and world reaction on the processes of the revolutionary and liberation movement, they became an instrument of the global strategy of imperialist forces. At the same time their content and thrust changed radically. In the postwar period the spearhead of local armed assaults by imperialism was directed for the most part against the forces of the world revolutionary process, including against individual socialist countries.

Three historical periods can be delineated in the history of local wars and armed conflicts: the first -- from the establishment of imperialism to rupture of its general chain as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution; the second -- from the October Revolution to the end of World War II; the third -- the period of new upsurge in the revolutionary and national liberation movement and acute struggle between the two social systems following World War II.

As special studies have shown, just in these three periods imperialism has initiated or incited 259 local wars or large-scale military conflicts, including 52 during the first period, 64 in the second, and 143 in the third (see appendices 1, 2, 3). Thus over a period of almost 80 years the number of local armed clashes steadily increased. As figures for the third period indicate, however, the number appreciably dropped off beginning in the latter half of the 1960's, following the crushing military defeats of imperialism in Southeast Asia. This can only be assessed as bankruptcy of the imperialist policy "from a position of strength."

Representatives of Western militarist circles themselves are compelled to state that a policy of resolving international problems by military means does not guarantee success. "The experience of the Vietnam War," stated G. Ball, U.S. under secretary of state, "should be assessed only pessimistically. But it by no means attests to

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a decrease in our military might but rather to the fact that there are areas in the world where employment of modern weapons does not guarantee achievement of the most effective results."¹

U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger made a definite statement about the lessons of Vietnam in 1975. "Following the bitter experience of Vietnam," he acknowledged, "America has learned that it does not possess sufficient might to solve every problem and that our influence has its limits...."²

The policy "from a position of strength" in international relations, permeated by a spirit of militarism, has plunged into an acute crisis. This crisis has a broad spectrum of manifestations. It is expressed in particular in the fruitlessness of attempts by imperialism to secure military-technological superiority over the socialist countries or to exhaust them economically, and in failure of the strategy of local wars.

F. Engels drew attention to the external and internal consequences of militarism. Operation of the economic factor in the direction of bankruptcy of militarism, he pointed out, is grounded on the fact that violence is not simply a volitional act but requires quite real preconditions for its implementation, namely a certain number of artillery pieces. Building these guns costs "a devilish amount of money," which must be obtained through economic production, the capabilities of which are not limitless. Hence, he concluded, militarism contains "the seeds of its own downfall,"³ which is inevitable for the wealthiest industrially developed countries, for they alone are capable of producing the highly complex implements of war, which rapidly become obsolete, acquiring together with this a monopoly of wasting money and bringing a financial collapse ever nearer. V. I. Lenin spoke quite definitely about the inevitability of crises with the domination of monopolies as early as 1915 and persuasively demonstrated this with facts of history. In the article "Marxism and Revisionism," defending the Marxian theory of crises against attacks, he wrote that at the beginning of the 20th century "the forms, sequence, and picture of individual crises changed, but crises have remained an inevitable component part of the capitalist system."⁴

In another work, "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism," V. I. Lenin stressed that "crises of all types, and economic crises in particular, but not just these alone,"⁵ intensify the parasitic, rotting character of this system, when some of its main properties are transformed into their opposite, when features of a transition era from capitalism to a higher socioeconomic system -- socialism -- are formed and revealed along the entire line.

The crisis of the policy "from a position of strength" definitely does not signify the automatic collapse or spontaneous disintegration of the military system of imperialism, but it limits to a significant degree capabilities to employ military force.

The persistent, consistent struggle by the Soviet Union and all peace-seeking forces for détente in international relations is bringing tangible fruits in the world arena. But détente is not to the liking of many in the world of capital. Powerful, influential forces are still operating in the West, which are attempting to remake the world in conformity with their bourgeois ideals of "freedom and

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independence." These are primarily representatives of the military-industrial complex in the United States and other capitalist countries; marching shoulder to shoulder with them are the Maoists, on whom the enemies of peace and détente are now counting.

These forces embody the adventurous course of foreign policy of the imperialist powers, which is fraught with the danger of outbreak of new local wars and military conflicts. The activities of these forces have quite specific manifestations. The first is an endeavor to achieve a steady buildup of military power, in spite of a narrowing of the framework of its application, and counting on further escalation of the arms race and increasing military budgets for the sake of profit and gaining military superiority over the socialist countries. A second is maintaining a course toward dictate in foreign policy, toward the military presence of major imperialist powers in various regions of the world, and strengthening of military blocs for the sake of violent suppression of the national liberation movement and preservation of strategic positions on all continents. A third is insistence on old, fully compromised global strategy concepts and elaboration of new methods and forms of application of military force, in order to raise the degree of its "utility."

Following the crushing defeat in Vietnam, the attention of the strategists of imperialism began to be drawn to an even greater degree by Africa and the Near East. The political leaders of the imperialist countries are counting on support from the Pretoria racists, on Israel, as well as on reactionary regimes in certain Arab countries. They are offering generous support to these countries and regimes, hoping to strengthen their influence both in Africa and in the Near East, and to ignite focal points of conflict in this area, in order to achieve their imperialist goals by the hands of the Africans and Arabs. This attests to the fact that new aspects have appeared in the global strategy of imperialism, reflecting its endeavor to expand the sphere of its activities in the world.

In present-day conditions militarist circles in the imperialist countries are seeking to modernize their "base strategy" to some extent, carrying out plans of establishing military bases on sparsely-populated islands near centers of the national liberation movement. These same objectives are pursued by the policy of "remote military presence," where U.S. mobile forces on the continent and at nearby bases are kept in a state of constant readiness for swift redeployment to military conflict areas.

Recent events indicate that in the United States and certain other imperialist countries power is swinging over to those groups which would escalate the arms race and incite new military interventions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

A direct consequence of the influence of these groups, for example, is the intervention by imperialist forces in Zaire, undertaken in 1978 in response to an armed rebellion by the people of Shaba Province, as well as acts of armed provocation against Iran, aggressive actions against Afghanistan, attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, etc. As was noted on 18 January 1980 by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in replies to questions put to him by a PRAVDA correspondent, "Washington has arbitrarily appropriated to itself the 'right'

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to reward or 'punish' independent sovereign nations, and this brings up a fundamental question. By such action the U.S. Government is in fact harming the orderly international-legal system of relations between nations."⁶

The experience of local wars and military conflicts indicates that the political restrictions to which one or both warring sides are compelled to resort in armed conflicts in our time place a certain imprint on the scope of military operations, on the parameters of employment of arms, and on the very character of an armed conflict. Suffice it to say that in the largest local war in the first postwar decade -- the war in Korea -- the American aggressors, contrary to their desire, refrained from giving free play to the employment of superior military force. In the course of the war in Vietnam the United States, faced by the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people and as a result of stern warnings by the USSR, were compelled on several occasions to cease bombing innocent towns and villages in the DRV, and in the final analysis were forced to adopt a program of "Vietnamization," and following the failure of this program, to accept a peaceful settlement. The U.S. Government, with all its hatred of revolutionary Cuba, recognized the necessity in 1962 of halting aggressive actions at that perilous line beyond which the flames of a "major" war could erupt. Finally, escalation of local wars in the Near East in 1956, 1967, and 1973 was averted as a result of forced political restrictions.

Millions of people have been killed in local wars and military conflicts, and nations have sustained enormous material loss. According to incomplete figures, more than 20 million persons were killed just in the wars and conflicts of the postwar period, or twice as many as during the entire period of World War I. And armed conflicts were accompanied by an enormous quantity of so-called noncombatant casualties. Approximately 10 million persons, for example, were driven from their lands and perished during the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971.

Local wars and military conflicts of the postwar period have contained a number of unique features in a military-technical respect.

First of all this pertains to employment of military equipment and weapons. The battlefields in local wars since World War II have continued to serve as weapons proving grounds for imperialist armies. The combat equipment brought to these "proving grounds," however, was qualitatively different. The scientific and technological revolution opened up extensive capabilities to produce unprecedented means of destruction, both nuclear and improved or new nonnuclear weapons. It was these weapons (with the exception of nuclear warheads) which were the primary "test material."

The experience of local wars indicated that the following were the principal directions of development and improvement of conventional arms:

increased versatility of arms and equipment for general-purpose forces (to use the American terminology), to produce a capability of conducting military operations in conditions of nuclear and conventional warfare;

improvement of weapons quality in order to increase their combat effectiveness, to compensate for a shortage of manpower on the side of the interventionists, and to replace the morally unstable soldier of the bourgeois army with a machine;

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development of equipment promoting increased mobility of units and combined units for swift intervention in military conflicts;

creation and development of means of automating the battlefield troop control process.

The process of increasing the versatility of army, air force and navy equipment proceeded along the line of ensuring the preparedness of the war machine of the aggressive nations for actions in any situation, in any conflict at a nuclear or nonnuclear level. To achieve this, special forces (units, combined units) were designated, first of all, in each branch of the armed forces, forces designated for self-contained operations in conditions of a nuclear or conventional war, and secondly, certain types of weapons (artillery, ground forces launchers, aircraft and naval missiles and rockets) were adapted for carrying both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads.

Improvement in the qualitative level of conventional weapons proceeded in the direction of development of more effective (in terms of lethal power and destructive force) of small arms, artillery and tank armament. As a result the firepower and striking power of ground forces has increased substantially, in particular because new missile systems have undergone extensive development.

A most important direction in the technological development of the armed forces of the United States and the other NATO countries is an increase in their strategic and tactical mobility. Strategic mobility has been achieved by building large-payload ships and aircraft for rapid delivery of troops to conflict areas. Tactical mobility is achieved by building up army aviation capabilities and by building transport helicopters and helicopter gunships. Special airmobile subunits and units have played an important role in increasing troop mobility.

Local wars have had an appreciable influence on armed forces organizational structure. Under the direct influence of the experience of local wars and military conflicts, there have occurred numerous reorganizations of the armies of the leading imperialist nations, which have boiled down to adapting them to the demands both of a "major" war and of local conflicts. The specific features of combat have sometimes resulted in creation of totally new combat arms. In particular, airmobile and amphibious combined units and units, as well as special-purpose forces have been developed.

Modes of operation of air forces, air defense and naval forces of the imperialist and developing countries have undergone considerable changes. One general trend has occurred in this area of the art of warfare: a return to the synthesized practices of World War II.

Typical in this respect is employment of air forces and air defense weapons in local wars. Jet aircraft were extensively used in combat in the war in Korea. But 15 years later, in the war in Vietnam, the Americans began to employ, alongside jet aircraft, piston aircraft of World War II vintage. Army aviation was extensively used in Vietnam, which resulted in the development of such a new type of operation as the airmobile operation. Transport aviation, which handled large-scale intercontinental airlifting of troops and supplies, also experienced rapid development.

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Air force tactics were strongly influenced by the adoption of air defense antiaircraft missile systems and their technical improvement. Aggressor air forces sought and found new modes of action in the effort to penetrate air defense.

Following World War II, of all the armed services, it was perhaps the navy which most fully assimilated the experience of local wars. This happened because during all these years the navy was developing under the direct influence of the interventionist policy of imperialism. As a result, fleet organization and equipment as well as modes of action underwent frequent changes. One can state that aggressive policy dictated development of the navy as a unique means of military expansion.

The experience of local wars exerted great influence on the system of acquisition, schooling and training of military cadres. As a result of involving large quantities of personnel in combat, the imperialist countries established large reserves of military specialists with combat experience. At the same time participation by capitalist armies in fruitless, antipopular local wars and conflicts led to a sharp deterioration in the morale of officers and enlisted men. This factor was one of the main reasons for a shift to the mercenary principle in obtaining manpower for the armies of almost all major imperialist countries. As a result, déclassé elements flooded the army, individuals with extremely vague concepts of morality.

The entire experience of local wars and military conflicts initiated or incited by the forces of imperialism, attesting to the hopelessness of the policy "from a position of strength," at the same time teaches people to be vigilant in regard to the intrigues of international reaction.

FOOTNOTES

1. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1969, pp 623-624.
2. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 18 December 1978, p 842.
3. K. Marks and F. Engel's, "Soch." [Writings], Vol 20, page 175.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 17, page 21.
5. Ibid., Vol 27, page 325.
6. PRAVDA, 18 January 1980.

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